CHAPTER XXI
BULGARIA ON THE AUCTION BLOCK
The failure of the Allied fleet at the Dardanelles did not definitely settle, the fate of Constantinople. Naturally the Turks and
the Germans felt immensely relieved when the fleet sailed away. But they were by no means entirely easy in their minds. The
most direct road to the ancient capital still remained available to their enemies.
In early September, 1915, one of the most influential Germans in the city gave me a detailed explanation of the prevailing
military situation. He summed up the whole matter in the single phrase:
"We cannot hold the Dardanelles without the military support of Bulgaria."
This meant, of course, that unless Bulgaria aligned herself with Turkey and the Central Empires, the Gallipoli expedition would
succeed, Constantinople would fall, the Turkish Empire would collapse, Russia would be reestablished as an economic and
military power, and the war, in a comparatively brief period, would terminate in a victory for the Entente. Not improbably the
real neutrality of Bulgaria would have had the same result. It is thus perhaps not too much to say that, in September and
October of 1915, the Bulgarian Government held the duration of the war in its hands.
This fact is of such preeminent importance that I call hardly emphasize it too strongly. I suggest that my readers take down the
map of a part of the world with which they are not very familiar---that of the Balkan States, as determined by the Treaty of
Bucharest. All that remains of European Turkey is a small irregular area stretching about one hundred miles west of
Constantinople. The nation whose land is contiguous to European Turkey is Bulgaria. The main railroad line to Western
Europe starts at Constantinople and runs through Bulgaria, by way of Adrianople, Philippopolis, and Sofia. At that time
Bulgaria could muster an army of 500,000 well-trained, completely organized troops. Should these once start marching
toward Constantinople, there was practically nothing to bar their way. Turkey had a considerable army, it is true, but it was
then finding plenty of employment repelling the Allied forces at the Dardanelles and the Russians in the Caucasus. With
Bulgaria hostile, Turkey could obtain neither troops nor munitions from Germany. Turkey would have been completely
isolated and, under the pounding of Bulgaria, would have disappeared as a military force, and as a European state, in one
very brief campaign.
I wish to direct particular attention to this railroad, for it was, after all, the main strategic prize for which Germany was
contending. After leaving Sofia it crosses northeastern Serbia, the most important stations being at Nish and Belgrade. From
the latter point it crosses the River Save and later the River Danube, and thence pursues its course to Budapest and Vienna
and thence to Berlin. Practically all the military operations that took place in the Balkans in 1915-16 had for their ultimate
object the possession of this road. Once holding this line Turkey and Germany would no longer be separated; economically
and militarily they would become a unit. The Dardanelles, as I have described, was the link that connected Russia with her
allies; with this passage closed Russia's collapse rapidly followed. The valleys of the Morava and the Maritza, in which this
railroad is laid, constituted for Turkey a kind of waterless Dardanelles. In her possession it gave her access to her allies; in the
possession of her enemies, the Ottoman Empire would go to pieces. Only the accession of Bulgaria to the Teutonic cause
could give the Turks and Germans this advantage. As soon as Bulgaria entered, that section of the railroad extending to the
Serbian frontier would at once become available. If Bulgaria joined the Central Powers as an active participant, the conquest
of Serbia would inevitably follow, and this would give the link extending from Nish to Belgrade to the Teutonic powers. Thus
the Bulgarian alliance would make Constantinople a suburb of Berlin, place all the resources of the Krupps at the disposal of
the Turkish army, make inevitable the failure of the Allied attack on Gallipoli, and lay the foundation of that Oriental Empire
which had been for thirty years the mainspring of German policy.
It is thus apparent what my German friend meant when, in early September, he said that, "without Bulgaria we cannot hold
the Dardanelles." Everybody sees this so clearly now that there is a prevalent belief that Germany had arranged this Bulgarian
alliance before the outbreak of the war. On this point I have no definite knowledge. That the Bulgarian king and the Kaiser
may have arranged this cooperation in advance is not unlikely. But we must not make the mistake of believing that this settled
the matter, for the experience of the last few years shows us that treaties are not to be taken too seriously. Whether there was
an understanding or not, I know that the Turkish officials and the Germans by no means regarded it as settled that Bulgaria
would take their side. In their talks with me they constantly showed the utmost apprehension over the outcome; and at one
time the fear was general that Bulgaria would take the side of the Entente.
I had my first personal contact with the Bulgarian negotiations in the latter part of May, when I was informed that M.
Koloucheff, the Bulgarian Minister, had notified Robert College that the Bulgarian students could not remain until the end of
the college year, but would have to return home by June 5th. The Constantinople College for Women had also received word
that all the Bulgarian girls must return at the same time. Both these American institutions had many Bulgarian students, in most
cases splendid representatives of their country; it is through these colleges, indeed, that the distant United States and Bulgaria
had established such friendly relations. But they had never had such an experience before.
Everybody was discussing the meaning of this move., It seemed quite apparent. The chief topic of conversation at that time
was Bulgaria. Would she enter the war? If so, on which side would she cast her fortunes? One day it was reported that she
would join the Entente; the next day that she had decided to ally herself with the Central Powers. The prevailing belief was
that she was actively bargaining with both sides and looking for the highest terms. Should Bulgaria go with the Entente,
however, it would be undesirable to have any Bulgarian subjects marooned in Turkey. As the boys and girls in the American
colleges usually came from important Bulgarian families---one of them was the daughter of General Ivanoff, who led the
Bulgarian armies in the Balkan wars---the Bulgarian Government might naturally have a particular interest in their safety.
The conclusion reached by most people was that Bulgaria had decided to take the side of the Entente. The news rapidly
spread throughout Constantinople. The Turks were particularly impressed. Dr. Patrick, President of Constantinople College
for Women, arranged a hurried commencement for her Bulgarian students, which I attended. It was a sad occasion, more like
a funeral than the festivity that usually took place.
I found the Bulgarian girls almost immediately, most in a hysterical state; they all believed that war was coming and that they
were being bundled home merely to prevent them from failing into the clutches of the Turks. My sympathies were so aroused
that we brought them down to the American Embassy, where we all spent a delightful evening. After dinner the girls dried
their eyes and entertained us by singing many of their beautiful Bulgarian songs, and what had started as a mournful day thus
had a happy ending. Next morning the girls all left for Bulgaria.
A few weeks afterward the Bulgarian Minister told me that the Government had summoned the students home merely for
political effect. There was no immediate likelihood of war, he said. But Bulgaria wished Germany and Turkey to understand
that there was still a chance that she might join the Entente. Bulgaria, as all of us suspected, was apparently on the auction
block. The one fixed fact in the Bulgarian position was the determination to have Macedonia. Everything, said Koloucheff,
depended upon that. His conversations reflected the general Bulgarian view that Bulgaria had fairly won this territory in the
first Balkan war, that the Powers had unjustly permitted her to be deprived of it, that it was Bulgarian by race, language, and
tradition, and that there could be no permanent peace in the Balkans until it was returned to its rightful possessors. But
Bulgaria insisted on more than a promise, to be redeemed after the war was over; she demanded immediate occupation.
Once Macedonia were turned over to Bulgaria, she would join her forces to those of the Entente. There were two great
prizes in the game then being played in the Balkans: one was Macedonia, which Bulgaria must have; and the other
Constantinople, which Russia was determined to get. Bulgaria was entirely willing that Russia should have Constantinople if
she herself could obtain Macedonia.
I was given to understand that the Bulgarian General Staff had plans all completed for the capture of Constantinople, and that
they had shown these plans to the Entente. Their programme called for a Bulgarian army of about 300,000 men who would
besiege Constantinople twenty-three days from the time the signal to start should be given. But promises of Macedonia would
not suffice; the Bulgarian must have possession.
Bulgaria recognized the difficulties of the Allied position. She did not believe that Serbia and Greece would voluntarily
surrender Macedonia, nor did she believe that the Allies would dare to take this country away from them by force. In that
event, she thought that there was a danger that Serbia might make a separate peace with the Central Powers. On the other
hand, Bulgaria would object if Serbia received Bosnia and Herzegovina as compensation for the loss of Macedonia---she felt
that an enlarged Serbia would be a constant menace to her, and hence a future menace to peace in the Balkans. Thus the
situation was extremely difficult and complicated.
One of the best-informed men in Turkey was Paul Weitz, the correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung. Weitz was more
than a journalist; he had spent thirty years in Constantinople; he had the most intimate personal knowledge of Turkish affairs,
and he was the confidant and adviser of the German Embassy. His duties there were actually semi-diplomatic. Weitz had
really been one of the most successful agencies in the German penetration of Turkey; it was common talk that he knew every
important man in the Turkish Empire, the best way to approach him, and his price. I had several talks with Weitz about
Bulgaria during those critical August and early September days. He said many times that it was not at all certain that she
would join her forces with Germany. Yet on September 7th Weitz came to me with important news. The situation had
changed over night. Baron Neurath, the Conseiller of the German Embassy at Constantinople, had gone to Sofia, and, as a
result of his visit, an agreement had been signed that would make Bulgaria Germany's ally.
Germany, said Weitz, had won over Bulgaria by doing something which the Entente had not been able and willing to do. It
had secured her the possession at once of a piece of coveted territory. Serbia had refused to give Bulgaria immediate
possession of Macedonia; Turkey, on the other hand, had now surrendered a piece of the Ottoman Empire. The amount of
land in question, it is true, was apparently insignificant, yet it had great strategic advantages and represented a genuine
sacrifice by Turkey. The Maritza River, a few miles north of Enos, bends to the east, to the north, and then to the west again,
creating a block of territory, with an area of nearly 1,000 square miles, including the important cities of Demotica, Kara
Agatch, and half of Adrianople. What makes this land particularly important is that it contains about fifty miles of the railroad
which runs from Dedeagatch to Sofia. All this railroad, that is, except this fifty miles, is laid in Bulgarian territory; this short
strip, extending through Turkey, cuts Bulgaria's communications with the Mediterranean. Naturally Bulgaria yearned for this
piece of land; and Turkey now handed it over to her. This cession changed the whole Balkan situation and it made Bulgaria
an ally of Turkey and the Central Powers. Besides the railroad, Bulgaria obtained that part of Adrianople which lay west of
the Maritza River. In addition, of course, Bulgaria was to receive Macedonia, as soon as that province could be occupied by
Bulgaria and her allies.
I vividly remember the exultation of Weitz when this agreement was signed.
"It's all settled," he told me. "Bulgaria has decided to join us. It was all arranged last night at Sofia."
The Turks also were greatly relieved. For the first time they saw the way out of their troubles. The Bulgarian arrangement,
Enver told me, had taken a tremendous weight off their minds.
"We Turks are entitled to the credit," he said, "of bringing Bulgaria in on the side of the Central Powers. She would never
have come to our assistance if we hadn't given her that slice of land. By surrendering it immediately and not waiting till the end
of the war, we showed our good faith. It was very hard for us to do it, of course, especially to give up part of the city of
Adrianople, but it was worth the price. We really surrendered this territory in exchange for Constantinople, for if Bulgaria had
not come in on our side, we would have lost this city. Just think how enormously we have improved our position. We have
had to keep more than 200,000 men at the Bulgarian frontier, to protect us against any possible attack from that quarter. We
can now transfer all these troops to the Gallipoli peninsula, and thus make it absolutely impossible that the Allies' expedition
can succeed. We are also greatly hampered at the Dardanelles by the lack of ammunition. But Bulgaria, Austria, and
Germany are to make a joint attack on Serbia and will completely control that country in a few weeks. So we shall have a
direct railroad line from Constantinople into Austria and Germany and can get all the war supplies which we need. With
Bulgaria on our side no attack can be made on Constantinople from the north---we have created an impregnable bulwark
against Russia. I do not deny that the situation had caused us great anxiety. We were afraid that Greece and Bulgaria would
join hands, and that would also bring in Rumania. Then Turkey would have been lost; they would have had us between a pair
of pincers. But now we have only one task before us, that is to drive the English and French at the Dardanelles into the sea.
With all the soldiers and all the ammunition which we need, we shall do this in a very short time. We gave up a small area
because we saw that that was the way to win the war."
The outcome justified Enver's prophecies in almost every detail. Three months after Bulgaria accepted the Adrianople bribe,
the Entente admitted defeat and withdrew its forces from the Dardanelles; and, with this withdrawal, Russia, which was the
greatest potential source of strength to the Allied cause and the country which, properly organized and supplied, might have
brought the Allies a speedy triumph, disappeared as a vital factor in the war. When the British and French withdrew from
Gallipoli that action turned adrift this huge hulk of a country to flounder to anarchy, dissolution, and ruin.
The Germans celebrated this great triumph in a way that was characteristically Teutonic. In their minds, January 17, 1916,
stands out as one of the big dates in the war. There was great rejoicing in Constantinople, for the first Balkan express---or, as
the Germans called it, the Balkanzug---was due to arrive that afternoon! The railroad station was decorated with flags and
flowers, and the whole German and Austrian population of Constantinople, including the Embassy staffs, assembled to
welcome the incoming train. As it finally rolled into the station, thousands of "hochs " went up from as many raucous throats.
Since that January 17, 1916, the Balkanzug has ran regularly from. Berlin to Constantinople. The Germans believe that it is
as permanent a feature of the new Germanic Empire as the line from Berlin to Hamburg.
CHAPTER XXII
THE TURK REVERTS TO THE ANCESTRAL TYPE
The withdrawal of the Allied fleet from the Dardanelles had consequences which the world does not yet completely
understand. The practical effect of the event, as I have said, was to isolate the Turkish Empire from all the world excepting
Germany and Austria. England, France, Russia, and Italy, which for a century had held a restraining hand over the Ottoman
Empire, had finally lost all power to influence or control. The Turks now perceived that a series of dazzling events had
changed them from cringing dependents of the European Powers into free agents. For the first time in two centuries they
could now live their national life according to their own inclinations, and govern their peoples according to their own will. The
first expression of this rejuvenated national life was an episode which, so far as I know, is the most terrible in the history of
the world. New Turkey, freed from European tutelage, celebrated its national rebirth by murdering not far from a million of its
own subjects.
I can hardly exaggerate the effect which the repulse of the Allied fleet produced upon the Turks. They believed that they had
won the really great decisive battle of the war. For several centuries, they said, the British fleet had victoriously sailed the seas
and had now met its first serious reverse at the hands of the Turks. In the first moments of their pride, the Young Turk leaders
saw visions of the complete resurrection of their empire. What had for two centuries been a decaying nation had suddenly
started on a new and glorious life. In their pride and arrogance the Turks began to look with disdain upon the people that had
taught them what they knew of modern warfare, and nothing angered them so much as any suggestion that they owed any
part of their success to their German allies.
"Why should we feel any obligation to the Germans? " Enver would say to me. "What have they done for us which compares
with what we have done for them? They have lent us some money and sent us a few officers, it is true, but see what we have
done! We have defeated the British fleet---something which neither the Germans nor any other nation could do. We have
stationed armies on the Caucasian front, and so have kept busy large bodies of Russian troops that would have been used on
the western front. Similarly we have compelled England to keep large armies in Egypt, in Mesopotamia, and in that way we
have weakened the Allied armies in France. No, the Germans could never have achieved their military successes without us;
the shoe of obligation is entirely on their foot."
This conviction possessed the leaders of the Union and Progress Party and now began to have a determining effect upon
Turkish national life and Turkish policy. Essentially the Turk is a bully and a coward; he is brave as a lion when things are
going his way, but cringing, abject, and nerveless when reverses are overwhelming him. And now that the fortunes of war
were apparently favouring the empire, I began to see an entirely new Turk unfolding before my eyes. The hesitating and
fearful Ottoman, feeling his way cautiously amid the mazes of European diplomacy, and seeking opportunities to find an
advantage for himself in the divided counsels of the European powers, gave place to an upstanding, almost dashing figure,
proud and assertive, determined to live his own life and absolutely contemptuous of his Christian foes. I was really witnessing
a remarkable development in race psychology---an almost classical instance of reversion to type. The ragged, unkempt Turk
of the twentieth century was vanishing and in his place was appearing the Turk of the fourteenth and the fifteenth, the Turk
who had swept out of his Asiatic fastnesses, conquered all the powerful peoples in his way, and founded in Asia, Africa, and
Europe one of the most extensive empires that history has known. If we are properly to appreciate this new Talaat and Enver
and the events which now took place, we must understand the Turk who, under Osman and his successors, exercised this
mighty but devastating influence in the world. We must realize that the basic fact underlying the Turkish mentality is its utter
contempt for all other races. A fairly insane pride is the element that largely explains this strange human species. The common
term applied by the Turk to the Christian is "dog," and in his estimation this is no mere rhetorical figure; he actually looks upon
his European neighbours as far less worthy of consideration than his own domestic animals. "My son," an old Turk once said,
"do you see that herd of swine? Some are white, some are black, some are large, some are small---they differ from each
other in some respects, but they are all swine. So it is with Christians. Be not deceived, my son. These Christians may wear
fine clothes, their women may be very beautiful to look upon; their skins are white and splendid; many of them are very
intelligent and they build wonderful cities and create what seem to be great states. But remember that underneath all this
dazzling exterior they are all the same---they are, all swine."
Practically all foreigners, while in the presence of a Turk, are conscious of this attitude. The Turk may be obsequiously polite,
but there is invariably an almost unconscious. feeling that he is mentally shrinking from his Christian friend as something
unclean. And this fundamental conviction for centuries directed the Ottoman policy toward its subject peoples. This wild
horde swept from the plains of Central Asia and, like a whirlwind, overwhelmed the nations of Mesopotamia and Asia Minor;
it conquered Egypt, Arabia, and practically all of northern Africa and then poured into Europe, crushed the Balkan nations,
occupied a large part of Hungary, and even established the outposts of the Ottoman Empire in the southern part of Russia. So
far as I can discover, the Ottoman Turks had only one great quality, that of military genius. They had several military leaders
of commanding ability, and the early conquering Turks were brave, fanatical, and tenacious fighters, just as their descendants
are to-day. I think that these old Turks present the most complete illustration in history of the brigand idea in politics. They
were lacking in what we may call the fundamentals of a civilized community. They had no alphabet and no art of writing; no
books, no poets, no art, and no architecture; they built no cities and they established no lasting state. They knew no law
except the rule of might, and they had practically no agriculture and no industrial organization. They were simply wild and
marauding horsemen, whose one conception of tribal success was to pounce upon people who were more civilized than
themselves and plunder them. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries these tribes overran the cradles of modern civilization,
which have given Europe its religion and, to a large extent, its civilization.
At that time these territories were the seats of many
peaceful and prosperous nations. The Mesopotamian valley supported a large industrious agricultural population; Bagdad
was one of the largest and most flourishing cities in existence; Constantinople had a greater population than Rome, and the
Balkan region and Asia Minor contained several powerful states. Over all this part of the world the Turk now swept as a
huge, destructive force. Mesopotamia in a few years became a desert; the great cities of the Near East were reduced to
misery, and the subject peoples became slaves. Such graces of civilization as the Turk has acquired in five centuries have
practically all been taken from the subject peoples whom he so greatly despises. His religion comes from the Arabs; his
language has acquired a certain literary value by borrowing certain Arabic and Persian elements; and his writing is Arabic.
Constantinople's finest architectural monument, the Mosque of St. Sophia, was originally a Christian church, and all so-called
Turkish architecture is derived from the Byzantine. The mechanism of business and industry has always rested in the hands of
the subject peoples, Greeks, Jews, Armenians, and Arabs. The Turks have learned little of European art or science, they
have established very few educational institutions, and illiteracy is the prevailing rule.
The result is that poverty has attained a degree of sordidness and misery in the Ottoman Empire which is almost unparalleled
elsewhere. The Turkish peasant lives in a mud hut; he sleeps on a dirt floor; he has no chairs, no tables, no eating utensils, no
clothes except the few scant garments which cover his back and which he usually wears for many years.
In the course of time these Turks might learn certain things from their European and Arab neighbours, but there was one idea
which they could never even faintly grasp. They could not understand. that a conquered people were anything except slaves.
When they took possession of a land, they found it occupied by a certain number of camels, horses, buffaloes., dogs, swine,
and human beings. Of all these living things the object that physically most resembled themselves they regarded as the least
important. It became a common saying with them that a horse or a camel was far more valuable than a man; these animals
cost money, whereas "infidel Christians" were plentiful in the Ottoman countries and could easily be forced to labour. It is true
that the early Sultans gave the subject peoples and the Europeans in the empire certain rights, but these in themselves really
reflected the contempt in which all non-Moslems were held. I have already described the "Capitulations," under which
foreigners in Turkey had their own courts, prisons, post offices, and other institutions. Yet the early sultans gave these
privileges not from a spirit of tolerance, but merely because they looked upon the Christian nations as unclean and therefore
unfit to have any contact with the Ottoman administrative and judicial system. The sultans similarly erected the several
peoples, such as the Greeks and the Armenians, into separate "millets," or nations, not because they desired to promote their
independence and welfare, but because they regarded them as vermin, and therefore disqualified for membership in the
Ottoman state. The attitude of the Government toward their Christian subjects was illustrated by certain regulations which
limited their freedom of action. The buildings in which Christians lived should not be conspicuous and their churches should
have no belfry. Christians could not ride a horse in the city, for that was the exclusive right of the noble Moslem. The Turk
had the right to test the sharpness of his sword upon the neck of any Christian.
Imagine a great government year in and year out maintaining this attitude toward many millions of its own subjects! And for
centuries the Turks simply lived like parasites upon these overburdened and industrious people. They taxed them to economic
extinction, stole their most beautiful daughters and forced them into their harems, took Christian male infants by the hundreds
of thousands and brought them up as Moslem soldiers. I have no intention of describing the terrible vassalage and oppression
that went on for five centuries; my purpose is merely to emphasize this innate attitude of the Moslem Turk to people not of his
own race and religion---that they are not human beings with rights, but merely chattels, which may be permitted to live when
they promote the interest of their masters, but which may be pitilessly destroyed when they have ceased to be useful. This
attitude is intensified by a total disregard for human life and an intense delight in inflicting physical human suffering which are
not unusually the qualities of primitive peoples.
Such were the mental characteristics of the Turk in his days of military greatness. In recent times his attitude toward foreigners
and his subject peoples had superficially changed. His own military decline and the ease with which the infidel nations
defeated his finest armies bad apparently given the haughty descendants of Osman a respect at least for their prowess. The
rapid disappearance of his own empire in a hundred years, the creation out of the Ottoman Empire of new states like Greece,
Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, and the wonderful improvement which had followed the destruction of the Turkish yoke in
these benighted lands, may have increased the Ottoman hatred for the unbeliever, but at least they had a certain influence in
opening his eyes to his importance. Many Turks also now received their education in European universities; they studied in
their professional schools, and they became physicians, surgeons, lawyers, engineers, and chemists of the modern kind.
However much the more progressive Moslems might despise their Christian associates, they could not ignore the fact that the
finest things, in this temporal world at least, were the products of European and American civilization.
And now that one development of modern history which seemed to be least understandable to the Turk began to force itself
upon the consciousness of the more intelligent and progressive. Certain leaders arose who began to speak surreptitiously of
such things as "Constitutionalism," "Liberty," "Self-government," and to whom the Declaration of Independence contained
certain truths that might have a value even for Islam. These daring spirits began to dream of overturning the autocratic Sultan
and of substituting a parliamentary system for his irresponsible rule. I have already described the rise and fall of this Young
Turk movement under such leaders as Talaat, Enver, Djemal, and their associates in the Committee of Union and Progress.
The point which I am emphasizing here is that this movement presupposed a complete transformation of Turkish mentality,
especially in its attitude toward subject peoples. No longer, under the reformed Turkish state, were Greeks, Syrians,
Armenians, and Jews to be regarded as " filthy giaours." All these peoples were henceforth to have equal rights and equal
duties. A general love feast now followed the establishment of the new r?gime, and scenes of almost frenzied reconciliation, in
which Turks and Armenians embraced each other publicly, apparently signalized the absolute union of the long antagonistic
peoples. The Turkish leaders, including Talaat and Enver, visited Christian churches and sent forth prayers of thanksgiving for
the new order, and went to Armenian cemeteries to shed tears of retribution over the bones of the martyred Armenians who
lay there. Armenian priests reciprocally paid their tributes to the Turks in Mohammedan mosques. Enver Pasha visited several
Armenian schools, telling the children that the old days of Moslem-Christian strife had passed forever and that the two
peoples were now to live together as brothers and sisters. There were cynics who smiled at all these demonstrations and yet
one development encouraged even them to believe that an earthly paradise had arrived. All through the period of domination
only the master Moslem had been permitted to bear arms and serve in the Ottoman army. To be a soldier was an occupation
altogether too manly and glorious for the despised Christian. But now the Young Turks encouraged all Christians to arm, and
enrolled them in the army on an equality with Moslems. These Christians fought, both as officers and soldiers, in the Italian
and the Balkan wars, winning high praise from the Turkish generals for their valour and skill. Armenian leaders had figured
conspicuously in the Young Turk movement; these men apparently believed that a constitutional Turkey was possible. They
were conscious of their own intellectual and industrial superiority to the Turks, and knew that they could prosper in the
Ottoman Empire if left alone, whereas, under European control, they would have greater difficulty in meeting the competition
of the more rigorous European colonists who might come in. With the deposition of the
Red Sultan, Abdul Hamid, and the
establishment of a constitutional system, the Armenians now for the first time in several centuries felt themselves to be free
men.
But, as I have already described, all these aspirations vanished like a dream. Long before the European War began, the
Turkish democracy had disappeared. The power of the new Sultan had gone, and the hopes of regenerating Turkey on
modern lines had gone also, leaving only a group of individuals, headed by Talaat and Enver, actually in possession of the
state. Having lost their democratic aspirations these men now supplanted them with a new national conception. In place of a
democratic constitutional state they resurrected the idea of Pan-Turkism; in place of equal treatment of all Ottomans, they
decided to establish a country exclusively for Turks. I have called this a new conception; yet it was new only to the individuals
who then controlled the destiny of the empire, for, in reality, it was simply an attempt to revive the most barbaric ideas of their
ancestors. It represented, as I have said, merely an atavistic reversion to the original Turk. We now saw that the Turkish
leaders, in talking about liberty, equality, fraternity, and constitutionalism, were merely children repeating phrases; that they
had used the word "democracy" merely as a ladder by which to climb to power. After five hundred years' close contact with
European civilization, the Turk remained precisely the same individual as the one who had emerged from the steppes of Asia
in the Middle Ages. He was clinging just as tenaciously as his ancestors to that conception of a state as consisting of a few
master individuals whose right it is to enslave and plunder and maltreat any peoples whom they can subject to their military
control. Though Talaat and Enver and Djemal all came of the humblest families, the same fundamental ideas of master and
slave possessed them that formed the statecraft of Osman and the early Sultans. We now discovered that a paper constitution
and even tearful visits to Christian churches and cemeteries could not uproot the inborn preconception of this nomadic tribe
that there are only two kinds of people in the world---the conquering and the conquered.
When the Turkish Government abrogated the Capitulations, and in this way freed themselves from the domination of the
foreign powers, they were merely taking one step toward realizing this Pan-Turkish ideal. I have alluded to the difficulties
which I had with them over the Christian schools. Their determination to uproot these, or at least to transform them into
Turkish institutions, was merely another detail in the same racial progress. Similarly, they attempted to make all foreign
business houses employ only Turkish labour, insisting that they should discharge their Greek, Armenian, and Jewish clerks,
stenographers, workmen, and other employees. They ordered all foreign houses to keep their books in Turkish; they wanted
to furnish employment for Turks, and enable them to acquire modern business methods. The Ottoman Government even
refused to have any dealings with the representative of the largest Austrian munition maker unless he admitted a Turk as a
partner. They developed a mania for suppressing all languages except Turkish. For decades French had been the accepted
language of foreigners in Constantinople; most street signs were printed in both French and Turkish. One morning the
astonished foreign residents discovered that all these French signs had been removed and that the names of streets, the
directions on street cars, and other public notices, appeared only in those strange Turkish characters, which very few of them
understood. Great confusion resulted from this change, but the ruling powers refused to restore the detested foreign language.
These leaders not only reverted to the barbaric conceptions of their ancestors, but they went to extremes that had never
entered the minds of the early sultans. Their fifteenth and sixteenth century predecessors treated the subject peoples as dirt
under their feet, yet they believed that they had a certain usefulness and did not disdain to make them their slaves. But this
Committee of Union and Progress, led by Talaat and Enver, now decided to do away with them altogether. The old
conquering Turks had made the Christians their servants, but their parvenu descendants bettered their instruction, for they
determined to exterminate them wholesale and Turkify the empire by massacring the non-Moslem elements. Originally this
was not the statesmanlike conception of Talaat and Enver; the man who first devised it was one of the greatest monsters
known to history, the "Red Sultan", Abdul Hamid. This man came to the throne in 1876, at a critical period in Turkish history.
In the first two years of his reign, he lost Bulgaria as well as important provinces in the Caucasus, his last remaining vestiges of
sovereignty in Montenegro, Serbia, and Rumania, and all his real powers in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Greece had long since
become an independent nation, and the processes that were to wrench Egypt from the Ottoman Empire had already began.
As the Sultan took stock of his inheritance, he could easily foresee the day when all the rest of his domain would pass into the
hand of the infidel. What had caused this disintegration of this extensive Turkish Empire? The real cause, of course, lay deep
in the character of the Turk, but Abdul Hamid saw only the more obvious fact that the intervention of the great European
Powers had brought relief to these imprisoned nations. Of all the new kingdoms which had been carved out of the Sultan's
dominions, Serbia---let us remember this fact to her everlasting honour---is the only one that has won her own independence.
Russia, France, and Great Britain have set free all the rest. And what had happened several times before might happen again.
There still remained one compact race in the Ottoman Empire that had national aspirations and national potentialities. In the
northeastern part of Asia Minor, bordering on Russia, there were six provinces in which the Armenians formed the largest
element in the population. From the time of Herodotus this portion of Asia has borne the name of Armenia. The Armenians of
the present day are the direct descendants of the people who inhabited the
country three thousand years ago. Their origin is
so ancient that it is lost in fable and mystery. There are still undeciphered cuneiform inscriptions on the rocky hills of Van, the,
largest Armenian city, that have led certain scholars---though not many, I must admit---to identify the Armenian race with the
Hittites of the Bible. What is definitely known about the Armenians, however, is that for ages they have constituted the most
civilized and most industrious race in the eastern section of the Ottoman Empire. From their mountains they have spread over
the Sultan's dominions, and form a considerable element in the population of all the large cities. Everywhere they are known
for their industry, their intelligence, and their decent and orderly lives. They are so superior to the Turks intellectually and
morally that much of the business and industry had passed into their hands. With the Greeks, the Armenians constitute the
economic strength of the empire. These people became Christians in the fourth century and established the Armenian Church
as their state religion. This is said to be the oldest Christian Church in existence.
In face of persecutions which have had no parallel elsewhere these people have clung to their early Christian faith with the
utmost tenacity. For fifteen hundred years they have lived there in Armenia, a little island of Christians surrounded by
backward peoples of hostile religion and hostile race. Their long existence has been one unending martyrdom. The territory
which they inhabit forms the connecting link between Europe and Asia, and all the Asiatic invasions---Saracens, Tartars,
Mongols, Kurds, and Turks---have passed over their peaceful country. For centuries they have thus been the Belgium of the
East. Through all this period the Armenians have regarded themselves not as Asiatics, but as Europeans. They speak an
Indo-European language, their racial origin is believed by scholars to be Aryan, and the fact that their religion is the religion of
Europe has always made them turn their eyes westward. And out of that western country, they have always hoped, would
some day come the deliverance that would rescue them from their murderous masters. And now, as Abdul Hamid, in 1876,
surveyed his shattered domain, he saw that its most dangerous spot was Armenia. He believed, rightly or wrongly, that these
Armenians, like the Rumanians, the Bulgarians, the Greeks, and the Serbians, aspired to restore their independent medieval
nation, and he knew that Europe and America sympathized with this ambition. The Treaty of Berlin, which had definitely
ended the Turco-Russian War, contained an article which gave the European Powers a protecting hand over the Armenians.
How could the Sultan free himself permanently from this danger? An enlightened administration, which would have
transformed the Armenians into free men and made them safe in their lives and property and civil and religious rights, would
probably have made them peaceful and loyal subjects. But the Sultan could not rise to such a conception of statesmanship as
this. Instead, Abdul Hamid apparently thought that there was only one way of ridding Turkey of the Armenian problem---and
that was to rid her of the Armenians. The physical destruction of 2,000,000 men, women, and children by massacres,
organized and directed by the state, seemed to be the one sure way of forestalling the further disruption of the Turkish
Empire.
And now for nearly thirty years Turkey gave the world an illustration of government by massacre. We in Europe and America
heard of these events when they reached especially monstrous proportions, as they did in 1895-96, when nearly 200,000
Armenians were most atrociously done to death. But through all these years the existence of the Armenians was one
continuous nightmare. Their property was stolen, their men were murdered, their women were ravished, their young girls
were kidnapped and forced to live in Turkish harems. Yet Abdul Hamid was not able to accomplish his full purpose. Had he
had his will, he would have massacred the whole nation in one hideous orgy. He attempted to exterminate the Armenians in
1895 and 1896, but found certain insuperable obstructions to his scheme. Chief of these were England, France, and Russia.
These atrocities called Gladstone, then eighty-six years old, from his retirement, and his speeches, in which he denounced the
Sultan as "the great assassin," aroused the whole world to the enormities that were taking place. It became apparent that
unless the Sultan desisted, England, France, and Russia would intervene, and the Sultan well knew, that, in case this
intervention took place, such remnants of Turkey as had survived earlier partitions would disappear. Thus Abdul Hamid had
to abandon his satanic enterprise of destroying a whole race by murder, yet Armenia continued to suffer the slow agony of
pitiless persecution. Up to the outbreak of the European War not a day had passed in the Armenian vilayets without its
outrages and its murders. The Young Turk r?gime, despite its promises of universal brotherhood, brought no respite to the
Armenians. A few months after the love feastings already described, one of the worst massacres took place at Adana, in
which 35,000 people were destroyed.
And now the Young Turks, who had adopted so many of Abdul Hamid's ideas, also made his Armenian policy their own.
Their passion for Turkifying the nation seemed to demand logically the extermination of all Christians---Greeks, Syrians, and
Armenians. Much as they admired the Mohammedan conquerors of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, they stupidly
believed that these great warriors had made one fatal mistake, for they had had it in their power completely to obliterate the
Christian populations and had neglected to do so.
This policy in their opinion was a fatal error of statesmanship and explained
all the woes from which Turkey has suffered in modern times. Had these old Moslem chieftains, when they conquered
Bulgaria, put, all the Bulgarians to the sword, and peopled the Bulgarian country with Moslem Turks, there would never have
been any modern Bulgarian problem and Turkey would never have lost this part of her empire. Similarly, had they destroyed
all the Rumanians, Serbians, and Greeks, the provinces which are now occupied by these races would still have remained
integral parts of the Sultan's domain. They felt that the mistake had been a terrible one, but that something might be saved
from the ruin.