Communication
under Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights
Date: 14 November 2004
N.B.
1. Terms indicating the male sex are intended in this document to include
the female sex, unless the context indicates otherwise.
2. References to "disputes" includes both civil matters and
criminal cases -- in particular, criminal cases where the complainant
and the accused person are of different sexes.
I. Information on the complainant:
Name: Zohrab……… First name(s): Peter Douglas………….
Nationality: New Zealand………
Date and place of birth: 02 December 1949, Moscow, Russia/USSR.
Address for correspondence on this complaint:
74 Wellington Road, Wainuiomata, Lower Hutt 6008, New Zealand.
Submitting the communication on my own behalf, and also, being myself
a man, as a class action on behalf of the men of New Zealand.
I consider it appropriate to bring this complaint on their behalf because:
I am the person in New Zealand -- if not internationally -- who best
understands the combination of legal and Men's Rights issues involved;
It is the men of New Zealand as a whole whom I wished to help by the
action which I was prevented from carrying out, and it was the fact
of being prevented from carrying out that action that led to this complaint.
I am a law student who may want to, or may actually work as a Men's
Rights lawyer, and having a New Zealand judiciary which is indoctrinated
against men by the Institute
of Judicial Studies (IJS) will prejudice the interests of my clients
and make my work harder, or even impossible, and tend to dissuade me
from in fact taking up that calling.
I understand that the Human Rights Committee holds its sessions behind
closed doors. Since open justice is itself regarded as a right under
the ICCPR, I find that somewhat disturbing. My complaint is against
the Feminism-inspired bias of the educational section of the Judicial
branch of the New Zealand government, which no doubt shares some basic
philosophical attitudes with the international judicial fraternity/sorority,
from which the Committee's members are drawn. I am also aware of the
influence of Feminism, together with its unproven, anti-male assumptions,
in many international organisations, including agencies of the United
Nations.
Since my complaint is against the Judicial, and not the Executive branch
of the New Zealand Government, I assume that the Human Rights Commitee
will not, as individuals, have to fear any sort of retribution, as might
have been the case if my complaint had been against the Executive branch
of a powerful country.
I therefore declare that I have an interest in my complaint being heard
in open court, if possible.
II. State concerned & Articles violated
Name of the State that is a party to the Optional Protocol: New Zealand.
Articles of the Covenant alleged to have been violated:
Articles 2, 3, 5, 14, 25, and 26
III. Exhaustion of domestic remedies & Application to other international
procedures
I have not exhausted these remedies, on the basis that they are not
available to me. The reason for this is that my complaint is against
the IJS, which is a body which is controlled mostly by the Judiciary,
with some influence from the Executive as well.
According to the Memorandum of Understanding under which it was founded,
the Board (apart from any co-opted members) consists of:
1. the Chief Justice or his or her nominee;
2. the President of the Court of Appeal or his or her nominee;
3. one Judge from the High Court;
4. the Chief District Court Judge or his or her nominee;
5. one Judge from the District Court;
6. the Chief Executive Officer of the Department for Courts or his or
her nominee;
7. one senior practitioner;
8. one academic; and
9. one member of the community.
I submit that for me to apply to a New Zealand Court for review of
their decision would be a situation where the judge deciding my case
would appear to a reasonable observer to be biased. Nemo iudex in sua
propria causa, as the maxim goes. Such a judge would appear indeed to
be a judge in his own case. In addition to the fact that his own thinking
would probably have been influenced directly by the Institute in particular
and by his judicial colleagues in general, a reasonable observer would
also surely doubt that he would be keen to pronounce an unfavourable
judgement on the most senior judges in the country.
The Privy Council in the apparent judicial bias case Man O'War Station
Ltd v Auckland City Council [2002] UKPC 28, 577 stated:
The test that "The question is whether the fair-minded and informed
observer, having considered the facts, would conclude that there was
a real possibility that the tribunal was biased" is consistent
with European and Scottish jurisprudence, and broadly in line with Australian
jurisprudence.
I consider that, on this test, I have no chance of a fair hearing in
New Zealand of a case against the Institute of Judicial Studies, because
of apparent bias..
Therefore I consider that I have no judicial remedies within New Zealand.
I have not submitted the same matter for examination under any other
procedure of international investigation or settlement.
IV. Facts of the complaint
a) The facts and circumstances of the violations, in chronological
order, including a summary of the main points mentioned in correspondence.
I have been a Men's Rights activist since 1987, and I am now a Law
student, although at the start of the incidents relevant to my complaint
I was a secondary (high school) teacher (teaching by correspondence).
My complaint relates to the oppression of men by the training organisation
of the New Zealand Justice System, and I enclose a copy of my book,
Sex, Lies & Feminism, and other examples of my writings on relevant
issues, so that you know I have researched the topic thoroughly, and
that I have written academic refutations of Feminist ideology. The book
has had a very favourable review in a Men's Rights periodical, which
you can see on the webpages listed below, and you can also see other
examples of my writings on similar topics in the "Issues"
sections of the the listed websites.
Here is an extract from the above-mentioned review:
Sex, Lies & Feminism is one of those rare books that instantly
reads like a movement classic.... Zohrab's intellect and knack for fresh
re-examination ... had me turning the pages almost as raptly as if I
were reading a novel.... A book that can actually get the reader to
develop or expand useful new modes of thought is rare indeed."
My authority to speak on such issues is central to my complaint, so
I request that you read the book, which is also available for free on
the World Wide Web at the following pages:
http://www.geocities.com/nzequality/contents.html
http://www.geocities.com/peterzohrab/contents.html
http://members.fortunecity.com/rightsofman/contents.html
http://peterzohrab.tripod.com/contents.html
http://nzmera.orcon.net.nz/contents.html
http://www.angelfire.com/pe/terzohrab/contents.html
http://equality.netfirms.com/contents.html
It is considered a truism in the international Men's/Fathers' Movement
that legal systems are biased against men, and my book (written before
I began my legal studies) is perhaps the clearest -- though incomplete
-- exposition of why this is so. Being a Law student has now allowed
me not only to deepen my understanding of the causes of this bias, but
also to confront it and combat it. In addition, I think I have now found
the root cause of this legal bias against men, which I discuss below
in the context of the legal culture of New Zealand.
I refer you to the References section of my book for other writings
from a similar perspective.
(i) What is Feminism ?
As I write these words, I imagine you thinking that Feminism is about
equality or equity between men and women, that this is not an ideology,
and -- even if it is an ideology -- it is a Human Rights issue, which
all judges must be bound to uphold. That is why I ask you to read my
book.
Feminists define "equality" and/or "equity" as
they see fit, and I am sure you understand that there is a lot of scope
for differences of opinion as regards those definitions. Moreover, Feminists
themselves select the issues to which they demand that their definition
of "equality" or "equity" be applied, and I am sure
you understand that there might be lots of other issues to which they
might not be so eager that those terms were applied. In addition, there
is no body which has the role or power to insist that the same definition
of "equality" or "equity" is applied to all those
issues, which means that Feminists are free to apply different definitions
to different issues, as seems convenient to them.
Feminist methodology typically involves -- as in the case of the IJS
-- either excluding all men, or excluding men who represent Men's Rights,
from meetings and processes having to do with forming conclusions, making
decisions, or disseminating information about equality or equity between
men and women. This is procedurally unfair and a breach of men's Human
Rights.
(ii) The Frontman Fallacy
Feminists obviously must give grounds for doing this. Another reason
for you to read my book is that simplistic arithmetic is the basic reason
why they are allowed to get away with this breach of natural justice.
Feminists have counted the number of men in decision-making positions
and found that this number is greater than that of the number of women
in decision-making positions. From this they have concluded, in a quasi-Marxist
manner -- without ever having demonstrated it to be a fact -- that men
have been using these positions to oppress or disadvantage women (relatively
to men).
However, they have never done an analysis of the disadvantages that
men have suffered in male-dominated societies, compared to women. In
the absence of such analysis, Feminists' focus on the supposed disadvantages
that women have suffered from lacks any reference-point. The Feminist
case, after all, is not that being in decision-making positions per
se is a human right -- their point is that groups who are not in such
positions in sufficient numbers suffer as a consequence of the decisions
that are made. As my book points out, this may be true for ethnic groups,
but it has not been demonstrated to be the case for men and women, because
men have often been paternalistic and chivalrous in exercising their
powers -- often disadvantaging men, in comparison to women.
Feminists never articulate the Frontman Fallacy in an intelligent manner,
so as to make it possible to determine at what point a country or institution
crosses the threshhold from "Patriarchy" to "Gender Equality"
or "Gender Equity" or even to Matriarchy. This is particularly
relevant in New Zealand, as we have a female Prime Minister, a female
Governor-General, a female Chief Justice and a female Attorney-General.
At what point is one, according to Feminism, supposed to say that men
have ceased to rule the country, or to dominate the justice system ?
Feminism, being basically incoherent, gives no answer to this question.
This is relevant in connection with the IJS policy on teaching Gender
Equity, since it seems to involve an assumption that this policy is
necessary to correct some imbalance in society, or in the justice system.
How does one estimate the size of this problem -- or even establish
its existence -- when opposing points of view are censored by the IJS
?
(iii) Events in Sequence
As soon as I became aware that New Zealand had acquired an IJS, I realised
that it was a potential means by which bias against men in the Legal
System would be increased. The Institute's Statement of Purpose (on
page 4 of its 1998-2001 Strategic Plan) reads as follows:
"The IJS ("the Institute") is the continuing education
arm of the New Zealand Judiciary.
The Institute will provide education programmes and services to the
Judiciary which:
assist professional development;
promote judicial excellence; and
foster an awareness of developments in the law, judicial administration
and the social context of the law."
I wrote to the Minister for Courts on 22 February 1999 to find out
what outside groups would have input into its processes. I have enclosed
copies of almost all the correspondence I refer to (I have been unable
to find copies of some of the correspondence I sent). The reply I received
(from the IJS itself), dated 24 May 1999, was not very informative,
so I eventually wrote a follow-up letter on 12 October 2001. I am active
in regard to a lot of Men's Rights issues, so the long interval between
24 May 1999 and 21 October 2001 was probably caused by my being involved
with other issues, which I rated as more important at the time.
In their reply of 23 October 2001, the Institute replied as follows:
"I refer to your letter of 12 October 2001.
The Institute has not organised any visits to the groups you mention
(i.e. "Men's groups, fathers' groups and women's groups, including
Women's Refuges and Rape Crisis -- P.Z.), nor has it hosted meetings
with any of those groups.
Thank you for your offer to meet but I am unable to assist you. This
is because the independence of the judiciary is an important principle
of the New Zealand constitution and as such freedom from political lobbying
ensures that the judicial process remains free from political interference
of any kind."
It is significant, in view of subsequent events, that
1. the letter denies any visits to or meetings with Women's Refuges,
and that
2. emphasis is laid on the need for freedom from political lobbying
and from political interference.
On 16 November 2001, the Institute replied (probably to another letter
from me), answering some of my questions. I quote the most significant
excerpt from this letter below:
"Each year the Institute involves experts in law and related areas,
usually academics or senior practitioners, to assist in the development
of programmes targeted at the judiciaries' (sic) professional development
requirements. There is no contact between the Institute and groups who
have aims targeted at legislative change, who are best advised to direct
their inquiries to government."
I wrote to the Institute by email on 16 December 2001, pointing out
(amongst other things) that their distinction between "academics"
and "groups who have aims targeted at legislative change"
was an artificial one, since academics are, in many cases, known to
espouse and promote legislative change -- which I indeed later experienced,
at first hand, to be the case, while studying Law.
In addition, I focused on the teaching of so-called "Gender Equity"
at the Institute, and asked the Institute to tell me who had been the
presenters on this topic.
Thre was a long delay, so I contacted the office of the Ombudsmen by
email on 6 February 2002, and complained about not having received a
reply from the Institute. Eventually, on 11 February 2002, I received
a letter from the Institute, answering my question.
By email on 15 February, I applied (amongst other things) to give a
presentation on Gender Equity, to counter the presentations on that
topic which the Institute had had from people who were obviously Feminists.
This application was acknowledged in a letter from the Institute dated
25 March 2002, and eventually rejected in a letter from the Institute
dated 14 October 2002.
It is that rejection that I am complaining about in this Communication
to the Human Rights Committee. I am not complaining about their refusal
to appoint me as Community Representative on the Board of the Institute,
which is another application that I made at the same time.
b) How I consider that the facts and circumstances described violate
my/our rights (General).
(i) The Decision to Teach only the Feminist Approach to "Gender
Equity"
The IJS, in the period covered by the 2002-2003 Annual Report, included
a "Gender Equity Consulting Group" as one of its "Education
Committees", which means that the Institute is committed to "Gender
Equity" at a deeper level than might appear to be the case just
from their decision to have Feminists come and teach them about the
notion. The Gender Equity Consulting Group during that period comprised
two female judges.
I cannot see that the decision to set up such a Group can be described
as anything other than political, and the question arises, where does
the Institute acquire their authority to commit themselves to this notion
of "Gender Equity"? Being a political notion, it is in fact
an ideology.
Moreover, since this Group is listed under the heading "Education
Committees", it is clear that the Institute's aim is to teach (or
one could use the word "indoctrinate") judges an ideology.
Again I ask, where does the Institute acquire its authority to do this
?
Apart from arguing that the Institute is illegally indoctrinating judges
in an ideology, I am also arguing that there is no independent audit
as to the intellectual standard, validity or fairness of the content
that is being taught, and that the content of the ideology is in fact
the opposite of what it claims to be. Instead of truly being "Gender
Equity", this ideology is in fact (female) "Gender Supremacy",
which does not even attempt to examine any issue from a male point of
view. It is based on mere assumptions that are at the very least unproven
and actually (I submit) totally untrue.
If the I.J.S. takes the Feminist stance (which they probably do) that
"Gender Equity" involves
providing a "woman's" point of view which the mainly male
judges are not aware of, they have the
onus of proving:
that the people they chose to teach them "Gender Equity" have
the magical ability to discern what
this point of view is -- in other words, that they represent all women,
rather than just themselves;
that the male justices have not been influenced by the decades of pro-female
and anti-male
propaganda that has been issuing (with little counter-argument) from
our universities and media; and
that male judges have ever, in actual fact, taken a pro-male stance
(on balance), as opposed to a
pro-female stance.
(ii) Possible Bad Faith
The IJS stated that "freedom from political lobbying ensures that
the judicial process remains free from political interference of any
kind," (in its letter of 23 October 2001, quoted above) and it
stated that " [t]here is no contact between the Institute and groups
who have aims targeted at legislative change," (in its letter of
16 November 2001).
However, the "Non judge presenters" on the topic of "gender
equity" (according to its letter of 11 Febraury 2002) included
Maria Bradshaw, who has the same name as someone who is identified on
the webpage http://www.themilitant.com/1996/6042/6042_12.html (last
accessed on 30 August 2004) as "a spokesperson for the National
Collective of Women's Refuges." From my perspective, there is no
doubt that the National Collective of Women's Refuges is, in fact, an
organisation that is routinely involved in political lobbying and is
a group who has aims targeted at legislative change. The fact that it
has probably already achieved many of its aims by lobbying for legislative
change (viz the Domestic Violence Act 1995), which means that it may
not be so active a lobbyist as it was in the past, is not relevant in
this context. Nor is the fact that Maria Bradshaw might or might not
have ceased being a spokesperson for that organisation at the time she
was invited by the IJS relevant in this context. I regard the National
Collective of Women's Refuges as the organisation that is perhaps the
most active in oppressing men in New Zealand today.
Similarly, Joy Liddicoat (a non-judge presenter) has the same name as
someone who received a grant from the NZ Law Foundation to publish the
"Feminist Law Review", according to the webpage: http://www.lawfoundation.org.nz/grants/research-legal.htm.
In view of those facts, I have severe doubts about the good faith of
the Institute in its communications with me. New Zealand has a population
of just four million people, and there is little doubt in my mind that
there can only be one person of that name in New Zealand who is active
in the area of gender and domestic violence."
Moreover, I had to use the Ombudsmen's Office and the Official Information
Act, in order to force the Institute to supply information about the
identity of the presenters. The Institute later claimed that it had
never received my email requesting the information !
Developed countries such as New Zealand do not, to my knowledge, admit
to having a state ideology. Nevertheless, promoting Feminism is now
a part of United States foreign policy, and the United States Embassy
has refused to state whether this amounts to an "ideology",
as far as it is concerned. There seems to be a lack of intelligent thought
on this issue. Either one has an ideology, in which case one pursues
certain policy goals which flow from that ideology, or one does not
have an ideology, and therefore does not pursue policy goals which appear
to flow from an ideology.
Similarly, the IJS, like New Zealand society generally, seems to operate
under a de facto Feminist ideology. Why else would they refuse even
to give me a hearing ? If they define "the social context of the
law" (as per their Statement of Purpose, quoted above) in such
a way as to include the viewpoint on "gender equity" of a
Feminist, but so as to exclude the view of a Masculinist on that topic,
they are obviously determined to hear only views with which they agree.
(iii) The Legal Culture of New Zealand
My point is not that there is a lot that is wrong with the preoccupation
with Human Rights that typifies the New Zealand legal system -- my point
is that this preoccupation expresses itself as a list of categories
of people who are deserving of particular deference, on the grounds
that they have historically been discriminated against. This list relevantly
includes women (but not men), and operates at the emotional level in
the minds of the majority of participants in the legal system. This
list operates as a rigid ideology, which categorises men as oppressors
by default. See the webpage: http://nzmera.orcon.net.nz/alqaedaw.html
.
On September 1st 2004, I heard New Zealand's Principal Family Court
Judge, Judge Peter Boshier, give a lecture at Victoria University of
Wellington. He started his lecture by referring to a stereotype (though
he did not use the word "stereotype", as I recall) of judges
being male, elderly and wearing pin-striped trousers.
It is clear that he was taking the Frontman Fallacy at face value --
acknowledging it, although not necessarily subscribing to it. But my
point is that he referred to it right at the start of his lecture. That
shows what political considerations are at the forefront of his mind.
The frequent allegations of Family Court bias against men, on the other
hand, were not mentioned by him, although they are mentioned (for example)
on page 199 of the Law Commission's Report 82 on Dispute Resolution
in the Family Court (2003).
In her Introduction to the New Zealand Law Commission's Preliminary
Paper 47, a discussion paper on Family Court Dispute Resolution (2002),
Ms Vivienne Ulrich QC (as she then was) states: "... we consider
that it is important that we understand where we have come from ....
remember the days pre-1980 when it was deemed essential for lady petitioners
to wear a hat and gloves to the High Court...."
The Law Commission's reference (above) to constraints on women made
no reference to any (possibly much more severe) constraints on men --
such as social pressures to volunteer for combat in wartime. It also
took a historicist approach, according to which modern society is seen
as having "progressed", i.e. improved on past social mores.
See also my webpages http://nzmera.orcon.net.nz/famlawls.html and http://nzmera.orcon.net.nz/famsecrt.html
, which discuss legal bias in New Zealand Family Law.
I have taken a course on Jurisprudence, which includes Feminist Jurisprudence.
When the lecturer gave his one lecture on Feminist Jurisprudence, he
more or less apologised for being male -- as if a woman would be more
appropriate to speak on that topic. He also stated that issues such
as domestic violence and rape were (exclusively) women's issues, which
is a more obvious example of the mentality that I wish to discuss.
The lecturer who apologised for being a man when discussing Feminist
Jurisprudence epitomises the approach in my Law Faculty, according to
which topics in which Feminists have claimed to have an interest are
seen as most properly dealt with by female lecturers -- even though
there clearly would be distinct male viewpoints, if the intellectual
atmosphere was such as to encourage them to be heard.
The textbook (Mark Henaghan and Bill Atkin (eds.) Family Law Policy
in New Zealand Wellington: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd Edition 2002)
for my Family Law course (at Victoria University of Wellington) contains
chapters by four males and five females -- some of whom co-wrote chapters.
The author of Chapter Seven, Professor Mark Henaghan, starts that chapter
with a quotation about bias from Feminist writer, Simone de Beauvoir,
and states (on page 245): "I am also a man; I hope I can overcome
that bias, but that is for the reader to assess." No other author
in that book apologises for being a man or a woman. In fact, it is inconceivable
that the book could have contained an apology of that sort from a woman
for being female, or a quotation from a Masculinist book.
One lecturer, who taught about the law of personal property, included
at the start of his teaching materials a short excerpt from a book on
Feminism which had to do with how studying Law can warp your mind !
He did not refer to it in class, and I consider that he included it
purely as a sop to his many militantly Feminist students.
Another lecturer, who taught me aspects of Contract Law, included in
one of his lectures a derogatory remark about his inability to do more
than one thing at a time, because he was male. It is inconceivable that
a female lecturer there would make a derogatory remark about her being
female, and I am sure that he did that, again, as a sop to the militant
feminists (i.e. Female Supremacists) in the class.
Feminists (as opposed to Masculinists) are organised, and practice
intimidation in the Law Faculty and -- I would assume -- in the wider
legal fraternity. See my webpage: http://nzmera.orcon.net.nz/femlawst.html
.
In section IV (a) (above), I said I thought I had found the root cause
of anti-male bias in the justice system. That root cause, I believe,
is a combination of chivalry (in conservative males) and Feminism (in
leftist males and females). That is what motivates the IJS in its policy
on the teaching of Gender Equity. The IJS treats (aspects of) Feminism
not just as an academic theory amongst others, but as the true ideology
that must guide its work.
(iv) How Feminists approach the topic of "Gender Equity"
On 14 November 2004, I did a search with the Google search engine on
the World Wide Web for the term "definition of Gender Equity"
(with quotation marks), excluding the term "education", so
as to get a wide spread of topics. I will discuss here the top five
results which I obtained, which were (ignoring the second page of two
that were listed from site no. 1):
http://www2.edc.org/WomensEquity/edequity96/0371.html
http://www.marquette.edu/genderequity/introduction/deans.html
http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/2003doc.nsf/43bb6130e5e86e5fc12569fa005d004c/598468eaedecad2dc1256cfa0057d0c8/$FILE/JT00141863.DOC
http://www.gsmt.org/resources_GSMTpatchprograms.shtml
http://www.city.toronto.on.ca/audit/1999/041399.pdf
Site no. 1 does not provide a concise definition. Its nearest approach
to a definition is as follows:
Equity emphasizes fairness in process and outcome, and does not presume
a hypothetical ideal and undifferentiated individual. Simple 'equality'
as a concept does not recognize the very different conditions under
which people attempt to live and work in society, the prejudices, the
failures to take into account the obstacles which others face, the subtle
and gross ways in which people are rendered invisible, silent or outsiders.
On its face, that approach lends itself, potentially, to being applied
to almost any subgroup of human society -- yet the only example given
on that page is of problems allegedly faced by girls in schools.
Site no. 2 only mentions definitions of Gender Equity in the context
of a suggestion that a definition be provided -- indicating that the
Gender Equity Task Force mentioned on that page had gone about its work
without the aid of any such definition ! The intellectual incompetence
of Feminists is a central feature of my criticism of Feminism, and this
page serves to highlight it. I am not confident that IJS instructors
would be any more competent that this.
Again, the focus is on women, though minorities do get a (somewhat
irrelevant) mention.
Site no. 3 has only the following to say about defining Gender Equity:
Between 40 to 60 per cent representation of each sex is the usual operational
definition of gender equity.
This is obviously a pragmatic, rather than a theoretical definition,
and it is hard to see how it differs from the notion of "equality
of outcomes". However, the focus is again on women -- this time,
in the context of employment policies.
Site no. 4 does not itself define Gender Equity, but it links to the
page http://www.gsmt.org/pdfs/gender_equity_JB.pdf
which defines it as follows:
Gender equity is an equal chance for females and males at:
-Learning, regardless of the subject
-Preparing for future education, jobs, careers
-High expectations
-Developing, achieving and learning
-Equitable treatment and outcomes in school and beyond
This is a Girl Scouts site, replete with female symbols, and the focus
is purely and simply on females.
Site no. 5 only mentions defining Gender Equity in the context of a
recommendation that a complete definition be provided ! And, once again,
the focus is entirely on women.
This is, admittedly, a small survey, but it is much better than a random
survey, since the Google search engines ranks sites in terms of their
popularity. This means that those five sites are the most popular sites
(for some technical definition of "popular") that conform
to my search terms.
In that context, it is outrageous, I submit, that only one of them
actually provides a concise theoretical definition of this important
term, based on which a lot of decisions (often impacting negatively
on men's careers) are taken. Two of the sites only mention defining
it in the context of a lack of an adequate definition. One provides
a merely "operational" definition (implying, perhaps, that
nothing better is available), and one provides a somewhat wordy characterisation
of the meaning of the term.
In addition, all of them focus on female needs, and do not even hint
at the possibility that men might be deserving of gender equity in any
respect whatsoever.
I feel justified in concluding that the type of "Gender Equity"
which the IJS is being taught is also probably both sexist (i.e. it
ignores men's needs and perspectives) and also incompetent (i.e. lacking
any adequate definition).
(v) How a Masculinist might approach the topic of "Gender Equity"
Men's Rights/Masculinism is a relatively new field of inquiry, and
it is routinely discriminated against in the academic world, because
it is seen as undermining Feminism. Consequently, very little research
has been done in this area. However, here is a list of some areas that
a Masculinist approach to Gender Equity might focus on:
child custody decisions by courts
court enforcement of parental access to children
police and court attitudes to sexual abuse by females
police and court attitudes to domestic violence by females
eliminating statutory offences which only males can commit
equalising the sentences imposed on men, as compared to women, for the
same offences
equalising the male and female prison populations
reversing the trend to decriminalise female-only crimes
reversing the trend to increase the penalties for male-only crimes
police attitudes to prosecuting women for false accusations made against
men
men being used as "support objects" by women
women living off the criminal earnings of men but not being prosecuted
as accessories
equal rights for fathers in decisions as to abortion
linkage between child-support and access arrangements
laws and court procedures in relation to rape and sexual violation
My book discusses issues such as these in more detail.
The relevant point here is that the IJS has refused to allow me to
talk to them about these sorts of issues, and they will certainly not
have heard about them, in the context of Gender Equity, from any other
source.
(vi) The Frontman Fallacy and Affirmative Action
Feminists, having got the legal system to accept the Frontman Fallacy
thesis that the legal system has been run by men in the interests of
men, have also been in the process of turning it into a female-dominated
institution.
The IJS was founded in 1998. Since 1999, according to the webpage http://www.justice.govt.nz/courts/chief_justice.html
, New Zealand has had a female Chief Justice: Dame Sian Elias. New Zealand
has also had only female Prime Ministers since 1997, according to the
webpage: http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/Gallery/parlt-hist/mps-women.html
. The Attorney-General is also a woman: Margaret Wilson, as is the Governor-General:
Dame Sylvia Cartwright. I am not against having women in such positions
-- but these women have all undoubtedly been Feminists, by my definition
(see Sex, Lies & Feminism), which gives them a sort of victim complex,
and a determination to carry out a Feminist agenda, in some ways and
to some degree.
You will know from my stance on the Frontman Fallacy that I am more
concerned by the policies of decision-makers than by their sex. Nevertheless,
since Feminists do espouse the Frontman Fallacy, and since it is probably
part of the justification for the Institute of Juducial Studies' refusing
to allow me to give a presentation, I must point out that they are contradicting
themselves: by their own Feminist reasoning, women are in charge of
New Zealand -- in charge of the Judiciary, in particular -- so they
should be treating men as victims of oppression, for "Gender Equity"
purposes -- not women ! Feminists should , by their own reasoning, be
banned from giving IJS presentations on this topic -- only Masculinists
should be allowed to do that, at the present time. I stress that this
is not my own belief, but a stance that the IJS is estopped from denying.
In addition, I think it is very likely that most or all of the above-mentioned
female leaders have enjoyed a boost to their careers at various stages
from the fact that they are female, because the New Zealand Establishment,
influenced by the Frontman Fallacy, has been keen to promote women to
top positions. Thus it is quite possible that men have had their careers
correspondingly unfairly damaged, and that many or most of the above
women have been promoted above their level of competence -- to the detriment
of New Zealand society.
(vii) Interaction of IJS with Other Developments
There is now a new process for complaints against judges and for dismissing
judges, since the recent passing into law of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner
and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004 (see enclosed diagrammatic overview).
This new process has the principal effect of adding a Judicial Conduct
Commissioner and a Judicial Conduct Panel to the previous process. While
this may have what may be seen as the advantage of separating the Judiciary
from the Legislature to a greater extent, it inserts one compulsory
level of bureaucracy (the Judicial Conduct Commissioner) and one occasional
level of bureaucracy (a Judicial Conduct Panel).
The problem with bureaucracies, from a Men's Rights point of view,
is that they can relatively easily be indoctrinated with an ideology
-- with Feminism, in particular -- as their personnel is not numerous,
they are typically not open to lobbying, and they tend to develop a
culture of their own. The New Zealand Public Service bureaucracy, to
my knowledge, has a highly Feminist culture, which inevitably has a
stronly anti-male component. Parliamentarians, by contrast, are open
to lobbying from Society at large, and do not so readily develop a closed
culture of their own.
Similarly, the Government has recently initiated public submissions
on a proposal to bureaucratise the appointment of judges, by means of
the creation of a Judicial Appointments Commission. I do not expect
that either the Judicial Conduct bureaucracy or any future Judicial
Appointments bureaucracy will necessarily be directly influenced by
the IJS. Nevertheless, once the IJS has cemented a pro-female approach
to "Gender Equity" into the culture of the Judiciary, one
can expect this to be taken as one of the norms and standards against
which applicants for positions in the Judiciary and the behaviour of
judges who are the subject of complaints will be assessed.
(viii) The IJS's Breach of its Fiduciary Duty
Justice Toohey in Mabo (Mabo v Queensland (1992) ALR 1 (HCA), 157)
states:
"... it is, in part at least, ... precisely the power to affect
the interests of a person adversely which gives rise to a duty to act
in the interests of that person; the very vulnerability gives rise to
the need for the application of equitable principles."
It is in the spirit of that famous Human Rights judgement that I submit
that the Institute of Judicial Studies has breached its fiduciary duty
to me and all other males of New Zealand, by allowing itself to be captured
by a one-sided ideology and by facile assumptions, leading to the formulation
of its one-sided policy on presenters on Gender Equity.
(ix) The IJS's Conflict of Interest
In deciding that the IJS would teach judges Gender Equity, and that
only Feminists (i.e. not Masculinists) would be allowed to teach that
subject, the judges who run the IJS have put themselves in a situation
of conflict of interest. Rule 1.03 of the New Zealand Law Society Rules
of Professional Conduct for Barristers & Solicitors (7th Edition
2004) states:
A practitioner must not act or continue to act for any person where
there is a conflict of interest between the practitioner on the one
hand, and an existing or prospective client on the other hand.
In the present matter, the issue is whether there is a conflict of
interest between judges as members of the Board of the IJS, or as participants
in Gender Equity training sessions -- on the one hand -- and their role
as judges in cases where counsel might find it necessary to address
issues relating to Gender Equity -- on the other hand.
As judges, their professional interest is to be impartial, and to be
seen to be impartial. However, they have decided that the IJS should
teach certain values, and they have thereby betrayed their own lack
of impartiality with respect to those values -- specifically, with respect
to their interpretation of "Gender Equity". No person appearing
before those judges -- or indeed any New Zealand judge -- can now feel
able to argue a meaning for the term "Gender Equity" that
differs from a Feminist one.
I submit that judges must not be held to a lower standard than other
members of the legal profession. Arguably, they should be held to a
much higher standard.
(x) The Ultra Vires Issue
It is not as if the term "Gender Equity" were an acknowledged
part of the New Zealand Constitution. That is certainly not the case.
I know of no New Zealand statute which gives that term any special status
-- or even a definition. In effect, the IJS is creating constitutional
law by fiat, without authority from Parliament, and without authority
even from the Common Law, since the judges in the IJS act extra-judicially.
I submit that their teaching of Gender Equity -- especially in this
one-sided way -- is ultra vires and unconstitutional.
(ix) Intellectual Incompetence and Political Bias in the Legal Profession
One lawyer with whom I communicated about this maintained that judges
were "too intelligent" to be taken in by Feminist approaches
to Gender Equity. This is a flawed argument, for three reasons:
The IJS is estopped from making this argument, because it is bound to
assume that what it teaches to judges has some effect on them -- as,
indeed, it must surely do;
Peer-pressure, group dynamics, and authority of senior judges must surely
all combine to force all but the most stubborn of judges to at least
modify their stances, if they were initially hostile to Feminist propaganda;
Judges are by no means as intelligent as is sometimes assumed or claimed.
There is a legal fiction that judges are all "learned". This
is important from the point of view
of courtroom discipline and so on, and it is right that ordinary lawyers
should be deferential to
judges. However, it clearly cannot be (and is not) the case that all
judges are learned (in areas
of knowledge that are outside the Law itself), or that they have a superhuman
ability to resist
brainwashing -- in the context of the I.J.S..
c) How I consider that the facts and circumstances described violate
my/our rights (Specific Articles of the International Convention on
Civil and Political Rights).
(i) Breach of Article 2
Article 2.1 states:
"Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect
and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to
its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status."
Clearly, the IJS' policy of teaching judges "Gender Equity"
merely from a female point of view breaches that provision.
Moreover, Article 2.3 states that:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized
are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his
right thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative
authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for by the
legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial
remedy;
The above-mentioned policy of the IJS (IJS) breaches Article 2.3 (a)
because the policy biases judges against giving men an effective remedy
when they are in dispute with a woman or girl. It also breaches Article
2.3 (b) because it potentially makes the entire New Zealand judicial
system incompetent -- through bias -- to determine the rights of a male
when he is in dispute with a female.
(ii) Breach of Article 3
Article 3 states:
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the
equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political
rights set forth in the present Covenant.
It follows from what I have stated in respect of Article 2 that the
IJS is also in breach of Article 3. Men will have no such equal right,
because it will not be enforced by the judges who have been trained
in Gender Equity by the IJS.
(iii) Breach of Article 5
Article 5.1 states:
Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for
any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform
any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized
herein or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for
in the present Covenant.
I submit that the IJS policy in question amounts to engaging in an activity
aimed at the destruction of some of the rights and freedoms recognized
in the ICCPR or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided
for in it. The rights and freedoms involved are those which I mention
in connection with other Articles of the Covenant.
(iv) Breach of Article 14
Article 14.1 states, in part, that:
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the
determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and
public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established
by law.
It follows from what I have stated above that the IJS policy breaches
article 14.1 by:
1. Making males potentially less than equal to women before the New
Zeland courts and tribunals;
2. Ensuring that males who are in dispute with females will probably
not receive a fair hearing; and:
3. Ensuring that New Zealand tribunals (which I take to include courts)
will not be competent, independent or impartial with respect to disputes
between males and females.
(vi) Breach of Article 25
Article 25 states, in part:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any
of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable
restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through
freely chosen representatives;
The IJS policy in question breaches my right under Article 25 to take
part in public affairs, without
distinctions on the basis of sex or gender, in the sense of contributing
my expertise to the activities of the IJS.
(vii) Breach of Article 26
Article 26 states that:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit
any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.
It clearly and plainly follows from what I have said above that the
IJS policy concerned is in full-frontal breach of Article 26.
V. Checklist of supporting documentation (either enclosed or on the
Web):
(OMITTED FROM ELECTRONIC VERSION)
Response from HR Committee
