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War Warning Dec. 7
in the Year of our Lord 1941

How the Pacific War started

These are some of the events leading up Dec. 7, 1941.
November 1921-Febuary 1922
Washington Naval Treaty:

April 1930
The London Naval Treaty:

September 1931
The incident at Mukden on the South Manchurian Railroad:

MAY 1932
The Japanese Prime Minister Inukai is assassinated:
Japanese prime minister Inukai Tsuyohi, who opposed the
seizure of Manchuria and growing control of the military, 
was assassinated by a group of right-wing naval officers; 
this marked the end of pre-World War II Japanese democracy 
and the triumph of militarism and fascism.

January-March 1932
Shanghai:

February 1932
Manchuria:
The Manchurian Incident of September 1931 did not fail, and 
it set the stage for the eventual military takeover of the 
Japanese government. Guandong Army conspirators blew up a 
few meters of South Manchurian Railway Company track near 
Mukden (now Shenyang), blamed it on Chinese saboteurs, and 
used the event as an excuse to seize Mukden. One month 
later, in Tokyo, military figures plotted the October 
Incident, which was aimed at setting up a national 
socialist state. The plot failed, but again the news was 
suppressed and the military perpetrators were not punished. 
Japanese forces attacked Shanghai in January 1932 on the 
pretext of Chinese resistance in Manchuria. Finding stiff 
Chinese resistance in Shanghai, the Japanese waged a three-
month undeclared war there before a truce was reached in 
March 1932. Several days later, Manchukuo was established. 
Manchukuo was a Japanese puppet state headed by the last 
Chinese emperor, Puyi, as chief executive and later 
emperor. The civilian government in Tokyo was powerless to 
prevent these military happenings. Instead of being 
condemned, the Guandong Army's actions enjoyed popular 
support back home. International reactions were extremely 
negative, however. Japan withdrew from the League of 
Nations, and the United States became increasingly hostile.

March 1933
Japan announces that it intends to leave the League of Nations:

December 1934
Japanese abrogate the Washington Naval Treaty:

April 1935
The United States passed the Neutrality Act:

February 1936
A plot by a group of younger officers to seize power in Japan fails:

November 1936
The Anti-Comintern Pact is concluded by Germany and Japan:

December 1937
The air attack on the U.S. Gunboat Panay:

November 1938
The Japanese announce the establishment of the New Order for East Asia:

July 1939
The U.S. announces it's intention to withdraw from the 1911
commercial treaty with Japan:

23 September 1939
Japan, Politics:
Admiral Nomura becomes foreign minister in General Abe's 
recently appointed government. Between now and their fall in 
January 1940 some conciliatory moves are made toward the United 
States. These are not reciprocated and this strengthens the 
beliefs and standing of the more militant Japanese politicians.

14 January 1940
Japan, Politics:
Prime Minister Abe and all his Cabinet resign and Admiral
Mittsumasa Yonai is chosen to form a new government.

1 February 1940
Japan, Politics:
A record budget is presented to the Japanese Diet. Almost half 
is to be devoted to military expenditure.

31 May 1940
United States, Politics:
President Roosevelt introduces a "billion-dollar defense 
program" which is designed to boost the United States military 
strength significantly.

13 June 1940
United States, Politics:
Roosevelt signs a new $1,300,000,000 Navy bill providing for 
much extra construction.

15 June 1940
United States, Politics:
Another Navy bill passes into law. This provides for a much
expanded air corps, with 10,000 planes and 16,000 more aircrew.

27 June 1940
Diplomatic Relations:
A confidential meeting is held between British and Australian 
representatives and the United States Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull. The British and Australians ask for help in standing up to 
Japan. They wish the USA to take economic measures or to move 
more units of the fleet to Malaysian and Philippine waters or to 
offer to mediate between China and Japan. Hull is unable to 
agree to of these moves which would involve a more active 
foreign policy than the American public is prepared to 
contemplate at this time.

1 July 1940
United States, Politics:
Roosevelt signs a further Navy bill providing for the
construction of 45 more ships and providing $550,000,000 to
finance these and other projects.

16 July 1940
Japan, Politics:
Prime Minister Yonai resigns because of military pressure and on
17 July a new Cabinet headed by Prince Konoye is appointed. 
Matsuoka is the new Foreign Minister and will be very 
influential. The Cabinet also includes a number of supporters of 
a more aggressive policy. The most important is General Tojo who 
becomes Minister of War.

19 July 1940
Unites States, Politics:
President Roosevelt signs the "Two-Ocean Navy Expansion Act". 
This order construction of 1,325,000 tons of warships and 15,000 
naval planes. Including the existing ships, the fleet will 
comprise 35 battleships, 20 carriers and 88 cruisers.

25 July 1940
United States Policy:
The United States prohibits the export of oil and metal products 
in certain categories, unless under license, to countries 
outside the Americas generally and to Britain. This move is seen 
as an anti-Japanese measure, particularly because of Japan's 
needs for foreign oil. From this time Japanese fuel stocks begin 
to decline. There are similar problems with other raw materials. 
Japanese attention is, therefore, drawn south from China to the 
resources of the Netherlands East Indies, and Malaysia.

26 July 1940
Japan, Policy:
The Japanese government formally adopts policy documents giving 
top priority to solving their China problem by blocking supplies 
reaching the Chinese through Indochina and to securing their own 
raw materials by a more aggressive stance in the Dutch East 
Indies.

1 August 1940
Japan, Politics:
A public policy declaration is made concerning Japan's support 
for a "New Order" in East Asia.

4 September 1940
United States, Policy: 
The United States warns the Japanese government against making 
aggressive moves in Indochina.

9 September 1940
United States, Politics:
A new $5,500,000,000 appropriations bill becomes law in the 
United States. Contracts are placed for 210 new vessels for he 
navy, including seven battleships and 12 carriers.

22 September 1940
Indochina:
The Japanese enter Indochina after concluding a long period of 
negotiation with the Vichy government. The Japanese aim is to 
prevent aid reaching the Chinese through Indochina. There are to 
be 6,000 troops stationed in the country and they are to have 
transit rights.

26 September 1940
United States, Policy:
An embargo is imposed on the export of all scrap iron and steel 
to Japan.

27 September 1940
Axis Diplomacy:
Germany, Italy and Japan sign an agreement promising that each 
will declare war on any third party which joins the war against 
one of the three. It is stated that this agreement dose not 
affect either Germany's or Japan's relations with the USSR. This 
treaty is known as the Tripartite Pact. All the signatories hope 
that the pact will deter the United States from joining the war 
in Europe or taking a more active line in the Far East.

5 October 1940
United States, Politics:
The Tripartite Pact is condemned by Navy Secretary Knox and he 
announces that he is calling up some of the naval reserve.

16 October 1940
United States, Home Front:
Registration begins for the draft according to the provisions of 
the Selective Service Act. The first drafts will be balloted on 
29 October.

16-19 October 1940
Diplomatic Affairs:
There are discussions between the Japanese and the authorities 
in the Dutch East Indies concerning the supply of oil. It is 
agreed to supply the Japanese with 40 percent of the production 
for the next six months. There are British attempts to block 
this agreement.

12-13 November 1940
Dutch East Indies:
Agreement are concluded between the Japanese and the principal 
oil companies whereby the Japanese are to receive 1,800,000 tons 
of oil annually from the Dutch East Indies.

30 November 1940
China, Politics:
Japan officially recognizes the puppet Nanking government led by 
President Wang Ching-wei.

10 December 1940
United States, Policy:
Roosevelt announces an extension of the export-license system. 
Iron, ore, pig iron and many important iron and steel 
manufactures are brought within the system. Like pervious 
measures this is aimed at Japan. The changes come into effect at 
the end of the year.

29 January-27 March 1941
Allied Planning:
There are secret staff talks in Washington between British and 
American representatives. They produce conclusions code named 
ABC1 which states that Allied policy in the event of war with 
Germany and Japan should be to put the defeat of Germany first. 
In March an American mission visits Britain to select sites for 
bases for naval and air forces in case of war with Germany. 
Preliminary work to equip these bases will begin later in the 
year. The talks mark an important stage in the development of 
cooperation between the US and Britain. As well as their 
important decision they accustom the staffs to working with each 
other.

1 February 1941
United States, Command:
There is a major reorganization of the US Navy. It is now to be 
formed in three fleets, the Atlantic, the Pacific and the 
Asiatic. Admiral King is appointed to command the new Atlantic 
Fleet. There is to be a significant strengthening of the forces 
in the Atlantic.

Japan, Home Front:
Japan announces that it will be necessary to introduce rice 
rationing.

13 April 1941
Diplomatic Affairs:
The USSR and Japan sign a five year Neutrality Agreement. For 
Stalin this is an invaluable piece of diplomacy which, backed by 
secret information from Soviet spies in Tokyo, will allow him to 
transfer forces from Siberia to face a possible German attack. 
These move begin now and will be particularly important during 
the final German advance on Moscow later in the year.
The agreement represents a complete change in Japanese policy 
and marks the growing concerns of the Japanese military leaders 
and statesmen to look south to the resources of the East Indies. 
The agreement has been negotiated almost alone by Foreign 
Minister Matsuoka, in Moscow on the way back from a European 
visit. Although it conform well to the other Japanese leaders' 
idea, they are upset at Matsuoka's brash and independent 
attitude.

5 June 1941
United States, Politics:
The US Army Bill for 1942 is introduced in to Congress. It calls 
for appropriations amounting to $10,400,000,000. It will be 
passed on 28 June.

2 July 1941
Japan, Policy:
An Imperial Conference (a meeting of Japanese government and 
military leaders and the Emperor to explain policy to the 
Emperor and nominally to take important decision - in fact these 
are already taken at the Liaison Conferences between the 
politicians and the military leaders) records the decision that 
attempts should be made to take bases in Indochina even at risk 
of war. The US authorities very soon know of this determination 
through their code- breaking service which has managed to work 
out the key to the major Japanese diplomatic code and some other 
minor operational codes. The information gained from the 
diplomatic code is circulated under the code name Magic.

10 July 1941
United States, Politics:
Roosevelt submits new appropriations measure to Congress. He 
asks for $4,770,000,000. for the army. On 11 July he asks for 
$3,323,000,000. for the navy and the Maritime Commission.

16-18 July 1941
Japan, Politics:
In order to remove Matsuoka from the Foreign Ministry, Prince 
Konoye resigns on the 16 July and re-forms his Cabinet on 18 
July with Baron Hiranuma as deputy prime minister and Admiral 
Toyoda as foreign minister. Already personally unpopular, 
Matsuoka is removed because he has been urging that the 
Neutrality Agreement with the Soviets should be abandoned and 
that Japan should join with Germany in the attack on the USSR. 
The other Japanese leaders do not wish to take such a decisive 
step, and have decided that without Matsuoka and his known 
liking for Hitler they have a better chance of reaching an 
agreement with the US over the pressing problem of the oil 
resources.

21 July 1941
United States, Politics:
Roosevelt asks Congress to extend the draft period from one year 
to 30 months and to make similar increases in the terms of 
service for the National Guard. These measures pass the Senate 
on 7 August and the House on 12 August only after considerable 
debate. Indeed, the Bill is only passed by one vote (203-202) in 
the House, so it would wrong to say that American political 
opinion is strongly in favor of a more militant policy at this 
stage. 

24 July 1941
Japanese Policy:
In line with the Imperial Conference decision of 2 July, the 
Japanese presented an ultimatum to the representatives of the 
Vichy government on the 19th demanding bases in southern 
Indochina. This demand is now conceded. The Japanese forces 
begin to occupy the bases on the 28th. It is very clear that the 
main use for such bases would be in an invasion of Malaya, the 
East Indies or the Philippines.

26 July 1941
Diplomatic Affairs:
Japanese assets in the United States and Britain are frozen. On 
28 July Japan retaliates with similar measures. Also on 28 July 
Japanese assets in the Dutch East Indies are frozen and oil 
deals cancelled. On 29 July Japan freezes Dutch assets. This 
means that almost 75 percent of Japan's foreign trade is at a 
standstill and that 90 percent of its oil supplies have cut-off.

Philippines:
Roosevelt orders that the Philippine army be entirely 
incorporated in to the US Army for the duration of the tension 
with Japan. General MacArthur, who has been leading the Filipino 
forces, is appointed to command the US forces in the area as 
well.

30 July 1941
China:
The US gunboat Tutiula is damaged by an attack by Japanese 
bombers in Chungking. Japan apologizes for the incident but it 
dose nothing to ease the strained relations between the two 
countries.

1 August 1941
Diplomatic Affairs:
President Roosevelt forbids the export of oil and aviation fuel 
from the United States except to Britain, the British Empire and 
the countries of the Western Hemisphere. This decision hits very 
hard indeed against Japan because Japan has no oil of her own 
and is left with only strictly limited stocks. The position is 
such that Japan must either change her foreign policy very 
radically or decide very quickly to go to war and try to gain 
access to the oil of the East Indies. Roosevelt's decision 
confirms the steps taken recently when Japanese assets were 
frozen.

6 August 1941
Diplomatic Affairs:
Konoye's government presents proposals involving some 
concessions in China and Indochina to the US, asking in return 
for the freeze on Japanese assets. The proposals are not 
acceptable to the US and when the rejection is made known to the 
Japanese they propose that Konoye and Roosevelt meet to discuss 
the issues at stake. This question is not resolved until after 
Roosevelt and Churchill meet at Placentia Bay.

9-12 August 1941
Allied Diplomacy:
Churchill and Roosevelt meet at Placentia Bay in Newfoundland. 
Both are accompanied by their military staffs. The discussions 
cover the situation in Europe and the Far East. It is agreed to 
send strong warnings to the Japanese and it is understood that 
America will almost certainly enter the war if Japan attacks 
British or Dutch possessions in the East Indies or Malaya. A 
message is also sent to Stalin, proposing a meeting in Moscow to 
make formal arrangements for the provision of supplies to the 
Soviet Union. The conference is the best remembered for the 
agreement later called the Atlantic Charter. This is a statement 
of the principles governing the policies of Britain and America 
and states that all countries should have the right to hold free 
elections and be free from foreign pressure.
  Although its noble intentions will have comparetively little 
influence on the course of the war it is important as setting 
out the reason why the United States might go to war and as a 
description of the aims of such a war.
  The conference is important also because of the opportunity it 
gives the British and American staffs to get to know each other 
and to work together. 

17 August 1941
Diplomatic Affairs:
The United States presents a formal warning to the Japanese 
along the lines agreed at Placentia Bay. The text of the note 
has been tones down somewhat from the draft orginally agreed 
with the British and Dutch, so they do not present their notes 
in order not to be seen to disagree with the American line. No 
decision has yet been taken on the Japanese proposal of a 
meeting between Roosevelt and Konoye, but on 3 September the 
Japanese will be told that it cannot take place. The Americans 
are worried that Konoye would not be able to make the Japanese 
military keep to any agreement that might be made.

2 September 1941
Naval Policy:
Adm. Yamamto unveiled his plans to attack Pearl Harbor.
An interesting note to this plan.
  General Marshall was convinced from his visit to Oahu the 
previous year that with "adequate air defenses" as he put it in 
a May 41 report to the President, "enemy carriers and escorts 
and transports will begin to come under air attack at a distance 
of 750 miles." He therefore concluded that a major attack 
against Oahu is considered impractical. This one of the reason 
that this man couldn't write his memoirs. He didn't know a damn 
thing about the Pacific.

6 September 1941
Japan, Policy:
Konoye gives in to military pressure and an Imperial Conference 
decides that, in view of the declining oil stocks, war 
preparations should be completed by mid-October and that if no 
agreement is reached by then that the decision to go to war 
should be taken. Konoye continues to make some conciliatory 
proposals to the US but is judged insincere despite the advice 
of Grew, the Ambassador in Tokyo, that if no agreement is 
reached the moderate Konoye may be replaced by a military 
dictatorship.

15 September 1941
United States, Politics:
The Attorney General rules that the Neutrality Act does not 
prevent US ships from carrying war material to British 
possessions in the Near and Far East or in the Western 
Hemisphere.

16 October 1941
Japan, Politics:
Prime Minister Konoye resigns and is replaced by War Minister 
Tojo. Tojo himself takes the offices of prime minister, war 
minister and home affairs minister. Shigenori Togo is foreign 
minister and Admiral Shimada is navy minister. These changes 
mark the increasing ascendency of the party which intends to go 
to war. The decision to go to war has not yet finally been 
taken, and it has been suggested that Tojo has taken the Home 
Affairs Ministry himself in order to be able to prevent any 
violent opposition if a decision for peace is reached.

25 October1941
War at Sea:
The British battleship Prince of Wales leaves the Clyde for the 
Far East. Admiral Phillips is aboard on the way to take command 
of the new Far East Fleet which is to be created around Prince 
of Wales. On 28 November Prince of Wales and Repulse both arrive 
at Colombo. The carrier Indomitable is intended to join them, 
but will be accidentally damaged on 3 November in the West 
Indies while training.

November 5 1941
Diplomatic Affairs:
After discussion the Japanese decide to make further peace 
attempts, setting their deadline for the end of any negotiations 
at the end of November. The terms they offer are rejected by the 
United States because they contain no repudiatio of the 
Tripartie Pact and because the Japanese intend to maintain bases 
in some parts of China. The outcome of the Japanese discussions 
and their diplomatic plans continue to be intercepted by the US 
code-breaking service

War Warnings

These failures were to become evident in the fatal calendar of 
diplomatic and military events in the final month of Pacific 
peace:
 
November 7 1941
Pearl Harbor Strike Force:
After dress rehearsal of Operation Z by the 350 aircraft flown 
from the 6 carriers of the Combined Fleet's "Strike Force," 
Admiral Yamamoto issued "Operation Order No.2" setting December 
8 as Y Day for the attack on Oahu (December 7 Hawaiian time).

November 10 1941
Washington:
Ambassador Nomura arrived at the White House to present the "A" 
Proposal for a comprehensive settlement. Knowing that the "modus 
vivendi" would be Japan's next move, Secretary of State Hull 
stalled. The President rejected an immediate reply by telling 
Nomura, "Natioons must think one hundred years ahead."

World Affairs:
In a public speech Churchill announces "that should the United 
States become involved in war with Japan, a British declaration 
of war will follow within the hour."

November 14 1941
Washington:
Secretary of State Hull rejected Tokyo's "A" Proposal. He 
insisted on the evacuation of all Japanese troops from China. 
This was a blow to Nomura, who had already mistakenly reported 
to Tokyo that the United States was "not entirely unreceptive". 
Now he had to explain they were making a demand that would be 
entirely unacceptable to the military, who had fought a four-
year war at the cost of 1 million lives to settle the national 
interest on the mainland. 

November 15 1941
Washington:
Bishop Walsh's effort to mediate was dismissed by the State 
Department as "naive." Hull concluded after meeting Kurusu that 
the new envoy was "deceitful." Magic intercepted Tokyo's message 
to Consul Kita in Honolulu ordering him to make a "ship in 
harbor" report twice weekly. (But this clue was not passed on to 
Pearl Harbor.)

November 16 1941
Pearl Harbor Strike Force:
Concealed by strict radio silence, the carriers sailed from the 
Inland Sea to avert suspicion--their destinaton remote Tankan 
Bay in the Kurile Islands. To camouflage their movements, 
Yamamoto ordered their radio call signs transferred to 
destroyers.

Washington:
Magic intercepted a cable from Tokyo to Ambassador Nomura 
advising him: "Fate of the Empire hangs by a sheer thread. . . 
please fight harder!"

November 18 1941
Pacific:
A force of 11 Japanese submarines leaves their home ports to go 
to take up stations off Hawaii or to take part in other scouting 
missions. A further nine vessels sail toward Hawaii from 
Kwajalein. 

November 20 1941
Washington:
Ambassador Nomura presented Tokyo's "B" proposal for a "modus 
vivendi" as "absolutely final." The preemptive Magic translation 
had already persuaded the Secretary of State to regard it as "an 
ultimatum." The President, however, told him to give it 
"sympathetic study."

Diplomatic Affairs:
The Japanese make proposals for an interim settlement with the 
United States. The proposal are unacceptable but Secretary Hull 
prepares a negotiating reply. this is not delivered because 
Chiang Kai-shek's government are successful in making the 
British and Dutch worried about the concessions offered to the 
Japanese in China.

November 21 1941
London:
The British Joint Intelligence Committee transmitted to its Far 
Eastern Command the assessment that if negotiation broke down, 
Japan would not attack Siberia or try to cut the Burma Road or 
invade Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies because of the 
danger of precipitating an all-out war; only a limited invasion 
of Thailand was anticipated. (The War Department, which was 
breaking the British codes as well as the Japanese, circulated a 
copy of this intelligence.

November 22 1941
Washington:
Magic intercepted Tokyo's message to Nomura that the deadline 
for negotiation had been extended four days, to November 29. 
"After that things are automatically going to happen."

Pearl Harbor Strike Force:
Waiting at Tankan Bay, Admiral Nagumo received orders to sail on 
November 26. (The signal was intercepted but in the JN25 code 
that could not be broken by U.S. Naval Intelligence.) 

November 24, 1941
Washintgton:
Magic intercepted Tokyo's clarification to Nomura that as a 
precondition to any agreement, America must cease aid to Chiang 
Kai-shek and lift the oil embargo. Hull, seeing this as a 
hardening of Japan's position, told Roosevelt that the outlook 
was "critical and virtually hopeless." The President informed 
his cabnet: "We are likely to be attacked next Monday for the 
Japs are notorious for attacking without warning." He then 
cabled Churchill: "We must all prepare for real trouble, 
possibly soon."

Manila and Hawaii:
The Chief of Naval Operations flashed warning of "SURPRISE AND 
AGGRESSIVE MOVEMENTS" by Japan. 

November 25, 1941
Washington:
The President's War Council approved the three month "modus 
vivendi" despite Roosevelt's concern about how to "maneuver 
Japan" into firing the first shot.

November 26, 1941
Pearl Harbor Strike Froce:
At dawn Admiral Nagumo's fleet put to sea, his final instruction 
from Yamamoto being: "In case negotiation with the United States 
reach a successful conclusion, the task force will immediately 
put about and return to the homeland."

Washington:
Intelligence reports that troop convoys had been sighted south 
of Formosa, apparently steaming for Indochina, were taken by the 
President as "evidence of bad faith on the part of the 
Japanese." Roosevelt, new evidence indicates, was actually 
acting on receipt of a secret leak of Japan's war plan. Hull 
accordingly was told to drop the State Department's counter- 
proposal for a "modus vivendi." to resume oil supplies "on a 
monthly basis for cilvilian needs." That afternoon the Secretary 
of State formally rejected Tokyo's "B" proposal for a temporary 
resolution of the crisis. Instead, Hull submitted a strongly 
worded document tying any relaxation of the oil embargo to the 
Japanese government's acceptance of ten specific conditions. 
These were a reiteration of the Open Door doctrine, which 
required the "withdrawal of all military, naval, air and police 
forces from China and Indochina."

Tokyo:
"This is an ultimatum," Prime Minister Tojo told his cabinet, 
having assumed the ten conditions to indicate that the American 
government was "unyielding and unbending." He saw "no glimmer of 
hope." Japanese consulates and embassies worldwide were warned 
that codes were to be destroyed when the war imminent signal was 
broadcast, hidden in the weather forecast. NIGASHI NO KESAME 
(EAST WIND RAIN) would indicate hostilities with the Unites 
States.

November 27,1941
Washington:
The Secretary of State received Hornbeck's assessment: "the 
Japanese Government dose not desire or intend or expect to have 
forthwith armed conflict with the United States." Hwe put "Odds 
of five to one that the United States will not be at 'war' on or 
before December 15." However, Hull knew otherwise, telling the 
Secretary of War he had washed his hands of it, and that it was 
now "in the hands of you and Knox- the Army and the Navy." But 
in an unprecedented move, Marshall and Stark jointly submitted a 
memorandum to the President: "If the current negotiations end 
without agreement, Japan may attack the Burma Road; Thailand; 
Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the 
Russian Maritime Provinces. . . The most essential thing now, 
from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time. Considerable 
Army and Navy reinforcements have been rushed to the Philippines 
but the desirable strength has not yet been reached." Magic 
monitoring of the weather warning code prompted an alert radioed 
to all commands: "Negotiations with Japan appear terminated. . . 
Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible 
at any moment. If hostilities CANNOT repeat CANNOT be avoided 
the United States desires Japan commit the first act."

Hawaii:
Garrison Commander General Short received the alert with the 
additional instructions: "Measures should be carried out so as 
not repeat not to alarm civil population or disclose intent." He 
therefore interpreted the whole message as a sabotage warning. 
Pacific Fleet Commander in Chief Admiral Kimmel received the 
specific alert: "This dispatch is to be considered a war 
warning. . Aggressive action expested by Japan in the next few 
days." He too believed that Hawaii was under no immediate threat 
because of the appended intelligence summary indicating that 
Japan's strike was expected to hit "Philippines, Thai or Kra 
Peninsula or Borneo."

Manila:
Appended to MacArthur's order was the instruction: "Should 
hostilties occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in 
revised RAINBOW 5." This called for him "to conduct air raids 
against enemy forces and installations within tactical operating 
radius of available bases. . ."

December 1, 1941
London:
The Admiralty ordered the battlecruiser Repulse, on passage with 
Prince of Wales to Singapore, to divert to Darwin, "to 
disconcert the Japanese and at the same time increase security."

Tokyo:
"Matters have reached the point where Japan must begin WAR with 
the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands to preserve 
her Empire." Prime Minister Tojo reluctantly advised an Imperial 
Conference. The Emperor did not dissent. To protect Operation Z, 
the Foreign Ministry agreed to present its formal rejection of 
America's conditions precisely half an hour before Pearl Harbor 
was due to be attacked. The code signals for war were flashed 
out: HINODE YAMAGATA To the Southern Army instructed the 
invasion fleets to be ready to sail on the planned schedule 
against Malaya and the Philippines. NIITAKA YAMA NOBORE (Climb 
Mount Niitaka) unleashed the Pearl Harbor Strike Force.

Washington:
Roosevelt summoned the British ambassador and informed him that 
U.S. Intelligence anticipated Malaya and Siam would be invaded. 
He assured Lord Halifax that with any attack on British or Dutch 
possessions, "we should all be in it together." 

December 2,1941
Hawaii:
The Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence Unit discovered that all 
Japanese warship call signs had been changed again. A big 
operation appeared imminent, but radio traffic and direction 
analysis of the unbroken Japanese fleet codes indicated that the 
Combined Fleet was still in the Inland Sea with only a single 
carrier as far east as the Marshall Islands. "Do you mean to say 
they could be rounding Diamond Head and you wouldn't know about 
it?" Admiral Kimmel asked, after examining his fleet 
intelligence officer's report. "I would hope they could be 
sighted before that," Captain Edwin T. Layton replied.

December 3,1941
Singapore:
H.M.S. Prince of Wales docked at the Changi naval base and 
carefully censored headlines welcome the "powerful naval force" 
defending Malaya.

Hainan Island:
The 14 Japanese transports and escorting warships of the Malayan 
invasion force sailed from Samah Bay, Hainan for the four-day 
crossing the Gulf of Thailand.

Hawaii:
Admiral Kimmel received "highly reliable information" from Naval 
Intelligence in Washington that Magic had intercepted messages 
the day before instructing all Japanese embassies to begin 
destruction of codes and sensitive documents. He had not, 
however, been forwarded two even more vital bits of evidence 
clearly indicating Japanese interest in Hawaii: the October 9 
intercept (decoded on November 24) instructing the Japanese 
Consulate to make detailed reports by dividing up the Pearl 
Harbor into alphabetically coded areas; and the November 15 
signal, decoded that very day: "As relations between Japan and 
the United States are most critical, make your ships in harbor 
report irregular, but at the rate of twice a week. Although you 
are already no doubt aware, please take care to maintain 
secrecy."

December 4,1941
Guam:
The U.S. Naval Governor was ordered to destroy all classified 
material.

Washington:
The Navy's listening post at Cheltenham Maryland picked up what 
the operator reported as the EAST WIND RAIN war warning message. 
It was apparently passed on by Commander Safford, but no action 
was taken and all copies subsequently disappeared. The grim news 
from the Pacific was temporarily eclipsed by the sensational 
exposure by the isolationist Chicago Tribune of what purported 
to be a U.S. "Victory Plan" to invade Germany in 1943.

Pearl Harbor Strike Force:
Less than 1,000 miles due north of Midway and shrouded by thick 
weather fronts, Admiral Nagumo ordered refueling before his 
course was set southeast for the run to Hawaii. 

December 5,1941
Hawaii:
The carrier LEXINGTON put to sea to ferry Marine aircraft to 
reinforce Midway for the bomber flight due in two days' time.

Manila: 
Admiral Sir Tom Phillips flew in from Singapore to ask General 
MacArthur and Admiral Hart for American air and warship support 
for his proposed foray by Force Z "against Japanese movements in 
the South China Sea." Next day, news that RAF patrols from 
Malaya had sighted a large Japanese invasion convoy heading 
across the Gulf of Siam sent Phillips flying back to Singapore 
"to be there when the war starts."

Tokyo:
Newspapers crackled with belligerent headlines: "Scandalous 
Encirclement of Japan," "Trampling on Japan's Peaceful 
Intentions," "Four Nations Simultaneously Start Military 
Preparations."

Washington:
The Japanese envoys summoned to State Department could not 
explain why large convoys were moving across South China Sea. 
The President and the Chiefs of Staff then accepted Army 
Intelligence estimates Japan would not attack the United States 
and that "the most probable line of action for Japan is the 
occupation of Thailand."

Sophocles, over twenty three centuries ago 
in his tragedy of the siege of Troy, placed 
in the mouth of Ajax:

Far-stretching, Endless time
Brings forth all hidden things,
and buries that which once did shine.
The firm resolve falters, the sacred oath is shattered;
And let none say, "It cannot happen here"

December 6,1941
Malayan Invasion Force:
South of Cape Cambodia, nineteen Japanese transports escorted by 
cruisers and destroyers were sighted through a cloudbreak by a 
Royal Australian Air Force Hudson patrolling from Kota Bharu on 
the northern Malayan coast. The pilot radioed that the convoy 
was heading east, apparently toward Thailand, before he was shot 
down.

London:
Churchill summoned the Chiefs of Staff for a crisis meeting. 
From the latest intelligence on the Japanese convoys they 
concluded: "It is not possible to tell whether they were going 
to Bangkok, to the Kra Peninsula, or whether they were just 
cruising round as a bluff." The code "Raffles" had been radioed 
out to put the entire Far East Command on war alert.

Singapore:
General Percival and his Commander in Chief spent most of the 
day debating whether to launch "Operation Matador" to send the 
11th Indian Division across the border into Thailand and 
forestall an invasion of the strategic ports of Singora and 
Patani. Air Marshal Brooke-Popham hesitated after receiving the 
cables advice of the British minister in Bangkok not to 
preemptively cross the frontier and give Japan an excuse to 
attack. Advance troops were therefore ordered only to begin 
moving up to the border, even through that evening an RAF patrol 
reported that the Japanese convoy was now less than 100 miles 
from Singora.

Pearl Harbor Strike Force:
By afternoon some 600 miles northwest of Hawaii, all hands 
cheered Admiral Yamamoto's Nelsonian signal: "The Rise or Fall 
of the Empire Depends Upon this Battle everyone will do his Duty 
with Utmost Efforts." Pearl Harbor was confirmed as the target 
for the next morning's attack, after the Japanese reconnaissance 
submarine I17 reported that the Lahaina anchorage on the 
northwest of Oahu was empty. Consul Kita's latest Hawaiian 
intelligence report, relayed from Tokyo, was that all eight 
battleships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, as well as three cruisers 
and sixteen destroyers, were in harbor, only the two carriers 
were still at sea. There was little air activity, indicating 
that "now would be a good opportunity to attack."

Washington:
The latest intelligence at 9 P.M. indicated that the Japanese 
invasion convoys were on course for Thailand. Roosevelt sent off 
a personal telegram asking the Emperor, "FOR THE SAKE OF 
HUMANITY," to intervene "TO PREVENT FURTHER DEATH AND 
DESTRUCTION IN THE WORLD." He told Eleanor wryly, "This son of 
man has just sent his final message to the son of God." He was 
back with his stamp collection, chatting with Harry Hopkins half 
an hour later when Lieutenant Commander Kramer arrived with the 
pouch containing the latest Magic intercepts of Japan's formal 
rejection of the American ten-point proposals. The President 
handed it to his aide with the comment: "THIS MEANS WAR." He 
rejected Hopkin's suggestion that America strike first. "No, we 
can't do that," Roosevelt reacted. "We are a democracy and a 
peaceful people. But we have a good record." 
He tried to reach Admiral Stark by telephone, only to learn that 
he was at a National Theater performance of The Student Prince. 
The President realized that there was after all nothing very new 
in th efirst thirteen parts of Tokyo's final communique to 
warrent alarming the audience by paging the Chief of Naval 
Operations. It was the same conclusion reached by Chief of Army 
Intelligence, who decided there was "no reason for alerting or 
waking up" General Marshall.

Formosa:
Late in the Afternoon the twenty-seven transports put out from 
the Formosan port of Takao with the 48th Division of the 
Imperial Army, to head south for the Philippines. The pilots of 
the four hundred aircraft of the Imperial Navy's 11th Air Fleet 
were briefed for the massive air assault next day to wipe out 
the American B-17 bombers on Luzon.

For everything there is an appointed time,
and there is a time for every purpose under Heaven.
A time to be Born, and a time to Die
A time to Laugh, and a time to Weep
A time for Peace, and now it is a time for War.

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