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Shanthi
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Reconciliation Between the Sinhala and Tamil Diasporas A Possibility? Research into Diasporas has been carried out mainly from a historical and sociological perspective. Very little attention has been paid to the role that diasporas can play in peacemaking and peacebuilding. As defined by Galtung, peacemaking means the search for a negotiated resolution of the perceived conflicts of interest/needs between the parties, Peacebuilding is changing structures and bringing about reconciliation between parties). There are major barriers to bring about reconciliation between the Tamil and Sinhala diasporas. But reconciliation should provide an impetus for peacemaking and peacebuilding in Sri Lanka. There are two main barriers to achieve reconciliation. First, the two diasporas remain polarised based on ethnic ideologies and sacred concepts. On the Sinhala side the concept that is non-negotiable for a resolution is that of the unitary state. On the Tamil side the concept that is sacred is self-determination and homelands. Unless there are indications that both the LTTE and the government are willing to compromise most members of the two diasporas would see attempts at reconciliation here in Australia as futile and irrelevant. Second, there is considerable resistance from the extremists of both sides. Most members of the Sinhala and Tamil diasporas who are attempting to bring about reconciliation have experienced this resistance. I argue that this is largely based on "nationalistic emotions" and the failure to look beyond the literal meaning of these sacred concepts. Tamil and Sinhala diasporas have a responsibility to work towards peace in Sri Lanka. This responsibility I believe is based on both rationality and the divinity present in all human beings. Of course we may fail. And as Gandhi said, it is not ours to determine the fruits of our actions. It is ours to trust that we may have planted some seeds on fertile ground, but we do not know when, if ever, they will be harvested. 'No matter how small a thing you do, it is very important that you do it.' This paper is based on my experiences and observations in Melbourne since 1979 and the recent attempts by the group (Shakthi) in which I am a member to establish a dialogue with the Tamil community. The paper begins with a definition of reconciliation followed by an outline of the reasons as to why the Tamil diaspora has become militant. It is argued that the failure of the Sinhala diaspora to acknowledge the grievances and bitter emotions of the Tamils and the continual use of Sinhala nationalist rhetoric has alienated even the moderate Tamils. Then I present the four essential elements of reconciliation. The militant nationalism of the LTTE is an obstacle for peace. But militant Tamil nationalism can only be understood in the context of Sinhala nationalism and the discriminatory policies by the Sinhala majority state. Reconciliation between the Sinhala and Tamil diasporas may provide an opportunity for the two diasporas to unite and work towards a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Self-determination is a basic right of the Tamil people. But it has to be negotiated with all those who are affected by the decision. Next, I provide examples of diaspora groups working for peace. The conclusion is about what we can hope from a process of reconciliation. Definition of Reconciliation The term reconciliation has no clear definition. Lack of a clear definition of reconciliation has an advantage, as the process could be adapted to suit the context. In political terms reconciliation suggests notions of equality, trust, acceptance of political and cultural differences, partnership, active friendship and mutual or joint interests. Reconciliation in spiritual terms suggests recognition of the divinity in all human beings. The goals of reconciliation are the ability to celebrate and to rise above difference and the recognition of one's social reality. Generally reconciliation is considered as a post-conflict process. But the process that I am presenting in this paper forms the foundation for changing the mindsets. The aim is for Sinhala and Tamil diasporas to accept the hurt that each has caused the other and work towards peace. I rely on the writings of Mennonite Peace activist, John Paul Lederach. His experience as a practitioner in bringing about reconciliation in many third world conflicts provides valuable insights. For Lederach reconciliation is the focus at every stage of peacebuilding. He states, Reconciliation is not limited to the period of postsettlement restoration. Rather, reconciliation is seen as providing a focus and a locus appropriate to every stage of peacebuilding and instrumental in reframing the conflict and the energies driving the conflict. Case studies of reconciliation from Northern Ireland, South Africa and Thailand provide examples of work in progress. Although reconciliation is considered at the political level, it is an individual act, experienced and practised person to person. It is the multiplication of their individual acts that bring about reconciliation between groups and communities. The Tamil diaspora Of the three million Tamils of Sri Lankan origin it is estimated that half a million live abroad. The majority of them are currently being mobilised by the LTTE to support the war effort. It was the discriminatory policies in language, education, employment, anti- Tamil pogroms, harassment by the LTTE and the government forces and economic hardships that led Tamils to emigrate from Sri Lanka. However the Tamil diaspora is not a monolithic community. It has divergent views as to how the conflict should be resolved. But what is evident is that it is the pro-LTTE groups that dominate the Tamil diaspora. Tamils who oppose the LTTE ideology and its violent campaign remain silent due to fear of ostracism and intimidation by the pro-LTTE lobby. The pro-LTTE lobby has a monopoly over opinion in the Tamil diaspora. Tamils who do not agree with the pro-LTTE ideology are considered as traitors to the Tamil struggle. Even a dialogue with the Sinhalese who are sympathetic to the Tamil cause is not acceptable to the pro-LTTE lobby. Many Sinhalese consider any attempts to reconcile with the Tamils as impossible and futile. The brutal tactics and the intransigence of the LTTE have resulted an intense antipathy if not hatred for the Tamils who are pro-LTTE by the Sinhala diaspora. But considering the realities of the conflict there is a need to suspend emotional judgement and to be clinical and empathetic and to understand scientifically the possible causes of the Tamil mindsets or "cultural lenses". How and why did a militant Tamil nationalism emerge? "Nationalism is the strong and sometimes intensely strong identification of an individual with his or her ethnic group." Nationalism can be defined in many ways. Psychologically it can be defined as, The conviction that one belongs to a certain human grouping, associated with a particular territory held together by a common history, language, customs, laws, social institutions, values, religion, ways of life, kinship and racial characteristics, which differ significantly from those of other peoples and set one apart even from neighbours who live in close geographic proximity. (Mack 1985:48) T amil nationalism cannot be seen as simply a reaction to Sinhala nationalism. Influenced by the south Indian Tamil nationalism an opposing Tamil identity existed before the conflict. But until the 1950s the Tamil political leaders considered the nation as a modern pluralistic society. It was the emergence of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism in the 1950s that triggered the formation of a Tamil identity based on a distinct Tamil identity. As Serena Tennakoon notes, the state had a pivotal role in the formation of a militant Tamil identity. The official installation and popular reaffirmation of a predominantly Sinhala Buddhist national identity and the concomitant peripherlization of minority ethnicities in both symbolic and material practice contributed to the development of a Tamil nationalist movement. According to Val Daniels an important characteristic of Tamil separatist politics is to focus on heritage rather than history. It is a claim to special Dravidian potential rather than a unique divine origin. It is a "heritage" based more on a historical consciousness of the awareness of Hinduism and the literary canon than upon specific dates and a divine perfection of the Tamil language. The projection to the past is based on an ancient kingdom. The symbol of the LTTE, a tiger is taken from the south Indian Chola Empire (850-1200 A.D). Sivaram, however, takes the view that Tamil nationalism came from south India as a result of the Dravidian nationalism of the 'Dravidian progressive Federation' or (DMK). While this movement is clearly separatist the DMK influence declined in the 1960s. The two important themes that remained from the DMK are hostility towards religion and an ideology of violence. Both these themes have been adopted by the LTTE. The militant Tamil identity of the LTTE is based on a Tamil homeland- an historical enclave going back to an ancient Tamil kingdom. Apart form a homeland, both a distinct culture and a language were attributed to the particular identity. The articulation for a separate state by the LTTE is based on political and linguistic, not on religious terms. The LTTE rejects the religious components of divisions occurring which are based on religion, caste and geographical identities. Not only is there an effort to mobilise the Sri Lankan Tamils, but also all Tamil-speaking people throughout the world. According to Coomaraswamy the discourse of Tamil nationalism "especially as expressed in certain types of expatriate literature appears to contain the same communalism as the Sinhala nationalist literature". Many moderate Tamil scholars see the Tamil nationalist writings as an attempt by the middle class expatriate population to capture momentum and give ideological direction to the Tamil nationalist movement. It was a permanent Sinhala majority, which through a series of legislative and administrative acts, ranging from standardisation of university admissions to discriminatory language and employment policies that alienated the Tamils. Protests by the Tamil politicians against the discriminatory policies were by means of either parliamentary or nonviolent means. These nonviolent protests by the Tamils led to anti-Tamil pogroms. A series of anti-Tamil pogroms in1958, 1977, 1979 and 1983 led to the feeling of fear and insecurity among the Tamils. In almost all these anti-Tamil pogroms there is evidence to establish either overt or covert involvement of the government in power. It was a period where ethno-based feeling had been motivated politically. The first anti-Tamil riots took place in 1958 as a result of nonviolent agitations by the Tamil politicians over the language issue. As noted by Purnak L.De Silva An important aspect that requires mention is the impact of inter-ethnic riots. A second wave of anti-Tamil riots were set in motion by the Sinhala mobs in 1977, 1978,1981 and 1983, which fuelled separatist conviction and fuelled the embryonic Tamil paramilitary groups. As pointed out by a number of writers to a large extent it is the anti-Tamil pogroms that galvanised the Tamils and created a conviction to the separatist struggle. There are many Tamils who left Sri Lanka as victims of these riots and who still carry bitter memories and emotions. To many Tamils it was the lack of lack of security in the South that led them to consider a separate state as the answer to their fears. It was a minority among the Sinhalese who were responsible for the anti-Tamil violence. But the governments of the day were largely responsible for instigating the violence. Why humans engage in the creation of enemies remain uncertain. What seems unlikely is that enmification is the sole source of the conflict, or even often the cause of the conflict. "It is certain that the creation of enemies is a by-product of conflict, but whether it rests at the centre is unclear". But the impact of the anti-Tamil pogroms and the failure of the Sri Lankan government to accept the Tamils grievances have made enmification easy. It is the unsatisfied Tamil needs and the Sinhala chauvinism that has formed the basis for enmification. The LTTE with its militant nationalistic rhetoric has been largely responsible for the enmification. But this enmification has been reinforced by the Sinhala nationalistic rhetoric of the government and the Sinhala diaspora. However Tamil nationalist ideology has provided the mindset needed for enmification. IT is difficult to analyse which came first, the drive to enimify or the conflict. Satisfaction of human needs such as identity and security is central to the resolution of the conflict. But even if enmification is not the cause of the conflict it certainly prolongs and presents a major obstacle to the resolution of the conflict. Understanding the processes and types of enmification is central to the resolution of conflict . The Sinhala Diaspora in Melbourne In the early 1980s there was only a small number of Sinhalese expatriates in Melbourne meant that they had no choice but to keep a low profile. But as the conflict exacerbated in Sri Lanka the Sinhalese could not escape the impact of the conflict. It was the deteriorating economic conditions as a result of the increase in defence expenditure and JVP violence that led many Sinhalese to migrate to the west. In Melbourne it was after the 1983 anti-Tamil riots that the Sinhala diaspora began to organise themselves against the Tamil diaspora. As a response to the riots number of prominent Sinhalese formed the "Organisation of Sri Lankan Overseas for National Unity" (OSLONU). The aim of this organisation was to oppose the demand for a separate state by the LTTE. The organisers invited Tamils to join them and to campaign against the division of Sri Lanka. But what shocked the Tamils and many Sinhalese was the failure of OSLONU to condemn the violence against the Tamils at home It was demeaning and an insult to Tamils to join such an organisation when there was no public statement condemning the violence against the Tamils in the south of Sri Lanka. In recent times a number of Sinhala organisations have been formed in Melbourne. Many Sinhalese find it difficult to understand or accept the causes of Tamil nationalism. Tamils are seen as a privileged minority who are now fighting for a separate state because their have lost their privileged status. But can the Sinhala diaspora ignore the grievances put forward by the Tamils? There are many Sinhala individuals and organisations that reject the claim that the Tamils have genuine grievances. For example the Australian Centre for Sri Lankan Unity (ACSLU) rejects the claim by the Tamils that they have been discriminated. Also the Society for Peace, Unity and Human Rights (SPUR) rejects the claim that Tamils have been discriminated. Alienating the Tamil diaspora by Sinhala Nationalist Rhetoric The failure to introduce effective policies and processes, which reject nationalist rhetoric and encourage peacebuilding, has meant that the government and the Sinhala diapora have alienated the Tamil diaspora. The focus of the government is rather to counter LTTE propaganda and lobby Western governments to prevent the flow of funds from the Tamil expatriates to the LTTE. By presenting LTTE as a terrorist organisation it aims to alienate the international community from the LTTE. For most Tamils the nationalist rhetoric that is emanating from the Sinhala diaspora reinforces the chauvinist Sinhala ideology. In a letter to the British Prime Minister, the UK Federation of Tamil Association states that the symbolism and the ideology of the government are evidence of continuing chauvinism. The letter goes on to state, the victory ceremony held on 6 December 1995 in Colombo after the capture of Jaffna is illustrative of the political reality of Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism. During the ceremony the deputy defence minister presented a scroll to the President that read, Your Excellency's rule and authority ahs been re-established in the historic city of 'Yapa Patuna'. Instead of using the name Jaffna the term used was 'Yapa Patuna'. It is a term used by conquerors of the northern Peninsula in medieval times. To outsider the ritual might have seemed arcane and meaningless, but to the Sinhalese who make up three-quarters of the Sri Lanka's 18 million population it has deep symbolic meaning. The use of Sinhalese-Buddhist iconography by the president carried a message that she has conquered Tamil lands and defeated her enemy in much the same manner as Sinhalese kings of centuries gone by. Language and communication are equally important in conflict and its resolution. The origin of the conflict lie in the language policy. It is the unsatisfied human needs that have lead to the conflict. But the satisfaction of these needs depends largely upon language to coordinate social activity. Nationalistic rhetoric not only alienates the Tamils but signals that the Sinhala state is continuing its chauvinist ideology and is not prepared to reconcile. John Lederach identifies truth, mercy, justice and peace as the four essential elements, which have to be present in any search for reconciliation. Lederach points out, Truth is the longing for the acknowledgment of wrong and the validation of painful loss and experiences, but it is coupled with Mercy, which articulates the need for acceptance, letting go, and a new beginning. Justice represents the search for individual and group rights for social restructuring and restitution, but it is linked with peace, which underscores the need for interdependence, wellbeing and security. (Lederach 1997:29). Truth Airing of the truth is essential to the resolution of any conflict. What is the underlying cause of the conflict? How did it start? What are the experiences of the Tamils and the Sinhalese? Truth validates memory, experience and people's reality. It brings out previously hidden events into the open and shows how people may have divergent views of the conflict. When both sides are guilty of killing and oppression, it is vital to acknowledge that this has happened. The process of truth telling can take various forms. For truth telling among the diasporas innovative methods are needed. Examples of methods that can be developed are to set up Web sites, conduct workshops, produce newsletters and use the community radios where people's experiences and feelings could be expressed. It is not enough to forgive, and air grievances by telling the truth. In order for peace to be sustainable there must be concurrent processes of justice. But for diasporas the way to achieve justice is to work towards a negotiated resolution to the conflict. Justice The Tamils demand peace with justice. The two types of justice practised after a conflict are retributive and restorative. Retributive justice is based on punishment and restorative is based on restoring the common humanity. In this paper as I am not looking at a post-conflict situation principles of restorative justice can be adopted to suit the needs of a reconciliation process among the diasporas. Restorative justice places emphasis first and foremost on restoring the humanity of the victims. It emphasises on the harm that has been done and the needs that have resulted from the harm. Restorative justice highlights the need to tackle and transform those structures and systems, which create exploitation, misery and violence. It also emphasises the obligations that follow on from violations; it encourages recognising and responding to the needs of those people who have been violated. The Tamils are demanding peace with justice. For the majority of the Tamils, the only peace that is acceptable is a recognition of the their identity and the right for self-determination. On the other hand Tamils need to recognise that they in turn have to deliver justice to Sinhalese and Muslims. For the diasporas in their search for reconciliation restorative justice means accepting the principles of justice and campaigning for them. Peace How could the diasporas work towards peace? The most effective way that the Tamil and Sinhala diaspora can work towards peace in Sri Lanka is to campaign towards a just political solution. In Sri Lanka it is the recognition of the tragic cost of the war and its futility that has given a considerable, impetus to the peace movement in the south. But as critics of the peace movement quite rightly point out, what can a peace movement achieve in Colombo? It can only mobilise Sinhala people towards peace, what about the Tamils? It has been observed that very few Tamils have participated in these demonstrations for peace. The experiences of the peace movement in Sri Lanka provide valuable insights to the thinking of Tamils on peace. Recently in Colombo a public seminar was organised by the Action Group of Tamils in Colombo (AGOTIC) on the 'Problems of the Tamils'. This seminar was well attended where there were over a dozen speakers who expressed their thoughts and emotions about the issue. For these members of the Tamil peace constituency the Sinhala peace movement has no relevance to their needs. There is a dichotomy between peace organisations in the south, which are Sinhala dominated and the civic organisations composed of Tamils such as the AGOTIC. The Sinhala dominated organisations call for peace and compromise and the Tamil organisations call for basic rights and the correction of wrongs before peace and compromise. What could the Sinhala diaspora learn from this dichotomy between the Sinhala peace organisations and the Tamil peace organisations in Sri Lanka? There are two fundamental issues that the Sinhala diaspora need to accept. First, that peace for Tamils means recognition of their rights as a 'nation' and the right to self-determination. Second, concrete and immediate steps need to be taken to alleviate the suffering of the Tamils in the north and the east. But it is the Tamil people who need to make the decision. Herbert Kelman identifies a number of criteria that need to be taken into consideration when one seeks to determine whether justice is served well or poorly by the creation of an independent state.
On the basis of the above criteria what is already evident is the unwillingness of the LTTE to provide protection to the minorities. There has been ethnic cleansing in the where Muslims and Sinhalese have been driven out of the north and the east.. While self- determination is a basic right of the Tamils, it has to be negotiated with all affected. But peace is not possible without the participation of the LTTE. However, considering the history of the LTTE there has to be a transformation of the LTTE into accepting certain democratic principles. For the LTTE leadership a relatively free democratic system of government may not be favourable. In such a system, the LTTE may actually lose the political and military power, which it currently enjoys. The LTTE has primarily consolidated the power by subverting democratic practices and suppressing criticisms. 'The LTTE will only change with internal criticism and dissent within Tamil society itself.' But for Tamils to start criticising the LTTE there have to be genuine peace proposals. For the Tamil diaspora their willingness to criticise the LTTE will only come when they see a genuine transformation and acceptance of the Tamils rights by the Sri Lankan government and the Sinhala diaspora. Reconciliation should enable a dialogue between the Sinhala and the Tamil diaspora and to deconstruct the Tamil and Sinhala myth-making and nationalist politics. The group formed was over two hundred. it met regularly to educate itself, and develop programs that could be shared with the greater community attending the forum. As a result of this effort a larger group, the Vision of peace with Justice in Israel/Palestine developed. The aim of this organisation is to work towards promoting a lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians based on mutual respect, justice and equality. They aim to create broad discussions about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with special emphasis on its root cause and the impact on daily life. Peace for them means that Jews and Palestinians share the land of Israel and Palestine and its resources acknowledging and respecting each other's rights as equal citizens and neighbours, free from violence. An organisation working for reconciliation in Australia At present there are a number of obstacles to bring about a reconciliation between the Tamil and Sinhala diasporas. The obstacles by the extremists on both sides have prevented a dialogue. On a global scale the only organisation that has attempted to foster co-operation, collaboration and unity between different ethnic groups of the Sri Lankan community in Australia is the "Friends for Peace in Sri Lanka" (FPSL) in Canberra. The FPSL was started in 1994 by a group of Australian Sinhala and Tamil professionals with the long-term objective of helping to achieve a lasting peace in Sri Lanka. FPSL believes that the Australian Sri Lankan community composed of different ethnic groups can play a significant role in achieving a negotiated settlement. "Shakthi" is a similar group that has been formed in Melbourne recently with the aim of establishing a dialogue with the Tamil community. John Galtung, "Three Approaches to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding", Essays in Peace Research, vol 2. Copenhagen, Christine Eljers,1976. John Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Tokyo, United Nations University, 1994. Sunday Times Military Column 9 June 1996. Joseph Montville, The Psychological Roots of Ethnic and Sectarian Terrorism, in V.Volkan, D.Julius and J.Montville, eds., The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, vol 1, Toranto, Lexington books, 1994,p. 165. Serena Tennakoon, "Newspaper nationalism: Sinhala Identity as a Historical Discourse", in Jonathan Spencer, ed., Sri Lanka, History and Roots of Conflict, London, Routledge, 1990,p.205. Val Daniel, "Three dispositions towards the past: one Sinhala, two Tamil", Social Analysis, vol 25,1992, pp.22-41. D.P Sivaram, "Pacifying the East", Sunday Island,21 November 1993. R. Commaraswamy, 'Nationalism: Sinhala and Tamil Myths', South Asia Bulletin vol VI no.2 fall 1986.pp.21-25. Purnak L de Silva, 'The Growth of Tamil Paramilitary Nationalism: Sinhala Chauvinism and Tamil Response, Journal of South Asia, vol, xx. 1997,pp. 97-117. Rajan Hoole and K.Sritharan, "Peace: understanding our Reality" Pravada, vol 3 no.11, march/april 1995,pp.5-9. Alan C.Tidwell, Conflict Resolved?, p.145. ibid, pp.126-145. ACSLU, "The Myth of Discrimination Against Tamils in Sri Lanka", ACSLU Publication No. 10 (Queensland 1996). See Website of SPUR "Facts about so called discrimination", www.spur.asn.au Letter to the British Prime Minister from the UK Federation of Tamil Associations, Tamil Nation, 1 February 1998. In South Africa and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established after the end of apartheid. Jehan Perera, 'Neither Peace nor Rights can be Achieved Unilaterally' Jehan@Sri Lanka.net. Sep 20 1999. Sasanak Perera, Peace, LTTE and Tamil Intellectuals. Pravada, vol.3.no 8 and 9, 1994.p.6. Website of Visions of Peace with Justice in Israel and Palestine-vopj.org/ we.are.htm. BIBILOGRAPHY A Lasting Peace for Sri Lanka? Proceedings of the workshop held on 31 August 1997, by The Friends for Peace in Sri Lanka. Burton, John. Conflict: Resolution and Prevention, New York, St Martin's Press, 1990. Burton, John, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988. Commaraswamy, R. "Nationalism: Sinhala and Tamil Myths", South Asia Bulletin vol VI no.2 fall 1986.pp.21-25. Gandhi,M. Gandhi on nonviolence, New York, New Directions, 1964. Galtung, Johan. "Three Approaches to Peace: Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peacebuilding", Essays in Peace Research, vol.2, Copenhagen, Christian Ejlers, 1976,pp. 282-304. Ghosananda, Maha, Step by Step, Berkeley. Parallex press, 1992. Hoffman, Gene Knudsen, "No Conflict, No Resolution", Journal of Humanistic Psychology, vol 29.no.3.summer, 1989.pp.361-366. Hoole, R and Srithran, K. 'Peace: Understanding our Reality, Pravada, vol 3,no.11, March/April, 1995. Kelman, Herbert. 'Negotiating national Identity and Self-Determination in Ethnic Conflict: The Choice Between Pluralism and Ethnic cleansing', Negotiation Journal, October 1997,pp.327-340. Lederach, John Paul, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, Tokyo, United Nations University, 1994. Mack, J.D. 'The psychodynamics of Victimisation among National Groups in Conflict', in V.Volkan, D.Julius and J.Montville, eds. The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, vol.1, Toranto, Lexington books, 1994,pp.119-126. Puangsuwan, Yeshua Moser, 'One Million Kilometres for Peace, Reconciliation and Hope: The Dhammayietra Movement in Thailand'.Unpublished paper Rothberg, Ronald, 'Buddhist Responses to Violence and War, Resources for a Socially Engaged Spirituality', Journal of Humanistic Psychology, vol.no.4, fall, 1992, 75-94. Sheffer, Gabriell, Modern Diaspora in International Politics, London, Croom Helm, 1994. Perera, Sasanka. 'Peace, LTTE and Tamil Intellectuals, Pravada, vol.3, no.8 & 9,1994,pp.5-8. Spencer, Jonathan.ed.Sri Lanka,History of the Roots of the Conflict, London, Routledge, 1990. Senanayka-Rajasingham, Darin. "From Ethnic Conflict to Dirty War: The Hidden Economies of Armed Conflict ", Pravada, vol 5,no.8, and 1998, pp.24-30. Spence, Rebecca. "Which way Forward? Processes of Reconciliation", A paper presented at Reconstruction, Recovery and Reconciliation in Bougainville, 1-2,Decemebr, 1998. Tidwell, Alan C. Conflict Resolved? London, Pinter, 1998. Volkan, Vamik, "An overview of psychological concepts pertinent to intraethnci and/or international Relationships", in Vamik Volkan, D.Julius and Joseph Montville, eds., The Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990.
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