SD/TS133/A16-3
DESTROYER SQUADRON TWELVE
United States Pacific Fleet.Serial 0033
Care Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California,
November 27, 1942.
From: Commander Destroyer Squadron TWELVE.
To : Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Task Force SIXTY-SEVEN.
(2) Commander South Pacific Force.
(3) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Report of Night Action off Savo Island, November
13, 1942.
Reference: (a) Commander Task Group 67.4 dispatch 120615
of November, 1942.
(b) Commanding Officer, AARON WARD's ltr. DD483/
A16-3(1) Serial #003 of November 20, 1942.
(c) Commanding Officer, FLETCHER's ltr. DD445/
A16-3, Serial No. (S)-1 of November 15, 1942.
(d) Commanding Officer, MONSSEN's secret ltr.
of November 16, 1942.
(e) Senior Survivor, BARTON's ltr. A16-3/L11 of
November 26, 1942.
Enclosures: (A) Copy of chart showing position of AARON WARD
at 0145 and 0156 for purpose of orientation.
(B) Sketch showing approximate disposition of
own and probable enemy forces at 0145
November 13, 1942.
(C) Sketch showing approximate relative positions
of ships of this unit at the time U.S.S.
BARTON was sunk.
1. In accordance with reference (a) Commander Destroyer Squadron
TWELVE at about 1800 formed up the ARRON WARD, BARTON, MONSSEN,
and FLETCHER, and joined Task Group 67.4, forming column astern
of JUNEAU. This group was now formed in column in the
following order: CUSHING, Commander Destroyer Division TEN
aboard, LAFFEY, STERETT, O'BANNON, ATLANTA, Commander Task
Group 62.4 aboard, SAN FRANCISCO, Commander Task Group 67.4
aboard (O.T.C.), PORTLAND, HELENA, JUNEAU, ARRON WARD,
Commander Destroyer Squadron TWELVE aboard, BARTON, MONSSEN,
and FLETCHER. After forming up Task Group 67.4 proceeded out
Sealark Channel. When Task Group 67.1 was eastward of channel,
Task Group 67.4 turned to the westward and proceeded back
through Lengo Channel, and at 0125 was in column on course 280?
in approximately the position shown on Enclosure (A).
2. At about 0126 numerous radar contacts were reported. HELENA
had two contacts bearing 310? T. distance 31,900 yards. At
0127 disposition changed course to 310? T., apparently in order
to close contact. Shortly after making the course change,
HELENA reported contact bearing 310? T., 26,000 yards and
reported the enemy course 105? T., speed 23 knots. At about
0130 changed course by head of column movement to 000? T.,
speed 18 knots. At about 0130 FLETCHER had radar contact with
enemy southwest of Savo Island, approximately 20 enemy ships
visible on radar screen. At about 0140 CUSHING reported three
unidentified ships on port bow 315?-300? relative, HELENA
reported four more. CUSHING reported ships dead ahead of port
bow, at about 4,500 yards maximum. Shortly thereafter it
appears that the CUSHING changed course to about 315? T. for a
short while, and then returned to 000? T. Enclosure (B) shows
the approximate disposition of own and probable enemy forces at
approximately 0145; this being gleaned from information
available. At about 0149 an enemy ship on port beam of our
column illuminated our cruisers by searchlights. Our forces
opened fire on the enemy. Ships of this group took ships on
the port bow under fire. At about 0152 BARTON fired five
torpedoed to port, but there is no information relative to
hits. At 0153 MONSSEN fired five torpedoes to starboard,
intermediate speed, average depth 10 feet, 2 ?? unit of spread.
Two torpedo hits on target between forward superstructure and
mainmast were observed.
3. At 0155 it was necessary for AARON WARD to stop and reverse
engines to avoid collision with a ship ahead. Apparently the
JUNEAU. At 0156 BARTON, having been hit by two torpedoes, brook
in two and sank within a short time. At about this time
observed a large ship about 90? relative from AARON WARD roll
over and sink. This ship was about 1000 yards distance, and
was thought to be the JUNEAU, as the paint was approximately
the same shade as that of the JUNEAU, this however, now is
assumed to be an enemy ship. The approximate position of ships
of this unit at the time BARTON was sunk is given in Enclosure
(c). Our cruisers appeared to have turned left to about 270?
T., and were engaging heavy units ahead. Shortly after this
the FLETCHER turned left to the southward and later delivered a
torpedo attack on the enemy, details given in reference (c).
4. At about 0200 the MONSSEN was taken under heavy fire and fell
out of formation, subsequent actions given in reference (d).
5. The subsequent movements of the ARRON WARD are given in
reference (b).
6. A summary for ships of this unit is as follows:
|
ARRON WARD |
BARTON |
MONSSEN |
FLETCHER |
| Number of targets taken under fire |
4 |
1 |
? |
? |
| Number of 5"/38 Cal. Projectiles expended |
216 |
80 |
? |
? |
| Number of 20mm. Expended |
500 |
? |
? |
? |
| Number of 1.1 expended |
300 |
? |
? |
- |
| Number of targets at which torpedoes fired |
0 |
1 |
1/1 |
1 |
| Number of torpedoes expended |
- |
5 |
5/5 |
10 |
| Number of torpedoe hits obtained (estimated) |
- |
? |
2/1(?) |
2-3 |
| Number of torpedoe hits sustained |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
| Number of shell hits sustained |
2-8"
4-5"
3-14" |
? |
37 |
0 |
| Number of dead |
15 |
210 |
140 |
0 |
| Number of wounded |
57 |
- |
- |
0 |
7. Special comments on enemy forces:
(a) It is believed that the enemy forces comprised of
destroyers, cruiser, and battleships. This assumption is
based on tie fact that hits received on AARON WARD were
from 5", 8" and 14" caliber shells.
(b) The enemy used blinker tubes, and clusters of lights on
the foremasts for recognition purposes.
(c) No smoke was used.
(d) The enemy's gunnery appeared to be fairly effective.
However, they appeared to have considerable difficulty in
locating and identifying targets. Star shell control
appeared effective. It is believed that bombardment
projectiles were used. Apparently no delay action fuses
were employed.
(e) It is difficult to make an accurate estimate of damage
inflicted on the enemy. However, from reports submitted in
references (b), (c), (d), and (e), it appears that tin
following damage was inflicted on the enemy by vessels of
this units
SUNK
1 large Destroyer or Cruiser of the KATORI Class
(gunfire).
1 "MAYA" type cruiser (Torpedoes).
DAMAGED
2 Destroyers. Started fires on one destroyer, and fires and
small explosions on another (Gunfire).
1 TENYRU or NATORI class cruiser reported hit heavily damaged .
and sunk (Possible).
1 Battleship. Two torpedo hits on "KONGO" type battleship
(Possible)
8. Special comments on own forces:
(a) Our own forces consisted of eight destroyers, two heavy
cruisers, and three light cruisers. Own forces disposed in
single column, making 18 knots. Just prior to opening fire
an order was received for our forces to come to course
000? T. After the battle started it was pretty much a
matter of every ship for itself.
(b) Communication:
T.B.S. was need to transmit battle orders. Four
combinations for fighting lights were seen, three
combination of which one observer believed to be on U.S.
Ships. The confusion in the fleet regarding fighting
lights combinations is very serious. It has resulted from
the use of CSP 1102 (soon to be eliminated), and from the
fact that special combinations have been prescrbed at
various times.
(c) Effectiveness of Gunnery:
Considered that gunnery was most effective, both main and
machine gun battery, and torpedo battery. No material or
training deficiencies were noted. Fire discipline was
excellent, and the fire control communications observed by
the Squadron Commander in AARON WARD was excellent.
(d) Pertinent comments on Engineering are covered thoroughly
in reference (b), which are concurred in.
9. Lessons learned and recommendations:
That the importance of careful study of own and enemy ship
silhouettes cannot be too strongly emphasized.
That too much despondence on T.B.S. is not wise. It is
recommended that authenticators be provided for use on valid
circuits if it is suspected that the enemy is practicing
deception.
A voice circuit in the 3,000-7,000 KC band should be provided
for use in the event of T.B.S. failure. A voice circuit in the
3,000-7,000 KC band should be used for tactical purposes when
there is a possibility of engaging the enemy. An intercepted
T.B.S. transmission may warn the Japanese that an American
force is very near (within approximately fifteen miles), and
therefore continued use of the T.B.S. will soon render it
impossible to catch the Japs by surprise.
Several enemy targets were identified by the AARON WARD by
means of their use of identification lights. These lights must
be used with utmost discretion.
R. G. TOBIN
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