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THE CHURCH IN INDONESIA: The plurality of the Indonesian society
Indonesia is a pluralistic society: multi-ethnic,
multi-cultural and multi-religious. A diversity of ethnic groups,
cultures, customs, languages and religions exists in this vast
archipelago of more than 13.000 islands. There are five
religions: Islam (87%), Protestantism (7%), Catholicism (3%),
Buddhism (2%), Hinduism (1%). The total population of Indonesia
is around 210 million people.
This plurality is at times a reason for pride when a unity in
diversity can be maintained. There are many local languages and
dialects, but there is one uniting language for the whole
country, called Bahasa Indonesia (the Indonesian
language). This diversity has enriched the inclusiveness and
openness of various regions. Pancasila (five pillars), the
five guiding principles for the whole country (belief in one
God, unity, humanity, democracy and social
justice for all), has united the people in shaping one
nation.
But at the same time this plurality is also prone to social
problems and conflicts. Amidst this plurality a fragmented
society has emerged, which is characterized by frictions in
inter-ethnic and inter-religious relations. SARA (suku,
agama, ras, antar golongan = ethnicity,
religion, race, inter-group relations) are the most sensitive
issues and keep the potentials of social problems. Ethnicity is
sometimes used to incite a conflict and religion is used as a
medium of dividing the adherents of different religions. Ethnic
and religious primordialism, which is the weak point in
Indonesian society, is easily manipulated by sharpening
primordial prejudices. This is aggravated by fanaticism (ethnic,
political, religious), which sometimes becomes a source of
problems and particularly in recent years it has tended to
intensify. A series of violence since 1996 to the present has
been closely related to political, ethnic and religious issues.
A multi-dimensional crisis
Unfortunately, in the era of New Order of Suharto nation
building, democracy and respect for human basic rights were
abandoned. It strived to achieve a high economic growth, but for
political legitimacy only. In fact its economic policies only
created fragile economic fundamentals, and the result was an
economic growth in appearance only. The Asian economic crisis in
1997 destroyed not only the Indonesian economy; it also opened up
the hidden social, political and judicial fractures of the
nation.
An in-depth analysis showed that this crisis situation was rooted
in the system and structure of the society and the practices
which put aside human dignity and basic rights. Firstly,
already since the beginning of the New Order the economy system
was not taking side with the interest of the people; the economic
development tended to benefit certain government officials and
business people/groups (conglomerates) to the detriment of
ordinary people. Low morale in the government officials and
politics of interest of certain groups have also played a major
part in provoking such a crisis, as noticeable in instrumentation
of human persons and abuse of structures and system. Secondly,
in that system every party tried to gain benefits for its own
self, group or family. The consequences were corruption, collusion
and nepotism, which grew wildly, and the unjust and
fraudulent practices became a way of life. Thirdly, the
exercise of state authority, which put priority on state
stability and people's security, supported by a strong military
domination, had resulted in sacrificing a great number of human
lives, especially in the military operation areas, such as Aceh,
West Papua/Irian Jaya, East Timor. Also kidnapping of
pro-democracy activists by certain members of military Special
Forces was used to silence those who might endanger the
statusquo. Fourthly, the reason why the majority of
people, who were involved in various forms of violence (incidents
related to SARA) were the grassroots people, seemed to be that
they had been the main victims of marginalisation and
displacement caused by development programs. Fifthly, the
fact that schools education, which was carried out as instrument
of political control, with orientation to (blind) obedience to
conform to the will of the government, had failed to foster
formation of human values and of right conscience. Sixthly,
the legal system was corrupt; it often did not side with the
truth and justice but with the interests of government, of
conglomerates, e.g. for monopoly; money could also buy 'justice'.
This bad situation signals that the society was infected by
"le mal modern", the evils of the time, which
had destroyed both social-political-economic systems/structures
and human conscience. Human life had no worth, others were
considered mere instruments of one's profit and even the critics
or the opponents were considered as threat or problem to be
"resolved".
This unfavourable situation culminated and exploded as a national
crisis, which was triggered by the invasion of the headquarters
of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Megawati Sukarnoputri, 27
July 1996, which then triggered a series of violence in many
parts of Indonesia: Situbondo, Pasuruan, Tuban, Jember,
Banyuwangi (East Java), Tasikmalaya (West Java), Solo (Central
Java), Pontianak and Sambas (West Kalimantan), Medan (North
Sumatera), Makassar , Luwu (South Sulawesi), Jakarta (Ketapang,
May 1998 riots and the shooting of Trisakti university students
and Semanggi tragedy), Kupang (West Timor), Mataram (Lombok) and
Poso (Central Sulawesi). The monetary and economic crisis in 1997
aggravated the life of the Indonesian people and opened up a
multi-dimensional crisis.
This crisis was actually ingrained in one fundamental crisis,
namely moral crisis of the nation. Unfortunately, this crisis
exploded in various forms of violence and the society became very
sensitive and reactive to issues related to SARA. This national
crisis was also complicated by East-Timor question, particularly
before and after the referendum on August 1999. And in recent
months terror such as bombings has also used as a means of
intimidating people and the new government.
The 32 years of Suharto autocratic regime also created a
stigmatisation, which led to marginalisation. This was expressly
indicated in:
a). Personal stigmatisation: a person or a group was given
a stigma, a bad name, a certain mark, e.g. those who were
involved in Communist Party. Their identity card was given a
certain mark. They were later marginalized and became victims.
b). Territorial stigmatisation: people from certain
territories got a bad mark. They were those who were conscious of
their self respect, of their rights and of the impoverishment of
their environment. They were labelled as GPK (Gerakan
Pengacau Keamanan = the Movement of Security Trouble Makers): GPK
Aceh, GPK Irian Jaya, etc. They were also marginalized and
unwanted and could be eliminated.
c). Identical stigmatisation: this relates to someone's
identity. A Chinese was called a non-pribumi (non-indigenous),
and so he/she belonged to a certain group. This was the beginning
of his/her marginalisation. The Chinese people were marginalized
from political role and positions, so they concentrated on
business. They were then considered rich, they had money and were
often extorted by those in power.
This New Order regime of Suharto (now called "Old
Indonesia") was noticeable in: 1) centralisation as a form
of colonialisation of regions by central government, 2)
militarism, 3) developmentalism, 4) destruction of environment,
5) conflict among the different elements of society, 5)
intellectual impoverishment through education (cf. youth problems
such as drugs and unqualified education), 7) discrimination and
harassment against woman, 8) violation of law which led into
chaos.
Against this background the Indonesian people are aspiring to
move towards a "New Indonesia", characterized by: 1)
regional autonomy, 2) civilized society, 3) nurturing social
relationship, 4) sustainable environment, 5) different elements
as an opportunity for unity in diversity, 6) education for
formation of human values, 7) emancipation for all, 8)
authoritative and well observed laws which promote justice. In
other words, a New Indonesia, now aspired by the Indonesian
people, is Indonesia which is human, civilized and just, which
respect freedom, human rights, and which strives for justice and
prosperity of all. These are the main challenges being faced by
Indonesia today.
The change of government to President Wahid has opened up a new
era of openness and democracy. A new consciousness of one's basic
rights is growing, as well as a strong sense of freedom: freedom
of speech without fear, free press, etc. There is a kind of
euphoria of freedom, which can be seen as a reaction to
suppression, limitations and tight control by Suharto regime. The
parliament is not reluctant any more to call the president to
hold a debate around his policies, and open critics to the
government officials by individuals or press are not taboo any
longer.
The Islam factor
Speaking of Indonesia it is indispensable to mention about
Islam, since Islam is the biggest religion in the country and
Indonesia has the largest Islam population in the world. A
revival and a new awareness of being majority has grown over the
years, along with a demand to control political, economical and
religious areas.
There are two main Islam organisations, which determine the
existence and the influence of Islam in the society: the Nahdlatul
Ulama/NU (traditionalist – formerly led by Abdulrrahman
Wahid) and the Muhammadiyah (modernist – formerly led
by Amin Rais). NU literally means "renaissance of Islamic
scholars". It was established in 1926 by a group of ulama
of East Java. The NU conserves and adopts the Javanese tradition
in their religious belief and practices. Its original
constitution committed it to a range of religious, social and
economic activities, in particular proselytising and the
protection of traditionalist religious education. The authority
of the ulama and the strength of the organisation are
rooted in pesantren (religious boarding schools). It
claims to have around 35 million followers. NU is tolerant and
open to other religions and does not resort to fundamentalism or
fanaticism. The Muhammadiyah was aimed at adapting Islam
to modern Indonesian life and was founded in 1912 at Yogyakarta
to counterbalance the development of Catholic and Protestant
mission. It is now much involved in schools, hospitals,
orphanages, boarding houses, with Islam as its ideological and
moral basis. Its membership counts around 25 million people. To
achieve these aims, it employed many methods of the Christian
missionaries.
In the political sphere the Islam population, mainly of these two
organisations, proliferated into so many Islamic parties, which
rose following the fall of Suharto from power in May 1998 and the
transfer of power to B.J. Habibie, which heralded a new phase of
Indonesia's history. Among the 48 contesting political parties in
the 1999 general election around 20 were Islamic. There are at
least two elements that identify a party as 'Islamic'. First, in
their documentation, many such parties have officially adopted
Islam as their ideological basis. Second, in some cases Islamic
parties have retained Pancasila but, at the same time, employ
Islamic symbols such as the star and crescent (ka'bah) or
one of the other symbols widely associated with Islam. In
addition, a number of 'Muslim' or at any rate 'Muslim-oriented'
parties could also be considered 'Islamic'. The result of the
election indicated that parties with a religious affiliation were
not popular among the masses. The majority of Islam population
preferred more nationalistic oriented parties, such as the
Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle and Golongan Karya
Party.
The Islamic parties, which adopt Islam as their ideological
basis, could be included in what is called 'Islam Politik'
(Political Islam). They strive to influence every political
orientation and decision with Islam aspirations in the government
and parliament, and to revive Piagam Jakarta = the Jakarta
Charter). They make every effort to include some elements of syariah
into marriage law, patrimony law, alms law, education law etc,
and that these laws be adopted as national laws. They use Islam
as a political commodity and ideology to attract their voters and
followers. They are mainly represented by Islamic parties such as
PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan), PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang),
PDR (Partai Daulat Rakyat) in the parliament and hardliner groups
such as KISDI (Komite Indonesia untuk Solidaritas Dunia Islam),
FPI (Front Pembela Islam).
On the other side there is 'Islam Kultural' (Cultural
Islam). It was a result of Suharto's repression of Islamic
politics. Muslims, whether they liked it or not, had to employ
'cultural Islam' in order to advance Islam and Muslim interests.
The aim was to create an Islamic culture, environment and
atmosphere or to permeate the society with Islamic values. They
aimed at creating the so called 'masyarakat madani' (civil
society), which resembled the society of Madinah during the time
of Mohammad. It was Nurcholish Madjid, a Muslim prominent
scholar, who provided a strong impetus to the rise of 'cultural
Islam' through his slogan, 'Islam yes, Islamic party no'.
The end result of 'cultural Islam' has been the renaissance of
Islamic religion and culture in Indonesia. Among indicators are:
the increase in number of mosques, madrasah (Islamic
schools) and hajj pilgrimages to Mecca. Others are the
establishment of ICMI (the Indonesian Association of Muslim
Intellectuals), Bank Muammalat Indonesia (the Islamic Bank),
Islamic insurance (takaful) and the like since the early
1990s. ICMI, for instance, has played an important political role
since its establishment in 1990, bringing Islam into the power
centre in the last years of the Suharto era.
The aspiration of certain Muslim groups, particularly the
hardliners, to make Indonesia an official Islam country is no
secret. When the founding fathers of Indonesia were preparing the
birth of a new nation (1945) a heated debate emerged on whether
to base Indonesia on a certain religious ideology or to be
secular. But the main concern of the founding fathers was the
unity of the diverse islands, cultures, ethic groups and
religions, and so a religious basis was rejected. But from time
to time certain Muslim groups tried over and over to revive 'Piagam
Jakarta' (the Jakarta Charter), which includes the following
words: "with the obligation to observe syariah law for
its adherents". They mean to add these words to the
first principle of Pancasila: "To believe in one God" (Ô
"To believe in one God with the obligation to observe
syariah law for its adherents").
During the 32 years regime of Suharto it was not allowed to
discuss or to talk about the Jakarta Charter. It was a taboo. But
in this era of reform and openness efforts to revive the Jakarta
Charter have emerged again. Parties and groups such as PPP, PBB,
PDR, KISDI, FPI have made public their intention to revive the
discussion on the insertion of the Jakarta Charter into Pancasila.
On the verge of the annual meeting of MPR (People's Consultative
Assembly), 7-18 August 2000, there was a move of these groups to
include in the agenda the discussion on Piagam Jakarta. On 7
August 2000 the first congress of Mujahidin was concluded with a
resolution called "Piagam Yogyakarta" (the Yogyakarta
Charter) which obliges the observation of Islam syariah
for all Muslims and rejects any ideology contrary to Islam. This
has sparked a heated discussion and although the recent People's
Consultative Assembly rejected the insertion of the Jakarta
Charter into Pancasila but it has once again opened up a
public debate on the issue.
It is to be noted that the stance of these hardliners does not
represent that of the Muslim majority. These groups want to give
an impression of their hardline stance and that they are fighting
for the interests of Islam. Not only they have made the life of
the non-Muslims difficult, but also that of the Muslims of good
will by creating a bad image of Islam in Indonesia.
The communal conflicts, particularly in the Moluccas
The conflict in the Moluccas is not separated from conflicts
in other regions. The invasion of the headquarters of the
Indonesian Democratic Party in Jakarta on 27 July 1996, which
killed a number of people, triggered other subsequent social
unrests and violence in different regions, as mentioned above (p.
2).
Ambon, the provincial capital of the Moluccan Province, which was
once considered peaceful and tolerant, had in fact kept the
potentials of a great conflict. The migrants, mostly from South
Sulawesi and Java of whom the majority were Muslims, became
better off economically. While the indigenous Ambonese, mainly
Protestants, were left behind. This fact created an economic
jealousy. In the meantime the government higher positions were
shifting from the Protestant to the Muslim officials. This was
also another reason of competition between the Christians
vis-a-vis the Muslims.
Another factor, which helped create and easily provoke conflicts
in the Moluccas, was the legacy of the colonial system of
settlement of the inhabitants. In some areas the settlements or
villages of the Christians were separated from those of the
Muslims. In this way each group had created a 'ghetto' and not so
much integration into daily life. So when the conflict started
Muslim villages, whose inhabitants were mainly from other ethic
groups, would attacked Christian villages and vice versa.
Ambon was once known as a Christian region with 60% Christians
and 40% Muslims. But this has changed since the launching of
transmigration program (moving people from other regions such as
overpopulated Java – mainly Muslims - to other less
populated regions). In these recent years the ratio of the
population has reversed: out of total population of Ambon 300.000
people 55% were Muslims and 45% were Christians of which 5% were
Catholics, of about 2 million people of the total population of
this Moluccan archipelago.
In such a constellation of this archipelago of 1000 islands a
conflict related to SARA could be easily provoked. In a
relatively short time all the main parts of the Moluccas were
affected by social unrest. Besides Ambon, the northern part of
the archipelago (Halmahera and its surroundings), where
Christians were very minority, was also hit by disturbances and
the Christians were wiped out of the region and were forced to
move to other regions. In the central Moluccas Buru and Seram
were also affected, as well as the south-eastern Moluccas such as
Kei Islands, Dobo in the Aru Islands and Tanimbar Islands, which
counted a good proportion of Christians.
Similar patterns could be detected in other conflict-afflicted
regions, such as in Poso, Central Sulawesi (last May-June) or
Luwu, South Sulawesi most recently (last August) affected again
by ethnic and religious conflicts.
The actors behind these conflicts
There has been a strong belief that the whole scenario was
orchestrated and played from Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia,
by certain groups, for their personal and political ends. They
are called 'auctores intellectuales' and 'provocateurs'. They do
not hesitate to use the issues related to SARA as an
instrument of their personal and political ends. The conflict in
the Moluccas and in other regions normally started as a communal
conflict, which manipulated ethnicity and religion for certain
ends rather than as an inter-religious conflict. Religion was
politicised.
a). Since the downfall of Suharto in May 1998 riots and communal
violence have increased. The followers or the cronies of
Suharto, who are financially powerful, did not like to see
him being blamed on the collapse of the country and being tried
in court, which would also mean that they might end in the same
fate. They wanted to maintain the statusquo of which they have
profited politically and economically. They wanted to see a
country destabilized and the present government discredited. They
were anxious to slow down reforms and apparently to prevent
recriminations against those involved in political and
human-rights abuses over the past three decades. They are also
still present in government, parliament, business and military
circles. Some of the former cabinet ministers, military generals
and some business people were publicly mentioned as those
involved in this conflict.
b). Also, the military was divided between the reformists
("the red and white military") who are willing to
adjust to the demands of new reforms and those who want to
maintain a statusquo and are not content with the reduction of
their socio-political function. Up to the time of Suharto regime
the military exercised powerfully a "dual function":
military and socio-political function. Also within the military
there are those who support the cause of hardliner Muslim groups
("the green military"). Now there is also a talk about
the progressive and the conservative groups within the military.
It was difficult to understand how the military was incapable to
prevent thousands of Laskar Jihad (Holy War troops) from
Java to reach the Moluccan Islands, although the president had
ordered to block their departure. There were strong allegations
on partiality of certain military personnel in the field and on
their help to facilitate the departure of these Jihad troops and
the supply of guns and ammunition they carried along or that were
sent to the Moluccas. They also became part of the problem. The
minister of defense, Juwono Sudarsono was quoted as saying:
"There are some, or even many members of the army, according
to information gathered from both of the warring camps, who have
become a major cause of the clashes." Also, the presence of
the deserter-soldiers complicated the situation.
c). There are also groups of fundamentalist and
radical/hardliner Muslims. They want Indonesia, which counts
the largest Muslim population in the world but is not an official
Muslim country, to become an Islam Republic. They use this
conflict situation to reinforce their aspiration to make
Indonesia an official Muslim country. They do not like President
Wahid, who is a man of dialogue and tolerance and who does not
support their cause.
The unbalanced reports in the Muslim media have helped provoke a
spirit of Jihad (Holy War) to defend their Muslim brethren, who
according to these media were being exterminated by the
Christians. After being trained in Java thousands of Jihad troops
arrived last May in Ambon and Halmahera, equipped with standard
and automatic weapons, and also with the intention to cleanse the
Christians from the Moluccas. Their arrival has worsened the
situation, which once was already calm, and their continuing
presence has made the desire to end the conflict difficult.
"From the data obtained, it is clear that the Ambon affair
has been masterminded from outside of Maluku with a view to
'ethnic cleansing' based on hate towards a CERTAIN
RELIGION." Semmy Waileruny, a lawyer, was quoted as saying:
"Also, shady provocateurs have played a hand in creating the
unrest … there was a coordinated campaign of attacks against
Christians to drive them out of the once-idyllic Spice Islands
… a pattern had begun to emerge of Christians being driven
out by Muslims … There are no more Christians in Ternate.
This process of Islamisation is already happening. This is an
effort to make an enemy of the Christian religion."
"Analysts trying to make sense of the Moluccan violence,
which has claimed more than 3,000 lives in the past 18 months,
believe it represents a confluence of interests. Those range from
disaffected retired and serving military officers trying to stir
the political pot in far-off Jakarta, to well-funded Muslim
extremists seeking to capitalize on a shift in the demographic
balance of a region that once had a clear Christian majority in
an otherwise overwhelmingly Islamic nation."
In an urgent appeal of 22 June 2000 the Crisis Centre of the
diocese of Amboina reported that "What is happening in the
Moluccas now cannot possibly be called 'riots' or 'violence' or
'bloody conflict' or even 'war': this is an organized
cold-blooded murdering of innocent people, conceded by the
Moslems themselves by means of the loudspeakers of their mosques
which call for annihilating all 'Christian infidels'. The
violence can no longer be looked on as a conflict, but a
straightforward endeavour to clear the Moluccas from everything
that is Christian." In reality Christians were already wiped
out from some areas in the northern Moluccas such as Ternate,
Tidore, Morotai, Obi, Bacan, Sula, Buru. Ambon and other parts of
the Moluccas have become killing-fields.
Although the situation seems to have improved, but it is still
very fragile. The enforcement of a civil state of emergency on 27
June 2000, followed by a limited isolation of the territory to
prevent arms and ammunition smuggling, did not help much. Only
the recently forced expulsion of a number of Jihad fighters and
the confiscation of thousands of weapons, hand-made bombs and
other sharp devices, along with the mounting pressures from the
international community and governments, seemed to have helped
ease the situation.
In the meantime the desire to end the conflict has grown.
"The desire to end the conflict is more and more heard from
both sides of the Christians and the Muslims. Many of the latter
also wish the jihad warriors to leave the place as soon as
possible. The police chief commander almost every day goes to
meet with either Muslim or Christian communities, even as far as
Masohi (the island of Seram). He declared on local TV that
virtually nobody wants the conflict to go on. On the contrary,
people wish to re-establish normal mutual relations, based on the
traditional Moluccan pela gandong (brotherhood). A Siwalima
reporter recounts that not seldom he can hear Muslims say: the
Christians suffer because of what is done to them by the jihads;
actually we, the local muslims, equally endure much suffering
from them".
This prolonged conflict in the Moluccas and occasionally in other
regions has forced people to flee their homes and land, and
became refugees. Thousands of people have fled the afflicted
areas and took safer shelters in North Sulawesi, and others
returned to their original places such as the South-Eastern
Moluccas, South Sulawesi or Java. In turn, this unprecedented
flow of refugees has created some grave problems, such as food,
evacuation, new settlement, home, work, damaging psychological
effects, etc.
The response of the Church of Indonesia
The concrete situation of the society also determines the
response of the Church. The joy and the hope, the suffering and
anxieties of the people are also those of the Church. In response
to the crisis situation the Church has stood as a critical and
moral voice, as expressed for instance in the Bishops' pastoral
letters: the Lenten letter 1997 (just prior to the general
election) in which the bishops expressed their concerns on the
crises which have intruded all levels of life, and were mainly
rooted in moral decadence; the 1999 Easter letter
("Risen and firm in hope") which was issued to respond
to the ongoing moral crisis, with special mention of current
issues such as 1999 general election, regional autonomy and
special regions. In their Moral and Political Call, 12
August 1999 (prior to the Independence day celebration, 17
August) the bishops voiced their concerns and stance on general
situation of the society and on the incidents in Aceh, Ambon and
East-Timor. The annual assembly of the Bishops' Conference,
November 1999, issued a pastoral exclamation "Let Us
Change". It expresses the long crisis, which originally
was triggered by the monetary and economic crisis. The Bishops
beg the Church to carry out the Gospel by prioritising those who
are victims and suffer from crises.
Above all, in their letters they speak of the defence of
humanity, regardless one's religious affiliation or ethnicity.
This unfavourable situation has also deepened a great sense of
solidarity among the faithful for all those who suffer from
crises and conflicts. A crisis centre affiliated to the Bishops'
Conference office was established.
It is significant to also note the shift of emphasis on the
Church's stance and view: from a more sacramental and
institutionalised Church, ad intram (an inward-looking),
to a more ad extram (an outward-looking) Church.
The emphasis of a more ad intram Church is on sacramental
services and well organized, well run institutions such as
internal organisations, qualified schools, hospitals, media, etc.
Until around 1990 the Church saw herself as a minority and did
not intervene in the socio-political sphere or was very 'careful'
to speak out on socio-political issues. In the words of the late
Indonesian Cardinal Justinus Darmoyuwono: "We regard
ourselves as 'an efficacious silence'." The influence of the
Church was largely felt through the presence of her services in
schools, hospitals, media, etc, and of a good number of lay
people in the government departments. In this time emerged an
accusation of christianisation of Indonesia by certain Muslim
groups.
An ad extram Church is a prophetic Church, a moral voice
in the society, and is involved in the cause of justice and
peace, is open to and in dialogue and partnership with various
components of the society. Solidarity with the suffering,
especially the victims of conflicts and violence has been
generously demonstrated by the faithful by sharing what they can
offer, by defending one's rights, by finding the truth and
justice. In this time communication, dialogue and cooperation
with other religions and other components of the society such as
NGOs has emerged as a major challenge to the Church. Team of
Volunteers for Humanity, started by a Jesuit Father Sandyawan
in cooperation with both Catholics and non-Catholics, is an
example of common efforts not only to help the marginal people
and the victims of violence but also to defend people's rights
and to find truth and justice. The most difficult challenges come
from Muslim hardliners, who are not open to dialogue.
Another aspect of being an ad extram Church is a shift
from a receiving to a missionary/sending Church. In terms of
personnel there is a good number of Indonesian religious sent
abroad as missionaries, as well as in a number of religious
congregations Indonesians have become part of general
administrations. A still great challenge to the Church is to be
financially self-sufficient, particularly in many local Churches,
where the contribution of the people cannot fill in the pastoral
needs in place, especially in the aftermath of the economic
crisis.
Facing the present crisis of the society the Church is expected
to play a role of hope-giving to those in depressed situation,
and facing the conflict situation a role of reconciliation in a
non-violence struggle for democracy, of defence of humanity and
to change potential conflicts into enriching and true
brotherhood. Particularly the role of the local Churches in
mediating conflicts, in promoting justice and peace, in defending
humanity, such as in Ambon has become very significant. From the
beginning the local bishop of Ambon, Mgr P. C. Mandagi MSC, has
acted as acceptable mediator between the two fighting groups.
This role has become more difficult once the Jihad troops arrived
in different parts of the Moluccas. Catholic institutions also
became target of attacks and many Catholics became victims of
clashes. The complexity of the solution of the conflict has
forced him to lobby the international community and governments
to help find solution of the conflict. In July the Bishop,
accompanied by other religious leaders, travelled to Europe and
then to the United States for this purpose.
Looking forwards to a new Indonesia the Indonesian Bishops
envision a great need of building up the Indonesian Church as basic
community, a communio, with an emphasis on 'ad
extram', meaning being a part of the society at large and in
partnership, dialogue and communication with all components of
the society. An honest dialogue and an open attitude towards
other religions, particularly Islam as the main religion, are
required, because the daily life of the Catholics is in the midst
of them. Also the right pastoral approach, which includes
analysis in the fields of culture, socio-politics, economics and
religion, is necessary.
In order to express the Church as communio the Bishops
have agreed to hold a Grand Catholic Gathering as culmination of
the 2000 Jubilee celebrations, at the beginning of November 2000.
It will gather the representatives of laity, religious, clergy
from all dioceses of Indonesia, in communion with the Bishops.
The theme of the gathering is "Empowering Basic
Communities towards a New Indonesia." Empowering
Christians of all walks of life can be a great contribution to
the creation of a new Indonesia, that is peaceful, prosperous,
built on a true brotherhood and characterised by mutual
understanding and acceptance, mutual appreciation and respect,
justice, peace and honesty.
In order to empower basic communities the quality of human
resources takes a great importance. Not only the formation of
religious and priests but more importantly also that of lay
people, particularly the youth, is indispensable. To be the salt
and the light of the Indonesian world, to be prophetic, and in
order to be present and influential in the society, the
Indonesian Church needs qualified lay people and pastoral agents.
They are in the forefront of the society. There are many lay
people who are capable to do further studies on various subjects,
or are available to follow formation courses, but often times the
main barrier is financial limitations. I believe that the future
of the Church lies in the hands of lay people. Already from the
beginning of the Catholic Church in Indonesia the lay people have
been the determining agents of evangelisation and growth of the
Church. But facing the mounting challenges, as mentioned above,
and those of this era of globalisation, which has been affecting
the Indonesian society as well, we need to build a prophetic
Church with ample and significant participation of qualified lay
people.
*******
| Rome, 1 September 2000 | J. Mangkey, msc |
(Presented at the Annual Conference of
Kirche in Not/Ostpriesterhilfe,
Königstein, Germany, 19 September 2000)
Source : http://www.paxchristi.nl/indonesia55.html
Christians report Malukus slaughter
JAKARTA
Wednesday 6 December 2000
The Age - Australia
Muslims have slaughtered 93 Christians since last week on a small island of the Maluku chain for refusing to convert to Islam, a church activist said yesterday quoting a survivor.
"The forced Islamisation of Christians in Kasiui Island has been continuing since last week and by Saturday, a total of 93 people have been killed for refusing to convert into Islam," said Sammy Weileruni, a lawyer with the Maranatha Christian centre in Ambon, the Malukus capital.
Mr Weileruni said a man who escaped from Kasiui on a boat arrived in Ambon yesterday and had given him the information.
Kasiui is a small island in the Watubela island group east of Ambon Island.
The man, a teacher, told him that when he left on Saturday, 763 other Christians, fearing for their lives, had accepted to convert to Islam.
The victims were among some 3000 people from four villages on the island who fled into the jungles following a mass attack by Muslims on November 28 in which eight villagers were killed.
The attackers, including Muslims from the neighboring Gorong island group, pursued the villagers. Those they captured were forced to convert or they were killed.
"The only help was a boat, requisitioned by the rulers of the state of civilian emergency (the governor's office) in Ambon, sent to Kasiui with a crew of 20," Mr Weileruni said, deploring the lack of reaction from Indonesian authorities since he first reported the slaughter last week.
The boat could not accommodate all those who wanted to leave Kasiui, "and the Muslims were also angered that they had come to pick up Christian refugees," he said.
The boat left for Ambon carrying only the teacher who was allowed on board to join his wife in Ambon. His children were allowed to join him.
The Maluku Islands, previously known as the Spice Islands, have been torn apart by almost two years of Muslim-Christian conflict, leaving more than 4000 people dead and over half a million refugees.
The sectarian violence was sparked by a dispute between a Christian public transport driver and a Muslim in Ambon city in January 1999 that quickly degenerated into fights that spread to other islands.
In June, Jakarta imposed a state of civil emergency in the Malukus but has so far failed to rein in the violence. Both sides have accused security forces of taking part.
The Britain-based Christian Solidarity Worldwide said last month that Muslim militant forces, many of them from outside the Malukus, have threatened that "there will be no church bells ringing in Ambon by Christmas". Maluku Governor Saleh Latuconsina said last week that some 1300 militant Muslim reinforcements from Java island were in the islands.
- AFP
by Roger L. Dixon, Ph.D.
I. BACKGROUND - 1945-1966
Beginning with the Situbondo incident in October, 1996, more Christian churches have been damaged, destroyed and burned than at any other time in Indonesian history. In fact, Romo Dr. Frans Magnis Suseno, SJ writes “the Indonesia Republic is the champion of the world in damaging and burning places of worship” (Tahalele, 14). How did this situation come to be in a country which had been exemplary as a pluralistic, tolerant society? The answer lies in the machinations of the Soeharto Regime.
II. SOEHARTO REGIME LAYS FOUNDATION
FOR RESTRICTING CHRISTIAN ACTIVITY
Inter-Religious Consultation - 1967
With the advent of the Soeharto government, certain subtle differences began to emerge. Publicly, the generally accepted understanding of religious tolerance was reiterated but time and again actions were taken that eroded the freedoms of Christians. The first of these was an Inter-Religious Consultation in November, 1967. “There was a strong initiative from the Muslim side, supported by the Department of Religion, to achieve agreement that no missionary activities should be undertaken among those already having a (government recognized) religion...” (Cooley, 1981:216). However, neither the Protestant nor the Roman Catholic representatives would agree to such a restriction.
Mohammad Natsir wrote, “The only way national peace can be achieved is if each religious group, besides guarding their own identity, respects the identity of others” [Perdamaian Nasional hanya bisa dicapai kalau masing-masing golongan agama, di samping memelihara identitas masing-masing juga pandai menghormati identitas golongan lain.] (1980:209). This opinion represented the position of most of the Muslim leaders. By “identity,” they were referring to all persons registered as Muslim (every Indonesian citizen must state their religion on their identity card), regardless of whether or not they understood or practiced their faith.
Reason for the Governmental Change
The reason behind this new agitation to curtail Christian activity was the turning of large numbers of Javanese people to Christianity in the aftermath of the abortive Communist Coup in 1965. Within the short span of a few years, several million Javanese had transferred from Islam to Christianity. Although much of this change was nominal, it was the largest turning of Muslims to Christianity in the history of the faith. At no previous time had so many Muslims decided to leave that faith for another. The Javanese phenomena traumatized Muslim leaders all over the world. Middle Eastern Muslim countries began putting pressure on Soeharto to stop this activity.
Djakarta Charter Used to Stir Feelings
In March 1968, the Muslim parties insisted on a return to the Djakarta Charter, which included the stipulation that there was an “obligation of practicing the law of Islam for the adherents of that religion.” This would provide a way for Muslim leaders to prevent Christian evangelism to those of the Muslim faith. However, the Djakarta Charter had been rejected under the Soekarno regime as inappropriate to a Pancasila society. The Christians would not agree, as they argued that Article 29 (2) of the 1945 Constitution provides that “the State shall guarantee freedom to every resident to adhere to his respective religion and to perform his religious duties in conformity with that religion and that faith.” For Christians and others, freedom meant just that -- the right to make choices in the area of religion.
Ministry of Religious Affairs is the
Regime’s Main Tool
After 1968, the Ministry of Religious Affairs began a continuous program to hamper Christian evangelism and the growth of the Christian Church in every way possible. One of their main tools was withholding permits for all kinds of religious activities. Churches had difficulty both locally and regionally in securing permission to erect new church buildings. Even permits to hold routine church synod meetings and consultations were hard to obtain from the security forces (Cooley, 1981:215). Among the reasons given for this was the active Muslim opposition to anything Christians wanted to do. But this alleged opposition seemed to come only from a small number of religious leaders.
Regime Permits Islamic Reaction
One of the most difficult areas to assess is how much the Soeharto Regime favored the reaction of Muslim leaders to Christian activity. There is little doubt that the illegal actions of Muslims were rarely punished by law. However, until 1996, their actions were not excessively threatening to the lives of their victims. Relatively few were killed. Some high profile incidents created a lot of attention. One such was the attack on a church in urban Jakarta. “In April, 1969, some 500 Muslim youths attacked and desecrated a recently built Protestant Church in the Slipi section of western Djakarta. Muslims alleged that no permission had been given by the Government for the building of the church (indeed the mayor’s office was specifically said to have opposed it), that Muslims outnumber Christians nearly seventy to one in the area, and that there are five churches in Slipi already, and that hence the building of yet an additional church was clearly ‘provocative.’” Within the same time frame, another church was burned down in Djatibarang near Indramayu. The local Christians were terrorized. Van der Kroef goes on to report, “Then, on 23 January 1970, irate Muslims sacked and burned the Roman Catholic Tarakanita Elementary School on the outskirts of Djakarta” (v.d. Kroef, 1971:236-237). A Muslim faction had been incited to draw the line over Christian expansion into what they perceived as their communities.
The Soeharto Regime’s Struggle with Muslim Political Forces
While the Soeharto government was appeasing Muslim elite by suppressing Christian activity, they were also struggling to counter rising Muslim political power. The regime did not want the leaders of the Muslim political organizations to have influence in decision making. One issue was the revival of the Masjumi party, which had been banned by Soekarno after they contributed to several regional rebellions in the fifties. In 1968, the new (then acting) president Soeharto also opposed Masjumi’s reinstatement and a new party was formed to cover Masjumi’s people. Partai Muslimin Indonesia (PMI) was the compromise organization resulting from these discussions. This illustrated the reluctance of the Soeharto Regime to put large political opportunity in the hands of Muslim religious leaders. In 1970, R.E. Ward wrote, “The policy of the Soeharto Government towards Masjumi and then the Partai Muslimin has been one of consistent opposition...” (Ward, 1970:57). While this may have been true in the area of political control, it was not true in the religious arena.
The Hidden Agenda
With the exception of a few insightful political observers, the government successfully hid their agenda from the populace. Church leaders, in general, were consistently fooled by the government’s public opposition to so-called “Muslim” goals. Behind the scenes, the Regime was carrying out plans to choke off Christian growth in order to appease the elite. In 1970, the PMI again unsuccessfully urged the government to curtail the propagation of the Christian faith in the following ways: “(1) prohibit the construction of a Baptist hospital in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, and declare every Christian missionary in the region persona non grata, (2) regulate construction of houses of worship ‘in proportion to the beliefs professed by the majority of the local population,’ and (3) stop the inflow of all foreign Christian missionaries” (v.d. Kroef, 1971:237). While none of these efforts were successful at that time, they would be by the end of the 70’s. The plot unfolded slowly.
The Closing Game
There were many moves in the process to
erode the ability of the Christian community both to perform the
duties of their faith and to share it with others. The door to
door tactics of the new Mormon groups created much agitation in
some of the urban communities. These actions along with the
anti-government stand of Jehovah Witnesses was improperly linked
to the Christian Church. By 1974, it became apparent that
political pressure was building against the mass tracting being
done throughout Java. Although there was no significant response
to the gospel by the Sundanese, religious authorities knew that
there was great response in Central and East Java. The
West Java military commander (Panglima Jawa Barat)
invited church leaders to discuss the interreligious tension that
had been reported to him. According to him, there were plans by
some groups to kill evangelists and destroy churches even though
every village in West Java (like all of Indonesia) was tightly
controlled by the military. The military commander “suggested”
that the tracting stop even though there were no laws forbidding
it and the general public seemed unconcerned about it. For awhile
the evangelicals slowed the pace of their work.
A favorite tactic of the Ministry of Religious Affairs was to let local authorities harass the Christians in remote places. Opposition took the form of personal attacks on believers in the villages. Every village group was subjected to various forms of coercion to force them to withdraw from the Christian fellowship. Frequently, congregational leaders were harassed by the local police and military as well as by community officials. They were often called in for interrogation in which they were forced to wait all through the day at the whim of a government official. Even though it may not have been the overt plan of the government to persecute the Christians, in fact, the Soeharto Regime covertly initiated, supported, and carried out a program of continual and constant persecution of villagers in Muslim areas who made a confession of faith in Jesus Christ.
Impact of Petro Dollars
The oil crisis of 1973 appears to be the event which most enabled the Soeharto Regime to carry out their anti-Christian program. It caused the price of oil to rocket upward and all of the OPEC countries accumulated enormous financial reserves. This, of course, included many Muslim countries. They began pouring money into internal and external religious propaganda all over the world. All Islamic countries were targeted for projects which would raise the profile of Islam. Huge amounts of this foreign money began to flow into Indonesia which had the largest Islamic population of any country in the world. Mosques and prayer houses (mushollah) were built, sound systems and other electronic equipment was donated for use in these religious establishments, and myriad training programs were initiated to produce a more capable religious leadership. The Indonesian government’s attitude toward an evenhanded application of freedom of religion under the Pancasila experienced a drastic change. The petro dollars gave the Islamic clique the leverage they needed to enact directives that would close down open propagation of the Christian religion.
Soeharto Regime Mounts Intense Public
Campaign
In the early months of 1975, it became
apparent that the groundwork laid by the Regime was beginning to
stymie the ministry. Following the arrest in February of a
Chinese man who was passing out tracts in Ciwedej, West Java, an
anonymous letter was circulated which stated that Christians
controlled enough government positions to cause serious damage to
Islam’s agenda in Indonesia. Although the accusation was
bizarre in its political naiveté, reaction was immense and
frightening. Most evangelism stopped in West Java. Fear
swept through the churches with almost every leader calling for
wisdom (kebijaksaan) in responding to the situation. By
using the word “wisdom”, they meant for the
evangelists and others to stop all forms of evangelism. Although
evangelism continued, storm clouds were gathering that would
break on their heads.
Political Attacks Accelerate
Probably the Christian organization most central to the public distribution of tracts was Every Home Crusade (EHC). In August, 1976, one of their evangelists was arrested in Majalaya, West Java, while passing out tracts in front of a mosque. While all agreed that this was a foolish move on his part, there was no violation of any law. The police kept him 4 days at the jail in Cibabat (Cimindi) on the west side of Bandung. Their reason was to protect him from harm (diamankan) but it seemed obvious that they simply wanted to teach the Christians a lesson. The government used this to inflame the situation even further.
On top of this, political action on the national scene took a new turn. Also, in December, 1976, the Attorney General of Indonesia banned Jehovah’s Witnesses from operating throughout the country (see: Jaksa Agung). Since the Christian Church was not too happy about the activities of Jehovah’s Witnesses, no one was concerned about their rights under the Pancasila to free exercise of religion. Many leaders forgot that the government had effectively linked the Jehovah’s Witnesses to the Christian Church so that action against them was construed by the people as restrictions on the Christians. The message to the public was negative about the Christians.
III. THE CHRISTIAN VOICE IS
THROTTLED
Soeharto Regime Prepares the Coup de
Grace
The continual response of the Javanese Muslims to Christ threatened the monolithic religious system in Java. Muslim leaders pressured the government to take action against religious groups disseminating propaganda to people of other religions. In addition, miscellaneous anonymous letters and pamphlets were circulated in an attempt to intimidate the Christians. All of this activity was fueled by the Islamic fundamentalist revival originating from the Middle East. The Christian evangelists, who had experienced so much freedom under the Soekarno Regime were baffled by what was happening in the larger arena. Government leaders kept saying they desired tolerance while promoting animosity between the religious groups.
Picking the Hatchet Man
With the installation of the Third
Development Cabinet (Kabinet Pembangunan III) in 1978,
Soeharto began more emphatic moves to gain Muslim support by
curbing Christian freedom in publicly sharing their faith. His
first step was to elect a former army general to be the new
Minister of Religious Affairs. He was Haji Alamsyah
Ratuprawiranegara and he did the most serious damage to the
Church in Indonesia of anyone before him or since. In a moment of
unguarded reminiscence in 1987, Alamsyah revealed the true
purpose of his appointment as the Minister of Religious Affairs
in 1978. Soeharto told him, “I am choosing you to convince
the Islamic community to accept the concept of Pancasila.” [Saya
angkat kamu untuk meyakinkan ummat Islam, agar mau menerima
Pancasila...]
[“Apa dan bagaimana konsep kamu’, sambung Presiden. ‘Pertama pak, dakwah adalah kewajiban umat Islam, karena itu jangan dilarang atau setiap naskahnya harus diperiksa dulu,’ jelas Alamsyah menerangkan langkah-langkah yang akan diambilnya selaku Menteri Agama. ‘Maka dengan demikian, mereka akan berhenti marah,’ sambungnya] (Presiden Jelaskan..., 1987).
In other words, to win the complete support of the Muslim elite to the Soeharto Regime, the freedom of speech of the non-Muslims would be sacrificed; particularly the freedom of speech of Christians.
The Infamous Directives
The key to the strategy to forcefully close down Christian evangelism throughout Indonesia was the issuance of two directives. In August, 1978, the Minister of Religion issued them. The first was Decision No. 70 [Keputusan Menteri Agama No. 70 Tahun 1978 Tentang Pedoman Penyiaran Agama] which concerned “Guidelines for the Propagation of Religion” The second was Decision No. 77 [Keputusan Menteri Agama No.77 Tahun 1978 Tentang Bantuan Luar Negeri Kepada Lembaga Keagamaan Di Indonesia] which dealt with “Overseas Aid to Religious Institutions in Indonesia.” They were commonly referred to as SK 70 & SK 77.
SK 70 - Virtually Eliminated Public
Evangelism
The first directive, SK 70, said that harmony among religious groups was a high priority and the government was restricting religious propaganda. Specifically, religious propaganda could not be aimed at a person of another religion, especially through social services, literature distribution, or personal visitation. Violators of these guidelines were threatened with unspecified punishment. (It was unspecified because these directives were not laws and had no basis in law by which punishment could be attached. Never-the-less, practically everyone was traumatized by them and was afraid to violate them because they knew action would be taken outside of law as is common in Indonesia.)
SK 77 - Attacked the Financial Basis of
Para-Church Groups
SK 77 concerned the relationships between religious groups and their connection to the government in respect to foreign money and personnel being used in religious activity. It specified that religious aid of any kind originating outside Indonesia must be channeled through the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Theoretically this applied to Islamic, Buddhist, and Hindu religions as well but due to other special harassment of Christian missionaries, this was felt by Christians to be particularly aimed at them. In fact, these kinds of directives were almost never enforced in relation to Islam. In addition, foreign religious personnel (Christian missionaries) would be restricted. Programs using foreign workers had to be structured to phase out foreigners within two years. Unspecified punishment was indicated for violations (again unspecified because this directive also had no basis in law). Walter Bonar Sidjabat, a Christian leader, describes these directives as an act which “tarnished some noble principles that were put forward by the founding fathers of the Republic of Indonesia in the Pancasila” (1982:9). [For more on this in English see: Cooley, 1981:217-220]
Christian Missionary Visas Restricted
Although the issue of foreign funds was never resolved, the government took the initiative in arbitrarily restricting missionary visas. At first, the government counted on normal attrition. But when the rate of missionary loss was unacceptable, they began to accelerate the attrition rate artificially. By August, 1979, over 100 missionaries had received 6 month visa extensions (instead of the usual 1 year) with the threat of no further renewal. New missionary visas were curtailed sharply. This tightening of restrictions on missionaries has continued in a consistent though varied style until today. In this way, the Indonesian Church was treated with contempt by the Indonesian government. They were denied the right to invite the guests with whom they wanted to work and were given no recourse to any appeal whereas Islamic groups were allowed their constitutional rights.
True Purpose of the Strategy
Within six months of issuing the directives, Alamsyah had moved against the Christian’s freedom to disseminate their religion. But nothing was done to restrict the Muslims. This clearly indicates that the two directives (SK 70 & 77) were never intended for the Muslim groups but only for the non-Muslims. On October 21, 1978, The Indonesian Council of Churches [Dewan Gereja Gereja di Indonesia] and the Indonesia Council of Bishops [Majelis Agung Waligereja Indonesia] [sometimes translated as General Council of the Roman Catholic Church in Indonesia] issued a joint letter strongly opposing these directives and claiming that they violated the basic constitution, the spirit of the Pancasila (5 principles of the Indonesian State), and that there were no bases in law to enforce them. However, Soeharto was publicly pushing the implementation of these two directives (Lanjutkan Pelaksanaan..., 11 October, 1978) and, over time, all of the church protests were ignored by the government because it had already established a precedent of violating the constitution where the Christian Church was concerned.
Consequences of Directives
Also in October, evangelism activity resulted in a number of situations which angered Muslim leaders. There was a complaint about the packets of Christian material being sent by the Living Word Publishing House [Kantor Kalam Hidup] in Bandung. In August, they sent at least 60 packets containing New Testaments, tracts and other Christian material through the mail to Muslim leaders in Majalaya and other places near Bandung.
The Chairman of the Majalaya Ward, Bandung, Council of Muslim Ulamas [Ketua Majelis Ulama Kecamatan Majalaya Bandung] sent a protest to the headquarters of the Operation for Keeping Order [Opstib] in Jakarta, to the West Java Provincial Government, and to the local military post [Opstib Pusat di Jakarta, Pemda Jabar, & Koramil]. A member of parliament said that the government was going to have to make the Directives 70 & 77 into law so that religious dissemination could be controlled better (Pemuka-Pemuka Agama..., 1978).
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE
ANTI-CHRISTIAN POLICY
The Soeharto Regime Redefines the Church
In the early 80’s, the government developed another diversion by which it could gain greater power over all community activity throughout Indonesia. It was the transformation of the state ideology, Pancasila, into a vehicle of national control. This strategy was able not only to distract the Church from its duties and activities but also to redefine its nature. A small incident at a Jakarta election rally in 1982 provided the opportunity. This was called the “Banteng Field Incident” (“Peristiwa Lapangan Banteng”).
Capability of Soeharto Regime to Rapidly Change Indonesian State Philosophy
By December, 1983, the regime’s strategy was in full swing with Soeharto’s address on Muhammad’s birthday [Maulid Nabi Muhammad SAW]. He stated that there was “absolutely no reason for anyone among us to think that Pancasila was a threat to religion”
[...sungguh sangat tidak beralasan apabila masih ada di antara kita yang menganggap Pancasila sebagai ancaman terhadap agama] (Pancasila Ancam..., 18 Dec. 1983, p.1).
Four days later, the National Congress of the Nahdatul Ulama [Munas Alim Ulama NU se Indonesia] at Situbondo laid the groundwork for a future acceptance (in 1984) of the Pancasila as the one and only basis of the organization. When the Full Working Committee of the Indonesian Communion of Churches [Dewan Gereja-Gereja Indonesia] met in August, 1984, they made two statements which were contradictory. First, they gave their agreement that every social organization must accept Pancasila as their sole principle in the Indonesian society. At the same time, they said that 1 Corinthians 3:11 proclaimed that Jesus Christ was the sole foundation of the Church. The Communion of Churches was on the horns of a dilemma which consumed their energies for most of the next five years.
Most of the Church in Indonesia
Capitulates
The Indonesian Communion of Churches began the capitulation by changing their name to the Fellowship of Indonesian Churches [Persekutuan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia] which somehow in their thinking allowed them to be both a social organization as well as a church body. Thus, they were able to say both what the regime wanted to hear as well as what the Church believed as her historic creed. The Council of Bishops for the Roman Catholic Church [Majelis Agung Wali Gereja Indonesia (MAWI)] appealed to the government to not include churches and certain religious groups as social organizations “but as internal Church concerns” (Lembaga Agama..., 3 Sept.1984). They went on to point out that if the Church was considered a social organization, it could be dissolved or frozen.
[“Maka organisasi keagamaan bisa dibubarkan atau dibekukan”, Ibid]
The Social Organization Law
In 1985, the government passed the bill requiring all social organizations to adhere to Pancasila as their sole principle (Undang-Undang No. 8 Tahun 1985 Tentang Organisasi Kemasyarakatan). In their final formula decreed in 1987, the Indonesian Communion of Churches cited Jesus as the foundation [dasar] and Pancasila as the sole principle [asas] of the Church. In fact, the words “foundation” [dasar] and “principle” [asas] are synonyms. But, for the purpose of enhancing the Pancasila philosophy, the Church pretended they were different. The Council of Pentecostal Churches [Dewan Pantekosta Indonesia] and Indonesian Fellowship of Evangelicals [Persekutuan Injili Indonesia] also acceded to this confession. But even more damaging to the theology of the Church, these associations of churches influenced more than 230 church denominations to also accept this formulation as the basis of their existence in Indonesia.
[“...tidak ada alasan apapun juga untuk mempermalukan Gereja dan mendegradasikan Gereja melalui Undang-Undang Keormasan (Undang-Undang Nomor 8 Tahun 1985) menjadi suatu organisasi sosial seperti Muhamadyah atau Nahdatul Ulama. Penguasa dengan demikian telah menginjak-injak HAM dan tidak menghormati serta melaksanakan alinea pertama dari Pembukaan Undang-Undang Dasar 1945.” ] (5 Oct., 1993:3).
End of a Long Process
In his dissertation on religious tolerance in Indonesia, Bonar Sidjabat explains the underlying reason which Sahetapy failed to note. He describes the debate on the meaning of Pancasila between 1945 and 1959 when the Constituent Assembly voted to return to the Constitution of 1945. “This decree also marked a temporary break in philosophical and theological activities among the Indonesians ever since the “Pancasila” was promulgated. But at the same time, this seems to prove that the basic issue in the country without minimizing the political, cultural, and economic problems, has been the religious one” (Sidjabat, 1982:88-89). In 1985, the Soeharto Regime arbitrarily forced their interpretation of Pancasila on the Church to accept its will outside of constitutional channels. At the same time, it created a condition by which any organization could be disenfranchised if it was found to be doing anything considered opposed to the government’s definition of Pancasila; such as criticism. This way Soeharto de facto took control of the Church in Indonesia.
[...sebelum permulaan kebaktian semua hadirin menghadap ke Tokyo (tempat kediaman sang kaisar) dan membungkuk ke arah itu, di depan bendera Jepang yang harus digantung di dalam gedung gereja] (van den End, 1993:328).
Pancasila Becomes Meaningless
The first principle (sila) of Divine Omnipotence had been reinterpreted to make Pancasila a political tool which was perceived as part and parcel of the “Divine Omnipotence.” The government had further tightened their control of the Indonesian Churches. In 1993, the Minister of Religion, H.Tarmizi Taher, smugly wrote that
“the relationship between religion and the Pancasila was clear. All social organizations, including those of religious faiths, had to hold the Pancasila as their sole principle. Belief and theology was based on the religion, that is, their holy books”
[Kedudukan agama dan Pancasila telah jelas. Organisasi kemasyarakatan, tak terkecuali lembaga keagamaan satu-satunya asasnya adalah Pancasila. Sedangkan akidah dan teologi umatnya bersumber pada agama, yaitu kitab suci masing-masing.] (Sairin, 1994:115).
Fear Becomes the Norm of Social Life
During the latter part of the 1980’s the character of Indonesian social, religious, and political life underwent enormous changes during which the evangelistic life of the Church was effectively stifled. Following the government’s lead in sowing suspicion of Christians, Muslim propaganda promoted fear among its followers towards those of other religions. This, in turn, resulted in driving the religious faiths apart and created fear in all religious groups concerning Muslim intentions towards them.
Christian Activity Continually Strangled
By 1985, the Christian missionaries were required to have work permits. This was a departure from a long history of exemption for religious workers in Indonesia. The government also followed the example of the Islamic state of Malaysia in restricting Christian missionaries to only 10 years in the country. When applied, this restriction turned out to be less than 10 years. By March 1986, the government said it would no longer process Christian missionary visas. Nevertheless, some visas continued to be granted.
Final Consequence
The results of the Soeharto Regime’s campaign against the Christian community has been seen more clearly in recent years. The increasing attacks on churches is the outcome of years of spreading distrust and hatred between the Muslim and Christian communities. It is sad that the common people have also been affected by this so that in 1999 many ordinary Muslims no longer have the close personal contact with their Christian friends that they once had. On the contrary, they are injuring and even killing each other in many places in Indonesia. This is the legacy of the Soeharto/Habibi era.
© Roger Linward Dixon
FOOTNOTES
Cooley, Frank L.
(1981). The Growing Seed: The Christian Church in Indonesia.
Jakarta: Christian Publishing House BPK Gunung Mulia.
Religious Organizations As Social
Organizations]. Bandung: Pikiran Rakyat, 3 September,
1984.
Sahetapy,
Prof. Dr. J.E. (5 Oct., 1993). “Pertumbuhan Gereja
Dalam Zaman Orde Baru.” [Growth of the Church in the New
Order] An unpublished paper.
van den End,
Th. & J. Weitjens (1993). Ragi Carita: Sejarah Gereja di
Indonesia 2. [Ragi Carita: History of the Church in
Indonesia] Jakarta: PT BPK Gunung Mulia.
Source : http://www.sunda.org/Church.html
