A CLOSER LOOK AT IRAN

  

by: David Zeidan

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONTENTS

 

INTRODUCTION 3

GEOGRAPHY 5

BRIEF HISTORY 6

IRANIAN ISLAMIC REVOLUTION & REPUBLIC 10

PEOPLE GROUPS IN IRAN 11

TWELVER-SHI`ISM AS RELIGION OF STATE 21

IMPACT OF SUFISM 23

IRANIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 25

IRANIAN CULTURAL TRAITS 26

CONSPIRACY THEORIES 28

INDIGENOUS ANCIENT CHURCHES 29

HISTORY OF MISSIONS 33

IRANIANS ABROAD 39

BIBLIOGRAPHY 46

 

 

  INTRODUCTION

 The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran came as a complete surprise to most observers, including mission agencies and missionaries working in Iran. This surprise was due to a misunderstanding of the Iranian context and identity and a gullible belief in the modernizing and secularizing theories of Western experts and the media.

This paper examines some of Iran's unique characteristics, hoping this will give a better understanding of Iran and Iranians that will be an aid to evangelistic efforts in the future.

Iran is unique in many ways. It is unique as one of the world's oldest centres of civilization that has forged and maintained specific identities over centuries. Iran has been independent or quasi-independent for most of the last 2500 years. It is one of the most ethnically diverse states in the world and the only one with Twelver Shi`a Islam as official state religion.

Whilst Iran has many similarities with other Muslim Middle East and Central Asian countries, it has its own special distinctives conditioned by its geography, history, religion and culture, which need to be taken account of in any involvement in that country.

 

Iran lies at the heart of five wider overlapping circles:

A. The Iranian language-family area which includes Farsi, Kurdish, Baluch, Tajik, Pashto, Dari - a total population of over 110 million. Whilst these are very diverse groups, and some are seeking autonomy from central governments (Kurds, Baluch), there is a cultural affinity.

B. The Persian (Farsi) language region. which includes Farsi, Tajik, Dari, which are mutually intelligible and can be seen as dialects of the same language. This enhances the cultural impact of Farsi as the carrier of the great classical culture of the region, and is an important element in the identity of these groups.

C. The Shi`a world community - besides Iran, where Shi`a are an overwhelming majority, there are sizable Shi`a communities in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Pakistan, North India, Yemen, Gulf, Saudi-Arabia, Azerbaijan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Iran is the only state with Shi`a Islam as the State religion, but there are important Shi`a communities in all the above mentioned states. In Iraq the Shi`a are the largest community, though the Sunnis are dominant. While Iranian Shi`ism is of the Twelver variety, all Shi`a communities: Isma`ili`li, Alevi, Alawi, Zaidi, feel nearer to Twelver Shi`sm than to Sunnism, and thus have a special affinity to Iran.

D. The Irano-Islamic Cultural Tradition - Iran, Central Asia, Caucasus, Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, North-India. After the first centuries of Arab-dominated Islamic culture, it was the Persian-Islamic culture that dominated most of the non-Arab Muslim world. Farsi was the cultural language of this huge area until the modern nationalistic era when the national languages such as Urdu. Turkish, Pashto, gained ascendancy.

E. The Sufi tradition - whilst Sufism is widespread throughout the whole Muslim world, many of the major classical Sufi masters wrote in Farsi (Rumi, Hafiz, Sa`di and many more). Sufism was instrumental in keeping the Muslim world together during the terrible Mongol invasion, and instrumental in the conversion of Mongols, Turks and others to Islam in the following centuries. It has had a special impact in Iran.

The Christian communities in Iran have a long history going back to the Book of Acts. Once large, relatively powerful and missionary minded, they have gradually dwindled due to devastating wars, massacres, and long-term Muslim pressure. The trend since the 10th century has been to an ever smaller percentage of the total population, this trend continues right up to the end of the 20th century. Emigration to the West is now the main drain on the Christian presence. The time can be foreseen when the Christians of Iran will almost vanish and be but a memory of history.

 

 

FACTS AND STATISTICS (1993)

 CAPITAL: TEHRAN, 6 MILLION

OFFICIAL LANGUAGE: FARSI

OTHER IMPORTANT LANGUAGES: AZERI, KURDISH, BALUCH,ARABIC, GILAKI,

MAZANDARANI, ETC.

AREA: 1.648 MILLION SQKM

POPULATION: 60 MILLION; 1995 - 66 m.

ANNUAL POPULATION GROWTH: 3.4%

GDP PER HEAD: $ 957; 1995 - $ 450

URBANIZATION: 57%

LITERACY: 53% (65% M; 43% F)

MAJOR TOWNS: MASHAD 1.4M; ESFAHAN 1.3 M; RAI 1.2M

TABRIZ 1M; SHIRAZ 850,000

OFFICIAL RELIGION: TWELVER SHI`A ISLAM

TRIBALLY ORGANIZED POPULATION: 10% -15%

NOMADIC POPULATION: 2%

 

 

GEOGRAPHY

 Situated in southwestern Asia, on the northeastern rim of the Middle East, Iran is a vast semi-arid plateau bounded by high mountain chains (the Zagros in the West; the Makran in the south and the Elburz in the North) and steppes. The central plateau contains two salt deserts, the Dasht-i-Kavir in the North and the Dasht-i-Lut in the south. Iran's mountainous character enhanced the variety of ethnic-linguistic groups living fairly isolated from each other, and made centralization difficult. The main areas of settlement are in or on the fringes of the plateau where the urban, peasant and tribal populations belong to the majority Shi`a community. Non-Muslims usually congregate in the towns. The remoter mountains and steppes tend to be occupied by tribally organized liguistic minorities, often of the Sunni community.

Iran has frontiers with Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan in the north, Turkey and Iraq in the West, Turkmenistan in the Northeast, and Afghanistan and Pakistan in the East. It controls all the Eastern coast of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, and the Southern coastline of the Caspian Sea.

Iran is strategically important as a land bridge between the Middle East (Fertile Crescent) and India, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Important trade routes, especially the Old Silk Route, traversed its territory, linking Europe, the Mediterranean and Arabia to India, Central Asia and China. In spite of its mountainous character many people and conquerors migrated through it and fought and settled in it, leaving their mark on its diversity in culture, religion, languages and customs.

The discovery of large oil deposits in the 20th century have made it doubly strategic and as such liable to increased pressure from the superpowers interested in the area and its resources. It also nourished Iranian dreams of becoming the region's hegemonic local power.

 

 

BRIEF HISTORY

 Achaemenids and Seleucids

 Elamites, Medes and Persians composed the ancient population of the Iranian region. In 550 BC the Persians under Cyrus the Great conquered a large part of the ancient world, creating the Achaemenid Empire stretching from the Indus to the Nile. Zoroastrianism was the state religion and Divine Kingship the focal point of the Empire.

Following Alexander the Great's invasion in 333 BC the population was Hellenized under the Seleucid dynasty (since then Hellenism has had a negative connotation for Iranians), creating a symbiosis between Greek and Persian cultures.

 

The Parthians

 The Parthians overran the Seleucids in 223 BC and ruled the area for four centuries, encouraging a return to Persian traditions. Their Empire was the superpower competing with the Roman Empire, many wars taking place between them, and the Western frontier shifting constantly in both directions. Christians first became an organised religious community in Iran towards the end of the Parthian era.

 

The Sassanids (226-642 AD)

 The Parthians were followed by another Persian dynasty, the Sassanids, who revived Zoroastrianism as the state religion, accompanied by a revival of Persian arts and culture. During their reign many Persians were converted to Nestorian Christianity (some estimate that 25% of the population of the Empire were Christian by the time of the Islamic conquest). Christians were sporadically severely persecuted by the state who saw them as a potential fifth column in its incessant wars against the Christian Byzantine Empire.

 

The Arab-Muslim Conquest

 Weakened by incessant wars, the Sassanian Empire was quickly overrun by the Arab Muslim armies in 636-642 AD. The Arabs settled in various areas as a ruling aristocracy, using the established administrative system to control their new Empire. The Muslim conquest meant a break with the past, as all pre-Islamic times were considered "times of ignorance", but it also marked a new beginning, as an Iranian-Muslim culture emerged combining much of the ancient Iranian heritage with the new Arab-Islamic culture. Iranians revived their language after two centuries of Arabic domination and retained a pride in their ancient history.

 

Umayads and Abbassids

 Under the Umayad and Abbassid Caliphates the Persians were Islamized and made enormous contributions to Islamic culture. Iranian influence was especially strong under the Abbassids, whose capital Baghdad was located on the Tigris in an area historically part of the Persian empire. Persians achieved high political posts in the administration.

In the 9th and 10th centuries independent Persian dynasties emerged, nominally subject to the Caliphate. Muslim-Persian (Farsi) replaced Arabic as the dominant language of the Eastern part of the Islamic Empire.

 

Seljuks

 From the 10th century onwards there was an infiltration of nomadic Turkic tribes into Iranian territory, settling in Azerbaijan and eastern Anatolia. The Turks formed a new military class that soon took over real power. For a while the Iranian area was ruled by the Turkic Grand Seljuks as Sultans nominally under the Abbasid Caliphs in Baghdad, initiating four centuries of nomadic rule.

 

Mongols

 The Mongols under Genghis Khan's grandson Hulagu overran Iran and the Abbasid domains, sacking Baghdad in 1258. Cities and countryside were devastated and whole populations massacred. Hulagu's descendants ruled as Ilkhans in Tabriz until the end of the 14th century. The Ilkhans were eventually converted to Islam at the end of the 13th century, after almost accepting Nestorian Christianity.

Timurlane, a descendant of Genghis Khan, established a Kingdom in Central Asia with its capital at Samarkand. In 1386 he invaded Iran and campaigned into Ottoman domains in Anatolia and Syria. He inflicted even worse devastation and wholesale massacres than his forbears in all areas he crossed, and it was under him that Nestorian Christianity in Central Asia was finally eradicated. The Mongol ravages are the main cause for the backwardness and stagnation of the areas they conquered in the following centuries. The Timurid Empire lasted until the mid-15th century when much of the Iranian area fell under the Turkmen Kara-Koyunlu ("Black-Sheep") and Ak-Koyunlu ("White-Sheep") tribal confederations.

 

 

Safavids

 In 1501 Sheikh Isma`il, head of the Turkmen Sufi Safavi order, conquered Azerbaijan from the Ak-Koyunlu, establishing his capital at Tabriz. He soon gained control of most of Iran, and declared Twelver Shi`a Islam the state religion, claiming to be descended from 'Ali and fanning Messianic expectations in an effort to unite his Empire against the Sunni Ottomans. For two centuries there was warfare between the two Muslim Empires until the border between them was stabilized. Iran lost Eastern Anatolia and Mesopotamia to the Ottomans, leaving a large Shi`a population suffering Sunni persecution in these areas.

The Safavids (1502-1736) later moved their capital to Isfahan which was transformed into a beautiful city in which Iranian culture and arts revived and flourished. Shi`ism was a useful tool to consolidate Safavi rule over the ethnically diverse population as it focused on their dynastic-religious role. Shi`a Ulama were incorporated into the state bureaucracy as one of its main pillars. The Safavids based their legitimacy on their claimed descent from the Imams, as representatives of the Hidden Imam, and as being the temporal rulers until his return.

 

Qajars (1779-1925)

 From the 1720s onwards there was a confused time when various pretenders seized the throne. In 1787, Agha Muhammad of the Turkic Qajar tribe took the throne and established Tehran as his capital. Under the Qajars Iran remained largely decentralized, the ulama and tribal leaders retaining considerable powers. The semi-autonomous regions were loosely held together by the Shah who played powerful local figures against each other.

Under the Qajars Iran was faced by Russian and British imperialism, and tried to play them off against each other. Russia extended its rule over Iran's Caucasian provinces and Northern Azerbaijan, whilst the British sought commercial domination of Iran's trade and economy. Iran became a pawn between the two Empires, who divided it arbitrarily into a northern Russian and a southern British sphere of influence.

The intrigues of these two "Christian" powers resulted in the intensification of Muslim distrust of Christians, and a deterioration of internal Muslim-Christian relations as Muslims felt Iranian Christians identified with the foreign enemy and benefited from their relationship to the Christian Powers who also claimed to be protectors of the various Christian groups in the Middle East.

Western ideas of liberalism, rationalism and nationalism, gradually penetrated Iran's elite, engendering a Muslim reform movement under Afghani and Malkam Khan. Iran's financial situation deteriorated and Shah Nasir al-Din (1848-96) tried to raise funds by selling monopolies to Europeans. This led the mercantile class (bazaaris) allied to the ulama to rouse popular feelings against the Shah, culminating in the constitutional revolution of 1906. Iran entered the painful transition from a traditional Muslim Empire to a modern nation-state which continues to this day.

Although Iran was neutral during WWI, its northwest suffered much because of fighting between Ottoman, Russian and British troops. The Ottomans who had massacred Armenians and Assyrians in Turkey egged the Iranian Kurds to participate in similar atrocities in Iran, resulting in a mass exodus of Assyrians from northwest Iran into British held Iraq (some 70,000).

 

Pahlavis (1925-1979)

 In 1925, Reza Khan, an officer of the Persian Cossack Regiment seized power as the first Shah of the Pahlavi dynasty. He imposed central authority on the unruly provinces and tribes and weakened the Shi`a ulama. He also modernized Iran by creating a modern army, a modernized education system and a westernized justice system.

Emulating Ataturk in Turkey, he promoted anti-clericalism, secularism and a modern Iranian national identity based on the glorification of pre-Islamic Iran. This started the trend to a "two culture syndrome" in Iran: the traditional bazaaris, rural classes and urban workers allied to the Ulama; and the Westernized secularized middle and upper classes supporting the regime. Modernization was experienced by many in Iran as a brutal attack on traditional culture.

Chauvinism on a Fascist model was encouraged, including the racial concept of Aryan Iranians superior to all surrounding Semitic and Turkic nations. "God, King, Fatherland" was the slogan. The Farsi language was imposed as the language of the state in an effort at creating an all-Iranian identity.

During WWII British and Russian troops occupied Iran in 1941 to protect the supply lines to the Soviet Union, creating much resentment. Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favour of his son Muhammad Reza who became the new Shah. By the end of the war the Soviets had founded two puppet regimes: the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. Both fell to the central forces once the Russians had withdrawn, but allegations that Assyrians and Armenians had supported these regimes further soured Muslim-Christian relations in the post WWII era.

Muhammad Reza Shah embarked on a policy of centralization, secularization and modernization similar to that of his father. Under the populist-nationalistic Prime Minister Mossadegh he was forced to leave Iran 1951-53, whilst Mossadegh, allied to bazaaris, ulama and nationalists, tried to nationalize the oil industry. The Shah was returned to power with the help of the Americans and British secret services, further raising Iranian resentment against the West and its intervention in internal Iranian affairs.

Growing oil revenues helped the Shah push his programmes on at an ever accelerating pace. As part of his modernization drive "the White Revolution" was instigated, including land-reform which benefitted many rural poor but antagonized the ulama who saw it as anti-Islamic. Whilst the goals of the reforms were worthy, the implementation was not well planned, the bureaucracy was too bloated and corrupt, and the fast pace demanded by the Shah was unrealistic. In spite of the huge sums of money invested in the reforms they were not very successful.

The Shah's regime was based on the narrow court elite. His modernization programme was not accompanied by any power sharing democratic initiatives that would broaden the base of government, and his secret police, SAVAK, brutally repressed all opposition groups leaving religion as the only vehicle for expressing protest.

Population explosion, rural to urban migration and the growing gap between rich and poor caused a feeling of alienation among the masses, fuelled by the ulama and the extreme left. The governing small elite was perceived as corrupt and totally subservient to the West. In the slums of the big cities religion experienced a revival as a cohesive force replacing the lost sense of village community and solidarity.

 

 

IRANIAN ISLAMIC REVOLUTION AND ISLAMIC REPUBLIC

 With growing oil wealth and modernization came a growth of a new urban middle class, traditionally oriented and wanting a share of political power. The economic boom of the 1960s and early 70s was followed by a recession which hit the poorer classes and frustrated the rising expectations of the majority of Iranians for a larger share in the country's wealth.

Islamic-leftist ideologists, of whom Ali Shari`ati was the most influential, formulated a radical revolutionary Shi`i discourse which appealed strongly to the disoriented educated youth. They were anticlerical, calling for a reformation of Shi`ism whilst manipulating its radical elements: its martyrdom complex, protest against oppression, call for social justice, illegitimacy of secular regimes, and expectation of an eschatological utopia. They succeeded in radicalizing and mobilising the masses, and much of their idiom was later taken over by Khomeini and the fundamentalists.

In the 1970s Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as the leading ulama opposed to the Shah. A mujtahid well-trained in jurisprudence (fiqh) and mystical Irfan, his arrest, exile and uncompromising stand against the Shah raised his appeal to the masses. Khomeini saw Western encroachment as an insult to Islam and the mullahs as the only defence against it. Whilst in exile he introduced new interpretations into traditional Shi`a doctrine, especially his "Vilayat-i-Faqih" which postulated that the guardianship of the people in all areas, including the political, devolved from the Hidden Imam to the leading jurist of the age as his representative. He thus demanded direct ulama control of the state at all levels, claiming that monarchy was illegitimate in Islam.

Manipulating both traditional religious and modern leftist-Islamic idiom, Khomeini emerged as the centre of all oppositional forces. Cleverly using modern mass media techniques to reach the masses, he promised liberation from foreign domination, freedom to all parties, rights for all minorities and social justice for the oppressed. Following huge mass demonstrations against the Shah, he returned to Iran in 1979 to establish the Islamic Republic. An outstanding fact of the Revolution was the participation of millions, which made it a real people movement.

Once in power Khomeini astutely out-maneuvered all his former secular and nationalist allies, crushing them one by one, finally leaving the ulama and their fundamentalist followers as the only ruling group. The new Constitution, whilst keeping to a republican form, devolved most authority to the "Guardian Jurist" as representative of the Hidden Imam. The fundamentalists had managed to build parallel power networks of militias, committees and comissars, which served to curb the real power of the elected government.

The Iraqi invasion of 1980 and the ensuing war until 1988 served to consolidate the regime, as nationalistic fervour was added to the Islamic rhetoric. Most Iranians united under the regime against the foreign enemy, and those that opposed the regime, especially the violent Marxist groups who had destabilized it with massive bombing attacks, were now easily labelled enemies of the nation and brutally crushed.

Whilst the clerics are in control of the state, there is no guarantee of this control being permanent. Many oppositional forces bid their time and infiltrate the system. No one can predict how the Islamic Republic will develop in the future, and who and when will be able to challenge its dominant clerical elite.

 

 

PEOPLE GROUPS IN IRAN

 Iran is a multiethnic nation-state. Vertical cleavages of language, ethnicity, tribe and religion are compounded by the horizontal new classes created in this century as a result of modernization and industrialization: the new middle classes, the working classes, and the urban poor.

The term "ethnic group" is a Western invention aimed at classifying and imposing order on an essentially fluid reality. Indigenous identities tend to be multiple and ambiguous. An individual might claim different identities with different priorities in different contexts. The criteria for defining identity are not just linguistic, but religious, sectarian, local or tribal affiliation, class, kinship, historical alliances, etc. Any description of Iranian groupings is a generalisation of a complex reality. Important is what the person we are dealing with claims to be.

Periods of crisis and rapid change form favourable context for reformulating identities - a fact useful in evangelistic strategy! Minorities must be flexible to survive, and can adapt to dominant neighbours without losing their core identity.

In the 19th century a main cleavage was between "Turk" (militarily dominant tribal and uncivilized) and Tat or Tajik (subordinated but civilized townspeople and peasants).

The Pahlavis tried to force national integration of the heterogenous Iranian population by "Persifying" the state and discriminating against linguistic and cultural minorities, hoping that economic and political development would lead to a withering of cultural, regional and tribal distinctions. The Islamic regime, whilst stressing the Islamic unity of the nation, is more open to linguistic, cultural and tribal pluralism, though more discriminatory to religious minorities.

Speakers of Farsi as first language comprise less than 50% of the Iranian population, whilst the total of all ethnic and religious minorities in Iran is estimated at 53%.

The largest linguistic groups are the Iranian, which includes the Farsi speakers (Persians), Kurds, Gilakis, Mazandaranis, Baluchs, Bakhtyari and Lurs; and the Turkic, which includes the Azeris, Qashqais, Turkmen, Afshar, Shahsevan, etc.

The Semitic groups include the Arabs of Khuzestan, the Assyrians and the Jews.

The Muslim groups are composed of the majority Shi`a (90%), the Sunnis (mainly Kurds, Baluch and Turkmen), the small extreme-Shi`a groups such as the Ahl-i-Haqq and the Yezidis (mainly among the Kurds), and the Bahais who originate from Twelver Shi`a Islam but now claim to be an independent world religion.

The Christians include the remnants of the ancient Church of Iran - the Assyrians (both Nestorians and Chaldeans), and the Armenians. The Evangelical churches include a small number of converted Muslims, Jews and Parsis in addition to a majority of Armenian and Assyrian believers.

The Jews, Christians and Parsis have the status of recognized "People of the Book", autonomous communities under Muslim rule.

Many of the Muslim minority groups are tribally organized with large groups still nomadic. The nomadic tribal groups were severely suppressed by the Pahlavis and are experiencing a revival of their lifestyles under the Islamic Republic.

Most linguistic minorities accept the modern Iranian identity, but resent the suppression of their languages and cultures under the Pahlavis and the Islamic Republic. The Kurds and Baluch are the ones most extreme in demanding regional and cultural autonomy. In their case the Sunni-Shi`a cleavage supports the separatist trend. Khomeini faced difficulties in the Turkmen, Baluch and Kurdish areas, where Sunnis and radicals fostered ethnic separatism. A combination of force and compromise eventually subdued these dissenting voices.

The regime opposes ethnic nationalism by stressing pan-Islamic solidarity - all Muslims belong to the one umma of Islam and ethnic particularism weakens it. This emphasis on Islam has affected the relative position of religious minorities: the Bahai are not regarded as a legitimate religious group, but are severely persecuted as evil apostates, and Christians are not seen as being really Iranian because they do not belong to the Muslim umma.

The Constitution does provide for regional control of local affairs and the authorities stressed they would respect ethnic languages and customs and that minorities were free to use their own language and culture. At the same time the new Constitution declared Shi`a Islam as the state religion (thus turning the Sunnis into official minorities, even though they are Muslim), and the Farsi language as the official state language and the exclusive language in schools. Non-Muslims have separate electorates for the few Majlis seats reserved for them.

 

 

 

ETHNIC-LINGUISTIC GROUPS (1993):

 

IRANIAN 45.6 M (76%) -

PERSIAN (FARSI) 27M (45%)

KURDS 6M (10%)

GILAKI 3M (5%)

LURI 2.7M (4.5%)

MAZANDARANI 2.1M (3.5%)

BALUCH 1.5M (2.5%)

BAKHTIARI 1M (1.7%)

TAT 600,000

HAZARA 280,000

TALYSH 110,000

PUSHTUN 110,000

 

TURKIC 13.2M (22%) -

AZERI 9.6M (16%)

TURKMEN 1.2M (2%)

QASHQAI 850,000 (1.3%)

AFSHAR 700,000 (1.1%)

SHAHSEVAN 360,000 (0.6%)

TEYMUR 170,000

KARAKALPAK 30,000

OTHER TURKICS 250,000 (0.4%)

 

ARABS 1.3 M (2.2%)

 

OTHERS 1.8M (3%) -

GYPSIES 1.2M (2% NAWAR, GHORBATI, KOWLI)

ARMENIANS 300,000 (O.5%)

BRAHUI 150,000

ASSYRIANS 70,000

JEWS 30,000

 

REFUGEES:

FROM AFGHANISTAN (MAINLY PUSHTUN?) 1.5M?

FROM IRAQ: KURDS 1M?

SHI`AS 0.5M?

 

RELIGIONS

MUSLIM: 58.8M (98%) -

SHI`A: 56M (86%)

TWELVERS 52.2M (87%)

AHL-I-HAQ 100,000

ISMA`ILI`ILI 50,000

YAZIDI 50,000

SUNNI: 7.2M (12%) MAINLY KURDS, TURKMEN, BALUCH,

SUFISM: FROWNED ON BY TWELVER SHI`A ULAMA, YET WIDESPREAD AND INFLUENTIAL AMONG

BOTH ELITES AND MASSES.

 

 

Christian: 1900 1.5% OF TOTAL POPULATION

1950 1.0%

1975 - 540,000 0.9%

1995 - 250,000 0.4%

                   1975     1995

ARMENIAN ORTHODOX 300,000 170,000

SYRIAN ORTHODOX   160,000 90,000

NESTORIAN          50,000 30,000

CHALDEAN           20,000 10,000

PROTESTANT         15,000 20,000?

OF WHICH EVANGELICALS 8,000 12,000

 

OTHERS: 420,000

BAHAI 350,000

PARSEE 40,000

JEWS 30,000

 

 

After the overthrow of the Shah many ethnic nationalists saw an opportunity to push for increased autonomy. There were violent encounters with the central government forces, and the rebellions were crushed by a combination of force and compromise. Unrest however continues beneath the surface.

Ethnic unrest will remain a problem in Iran focusing on the issues of language, culture, local elites and symbols of autonomy. It is unlikely that any group will secede, unless the whole country disintegrates.

 

 

TRIBALLY ORGANIZED GROUPS AND NOMADS

 Tribes (most of whom historically were nomads) have played an important role in Iran since the Turkic and Mongol centuries. They were the military forces of the central government, guarded the borders of the Empire and often supplied the ruling dynasty.

There has always been a symbiosis between state and tribe: large tribal confederations and their chiefs played an important role as kingmakers, whilst rulers created new tribes, transplanted others, and destroyed some in their efforts to strengthen their position, fight invaders, and weaken challengers.

Under the Qajars Iran was still a decentralized state, tolerating tribal confederacies as autonomous regional entities, and relying on tribal chiefs for military and administrative duties. Under the Pahlavis came the shift from a tribalized decentralized state into a modern centralized one in which the tribes became marginal.

The Pahlavis saw the nomads as an impediment to progress. Reza Shah destroyed the political structures of the tribal confederations, imprisoned and executed many of their leaders, confiscated their pastures, and implemented brutal settlement projects.

Nomadic tribes are found in all parts of Iran and practice mainly vertical (transhumant) pastoralism, moving from winter low grazing grounds to summer high pastures. They are very diverse in their structures and extent of their nomadism. Many tribesmen are settled in cities and villages and engage in salaried employment and agriculture. There is a constant movement from nomadism to settled lifestyles and also back to nomadism by those making enough money to be able to buy their own herds.

The main tribal/nomadic groups are the Kurds, Baluch, Turkmen, Arab, Qashqais, Lurs, Bakhtyaris, Shahsevan, Khamseh and Afshar. In the mid-19th century nomads accounted for almost 50% of the population; at the beginning of the 20th century they still accounted for 25% of the population; and in the 1970s at least 2 million people still led a nomadic lifestyle. It is estimated that some 15% percent of the population - settled and nomadic - regard themselves as members of tribes.

The Islamic Republic has treated the nomadic segments of the tribes better than the Pahlavi regime, recognizing their important role in the agricultural economy of Iran as well as their traditional support for Islam. It allows armed tribal militias to care for security in nomadic areas and provides infrastructural services in road-building, veterinary care, health, education, etc.

For those still leading a pastoral-nomadic lifestyle, the yearly migration from winter to summer pastures is the main event of the year, celebrated with great festivity. Nomads see themselves as better Muslims than settled people, closer to the pure desert Islam of the first Muslims. They value their independence from settled authorities, including Mullahs, and the urban dominated orthodoxy.

 

 

SOME MAIN PEOPLE GROUPS

 

AZERIS (9.6 million)

Settled non-tribal Shi`a Turkic ethno-linguistic group of Northwest Iran. Azerbaijan was Turkified by the Seljuks, and was the centre of the Mongol and Turkic dynasties that have ruled Iran for centuries, with Tabriz serving as capital for some periods. The Azeris are not separatist but would like more linguistic and cultural autonomy. Azeris have always been politically involved in the central government politics, the military and the economy. The former Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan was conquered by Tsarist Russia from Iran, thus the real trend would be for a reintegration of independent Azerbaijan into Iran (not very likely in the foreseeable future due to Russian and Turkish interests) rather than an independent Azerbaijan uniting both Azeri regions.

Many Azeris live in the large cities of Iran and belong to the economic elite. Azerbaijan being fairly industrialized has a large working class segment, and the communist Tudeh party was especially strong in Azerbaijan, both among ethnic Azeris and Christians, collaborating with the Soviets in 1945-6 in setting up the autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan which collapsed when the Soviet forces withdrew a year later.

Azeris played an important role in the struggle against the Shah, who had prohibited the use of the Azeri language in education and the media despite the large size of the Azeri population. After the Revolution Azeris pushed for larger autonomy and centred their protest in support for Ayatollah Shariatmadari, an important Azeri mujtahid from Tabriz who opposed many of Khomeini's activist moves. After several clashes, Shariatmadari was put under house arrest. Azeris close to Khomeini were put in control of Azerbaijan and Azeris were given a good representation in the current leadership.

 

KURDS (6 million)

Tribal Sunni settled and nomadic Iranian language-family group of Northwestern Iran. Having contiguous Kurdish communities across the borders in Turkey and Iraq, the Kurds have always been the most vocal minority demanding autonomy in Iran. Originally mainly nomadic, most are now settled. Whenever the central government weakened the Kurds renewed their drive for increased autonomy and had to be supressed by the central government forces as it regained its strength. Iran actively supported the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq until 1975, and then again during the Iraq-Iran war 1980-88. In the aftermath of the Gulf War Iran has accepted a large number of Kurdish refugees and cared for them relatively well, winning some goodwill in return.

As the Turkish drive against the separatist Kurds in its Eastern provinces accelerates, it is not clear what repercussions it will have on the Iranian Kurds. The Iranian authorities are united with the Turkish, Iraqi, and Syrian counterparts in negating the possibility of a united Kurdish homeland in the combined areas in which Kurds form a majority. On the other hand Kurdish troubles in Iran have been less severe than those in either Iraq or Turkey.

Whatever the future holds for the Kurds, they will continue to be pawns in the convoluted inter-state relations of the region.

 

GILAKI (3 M) & MAZANDARANI (2.1 M)

Non-tribal Iranian-language family groups of northern Iran. Though there were some trends to autonomy, they are usually considered as part of the wider Persian group.

 

 

LURS (2.7 M)

Shi`a nomads and settled tribal group of the Iranian language family. Live mainly in the central Zagros south of the Kurdish area.

 

BALUCH (1.5 M)

The Baluch are Sunnis belonging to the Iranian language family, living mainly in the deserts of the southwest on the Pakistani border with Baluchs also living across the border in Pakistan and South Afghanistan. They resent the domineering stance of Shi`ism in their region since the revolution. There has been periodic unrest in Baluchistan to demonstrate their discontent and desire for greater local and cultural autonomy.

 

TURKMEN (1.2 M)

Sunni Turkic tribal group living in the northeast on the borders to Turkmenistan. Turkmen live also in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Turkey and Syria. Entered the Middle East with the Seljuks and the Mongols. Established the Kara-Koyunlu and Ak-Koyunlu states in the 15th century. The Kizilbash Safavid Sufi order was mainly a Turkmen order that helped the Safavids set up their Empire, but most Turkmen remained Sunni. Since the revolution the Turkmen have been restless in seeking more autonomy, and are quite left-leaning. The largest Turkmen tribes in Iran are the Yomud and the Goklen.

 

ARABS (1.3 M)

Most Arabs in Iran are Shi`a and tribal, living in the oil-rich Khuzistan province bordering on Iraq. Whilst some still follow a nomadic lifestyle many are settled, working in the oil-industries and in the cities. The Arab tribes of Khuzistan enjoyed a great measure of autonomy until Reza Khan broke their power in 1925.

Iraq hoped to gain their collaboration in annexing Khuzistan (Arabistan) when it invaded Iran in 1980, but most remained loyal to Iran.

 

BAKHTYARI (1 M)

Nomadic tribal Iranian language group Shi`ites, related to the Lurs. Live mainly in the Central Zagros Northwest of Isfahan. Divided into two main tribal confederations: the Chahar Lang and the Haft Lang . The Bakhtyari khans were quite influential in the central government since the constitutional revolution of 1905-6.

 

QASHQAI (850,000)

Nomadic Turkic Shi`a group that move between winter quarters between Shiraz and the Persian Gulf, and summer pastures in the Southern Zagros. Were influential under the Qajars for their military might, and did not seek greater autonomy but more influence over politics in Tehran. Forcefully settled by Reza Shah they resumed their nomadic lifestyle after his abdication in 1941. Supported the Mossadeq regime. Crushed by Muhammad Reza Shah in 1962-3 and many of their leaders had to emigrate to the USA. Some returned after the Revolution.

 

AFSHAR (700,000)

Cluster of settled and nomadic tribal Turkic Shi`a groups widely scattered in Iran, mainly in Western Azerbaijan, and around the cities of Tehran, Kermanshah, Mashad, and Hamadan. Also found in Turkey and Afghanistan. Were pillars of the Turkmen Kara-Koyunlu and Ak-Koyunlu dynasties and later supported the Safavids as military forces. Today many are sedentary and at least partially lost their tribal identity. Their total number is estimated at 700,000, but they are scattered and fragmented in contrast to other tribes that live in a concentrated tribal region where they form the majority of the rural population.

 

SHAHSEVAN (360,000)

Turkic tribal Shi`a nomadic group of the Northwest. Created by the Safavids as a royal guard out of several Turkic tribes. Name means "Shah-lovers". Their winter pastures are in the Moghan Steppe, their summer quarters in the Savalan hills. Many are settled as farmers and wage labourers, but often return to nomadism if they can earn enough cash to own their own herds. Express their Islam mainly in the orthodox rituals of Ramadan and Muharram, in the rites of passage and in migration-time feasting. Have no Sufi orders and ridicule exorcism and magic.

 

BASSERI

Iranian Farsi-speaking Shi`a nomadic group of the South-West, once part of the great Khamseh tribal confederation of Fars province which included Turkic, Persian and Arabic tribes and competed in the 19th century with the Qashqai for hegemony in their region. Their central rite is the Spring Migration which emphasizes their collective solidarity. Ignore mosque religion and focus on shrines, protection from the evil eye, and exorcisms.

 

 

VILLAGERS

 Iranian villages experienced significant changes since the early 1960s. Land reform, population explosion and industrialization led to a massive exodus from rural areas to the big cities in search of employment.

Land reform ended the feudal relationship between landlords and peasants. However, large landlords were only required to relinquish half of their holdings, and as a result, peasants received small parcels of land not large enough to ensure their livelihood above subsistence levels. Many had to offer their services to landlords as hired laborers to supplement their income. Land reform was followed by a reduction in the production of basic food crops - aggravated by rich landlords switching to more lucrative cash crops for the industrial and export markets - and Iran, once self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs, had to import grains to feed its fast growing population.

Village infrastructure was neglected. By the end of the 1970s, the majority of Iranian villages still lacked serviceable roads, schools, clinics, potable water or electricity. Yet the expectations of the villagers had been raised by the government propaganda on the "White Revolution" and the "Great Civilization". This gulf led to widespread dissatisfaction among villagers.

Under the Islamic republic there have been some improvements, with peasants expropriating land from large absentee landowners, and the new government in general more supportive of its rural population and initiating improvements in infrastructure.

 

 

THE CITIES

 The traditional centre of Iranian cities was the bazaar, a concentrated complex of vaulted passages lined with small stalls for craftsmen and traders. Most crafts and trades were organized into guilds (asnaf) relatively autonomous in handling their internal affairs and relations to state authorities.

Bazaaris are a main element of the middle classes in traditional Iranian society (along with bureaucrats and ulama), occupying a position below the ruling classes of rich landlords, nobles and tribal chieftains, but above the masses of peasants, nomads, and urban labourers. Most received their education in the religious Madrassehs which promoted conservative values, and the bazaar was a major bulwark of Shi`i Islam. Much of the marketplace belonged to religious endowments (awqaf) for the support of mosques, schools, religious activities, students and ulama.

The bazaar has always been a political arena where bazaaris and ulama supported each other's complaints against the government. The Tehran bazaar was a centre of opposition in the constitutional movement of the early 20th century, and in the revolution of 1978-9. Bazaars often closed down to protest government policies, a protest that was quite effective as commerce ground to a halt.

Reza Shah weakened the power base of bazaaris, along with that of ulama and tribes, the government taking over the control of the bazaars and their guilds to a large extent. He also supported the large industrialists at the expense of the bazaaris, whilst the tax structure and banking system favoured the new, modern economic sectors.

The Shah's modernization programmes resulted in modern shopping centres diverting business to other parts of town and the bazaar lost its dominant position in commerce. As cities expanded, the bazaar became less accessible, although it remained a centre for handicrafts.

The bazaaris influence weakened in the Pahlavi era also because of the emergence of a new professional middle class, educated in the secular state educational system, and including engineers, doctors, civil servants and other professions. Investment in large factories also created a new class of industrialists and bankers outside the traditional bazaar system.

The government's hostility to the bazaar meant that the Shah had no support from it during the revolution. Rather, it supported the ulama and the bankrolled the revolution. Bazaars closed down for long periods, leading the nation in a general strike that brought the economy to a halt.

The bazaar is still a dynamic economic centre and retains its religiopolitical orientations. It has emerged greatly strengthened in the Islamic Republic. The alliance with the ulama has given the bazaaris a voice in government. Yet some bazaaris had become disillusioned because of decline in trade and many new contradictory regulations.

Another aspect of the cities is that the great influx from rural areas has created a new and large "lumpenproletariat" living in shanty-town slums with no fixed employment and available for extremist radicalization.

 

 

TWELVER-SHI`ISM AS RELIGION OF STATE AND OF MAJORITY

 The Iranian revolution demonstrated the vitality of Shi`ism in Iran, where dissent has always expressed itself in religious terms.

The early Shi`a were the party who after Muhammad's death defended the claims of `Ali and his descendants through Fatima to the Imamate. `Ali and his son Hussein were killed, as were most of the following Imams of their house. Hussein's death at Karbala is seen as the ultimate model of martyrdom, with mediatory and atoning aspects. The yearly Muharram processions in its commemoration are characterised by passion plays (ta`ziyeh), flagellation and frenzied emotional outbursts.

In the first Islamic centuries, Shi`a were always rebelling against the ruling Sunni dynasties in favour of the `Alid Imams. The suppression of these movements resulted in a tradition of martyrdom, oppression, and dissent that has characterized Shi`ism ever since. In contrast to triumphant Sunni Islam, Shi`ism identifies with martyrdom and suffering.

Later the doctrine of the Hidden Imam evolved, claiming the Twelfth Imam had disappeared into Occultation and would return at the end of time as the Mahdi (Messiah) to set up a kingdom of divine righteousness. This initiated a period of Shi`a quietism, its utopian and messianic expectations being now directed to a distant future. In the meantime, Shi`is must use dissimulation (taqiya, the concealment of their true beliefs) in order to survive under repressive regimes, and are to accept all temporal rulers who give them freedom of worship.

In 1501 Shah Isma`il declared Twelver Shi`sm as state religion in Iran, forcibly converting Sunnis. Shi`sm became the orthodoxy supported by the state and the Shi`a clergy, the ulama, became an important part of the establishment, controlling the mosques, education, and the legal system. They saw themselves as representatives of the absent Hidden Imam, having the sole right to interpret Islam. Many ulama became wealthy landowners via the religious endowments (awqaf) and their independent source of taxation, the khums.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, the Usuli school of Shia thought became prominent. It stressed that every Twelver believer must follow the rulings of a living Shi`a mujtahid (ayatollah, cleric qualified to interpret the law independently). This gave mujtahids great power and formalized the Shi`a clerical establishment into a hierarchy unknown in the Sunni world. This hierarchy consists of the Mullahs (akhunds), the Mujtahids (ayatollahs), and the Marja` al-Taqlid.

The orthodox ulama stressed the legal aspects of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and the literal interpretations of Quran and Sunna. In opposition to this trend, the Sufi mystics and philosophers developed an esoteric and spiritual interpretation of the inner meaning of the sources (irfan) aimed at satisfying man's hunger for a transcendent experience of unity with God.

From the 19th century on the ulama fought the Westernizing reformers and secularists. Under the Pahlavis their power declined, but it was revived in the 1970s when fundamentalist Islam resurged in Iran, fuelled by the massive dislocations of the swift modernization and the political repression of the Shah's regime. The quietist trend of traditional Shi`sm was transformed into an activist ideology by lay ideologues like Shariati and the Mujahedin -i Khalq, and later mobilized as a tool for revolution by Khomeini and his allies.

The holy month of Muharram and especially its tenth day, `Ashura, accompanied by processions and passion plays (ta`ziyeh), are the emotional highpoint of the Shi`a year. The ta`ziyeh has a great impact on the people at it engages spectators in a deeply moving emotional experience. It is a catharitic religious experience where people project their own suffering onto Hussein's martyrdom, in a vicarious and therapeutic identification. The sight of thousands of spectators openly weeping as they view the play is remarkable. It is a reenaction of the cosmic struggle of good against evil, where evil seems to win for a while, but good will eventually be vindicated by God.

Islam is both a unifying factor and a means of expressing specific individual, group and class identities. Different aspects of Islam are used to legitimize one group's superiority over others, or to justify an individual's right to wealth and status. Different aspects of Islam also serve to define boundaries between various classes, ethnic and tribal groups, settled and nomads, etc. Competition for scarce resources is often expressed in terms of superior orthodoxy or mystical practices. Whilst the ulama claim to be the orthodox norm givers, practiced Islam can be very different and expresses social divisions within the population.

 

 

IMPACT OF SUFISM

 Sufism is the mystical stream in Islam which arose as a reaction to the legalism of the early religious establishment. It aimed at an intuitive knowledge of God, attained to by ascetic disciplines and a spiritual interpretation of the Quran aimed at finding its inner "batini" meaning.

Sufism played an important role in forming Muslim society and in helping spread Islam into Central Asia, India and other new areas. Opposed to the dry scholasticism of orthodox teachers, it gave spiritual meaning to the lives of believers and served as an outlet for their emotions. It is an complex matrix of multiple orders (tariqas) spread over the whole Muslim world. Their extreme variety is manifested in a wide spectrum of beliefs and practices stretching from the sophisticated classical Sufism as expounded by the great masters and appealing to the elite classes, to the popular Cult of Saints characterised by the search for baraka (grace, power) as a defence against all evil that is popular with the rural and urban poor.

Leaders who achieved the highest stage of union with God were accepted as Saints (awliya'), mediators between God and man having special powers. They were revered by the masses and their tombs became pilgrimage centres visited in order to partake of their baraka, ask for their intercession and miraculous help through vows, prayers and offerings. The anniversaries of their death (urs) were celebrated and took on the character of folk festivals.

Sufis see their devotional life as an internal pilgrimage. Passing through altered states of consciousness during personal meditation and communal dhikr and sama` rituals, they experience ecstatic trances which unite them with the divine and give them a moment of illumination and bliss.

Whilst Sunni Sufism glorified Muhammad, Shi`i Sufism glorified `Ali, Hussein and the rest of the Twelve Imams. The Imams are seen as pre-existent beings around God's throne, and `Ali especially is seen almost as the Divine Logos.

Sufi teachings include:

a. Enlightenment (ma`rifa, inner knowledge, Gnosis) attained by sudden illumination. This is possible only to the select initiated disciples, not to the ignorant masses.

b. Union with God (Truth, Ultimate Reality) through the annihilation of self (fana'), dying to self so as to have God live in you.

c. Love of God (Mahabba) as the great motive of life, expressed in an endless search for the Beloved using symbolical terms and allegories which greatly impacted poetry. The language of human love was used to describe the relations between the mystic and God, reminiscent of the Song of Solomon and the Psalms.

d. The path to God, tariqa, can only be traversed under the leadership of an enlightened guide (pir).

Although first started by Arab ascetics, Sufism soon spread into Iran which became the centre of Sufi creativity. Most great Sufi masters wrote their mystical poetry and treatises in Persian (Farsi).

Sufism inspired a great poetic tradition and most of Iran's classical poetry is Sufi in content. Poetry is central in Persian culture, a medium in which every Iranian finds something of himself. Some of the best known Sufi masters who wrote in Farsi include: Ansari; Hujwiri; `Attar; Jalal al-Din Rumi (whose "Masnavi" is second in importance only to the Quran for Sufis); Sana`i; Jami`; Hafez; Sa`adi; etc. Their poetry is important even to the illiterate masses who memorize their lines and use them in their speech as others use proverbs.

The poetry of the masters used the allegories of wine (God's intoxicating love), the wine-cup (the Sufi's heart) and the cup bearer (the spiritual guide). The religion of love (the wine house) was contrasted to the religion of the law (the mosque).

Sufis had a special veneration for Jesus, beyond the respect shown to him as a great Prophet in the Quran. Jesus was seen as the "Perfect Man", a perfect Saint, a perfect mystical master and guide, exemplifying the ideals of union with God and love, the two main pillars of Sufism. He exemplifies the freedom from the bondage of custom, convention, blind imitation and habit. Jesus is mentioned positively and reverently in the poetry of most Sufi masters.

The Sufis also introduced the concept of the "Perfect Man", the heavenly prototype of created man, icarnated perriodically on earth by individuals who have mystical insight into real truth and are qualified to be mediators between God and man. Muhammad, the Imams, Jesus, and some Sufi leaders were said to be such "Perfect Men".

Though some ulama were also mystics there was always tension between the orthodox establishment and the mystical leaders (Urafa'). The ulama claimed to be the only legitimate interpreters of Islam, whilst the urafa claimed that all Muslims had that right. The ulama sporadically tried to force the government to persecute the urafa. Those among the mullahs who are Sufis establish a network of personal ties parallel to the official hierarchy. For the Shi`a masses both streams are influential, flow side by side, and their concepts form a part of the Iranian consciousness, worldview and identity.

Sufism was always widespread in Iran. In times of repression it went underground, but it was always an influential force both for the elite and for the masses and is still so today. It is claimed that even Khomeini wrote mystical love poetry.

 

 

IRANIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY

 How to fuse diverse ethnic, linguistic and tribal groups into a united state has always been a problem in Iran. Traditionally it was the common Shi`a religion of the majority, and loyalty to the dynasty that marked the identification with the Empire, the main loyalty being given to the local tribal, linguistic and religious group. Iran was a conglomeration of many semi-autonomous regions, tribes and classes, weakly held together by the dynasty who relied on tribal allegiances and military power to maintain their rule.

In the 20th century, common denominators have been provided by the state in an attempt at creating a modern national Iranian identity for all inhabitants regardless of language, religion and culture. This was to be based on a secular nation-state, a centralized government ruling over a well defined territory, pride in Iran's pre-Islamic history, its culture, and Farsi imposed by the state as the official language.

Throughout the 20th century there has been a struggle between secular Iranian nationalism and Shi`a Islam as Iranians grappled with the problems of tradition versus modernity and religion versus secularism. Under the Pahlavis Iranian secular nationalism seemed to triumph, with the monarchy as its symbolic expression.

Shi`ism and its ulama made a comeback in the 1979 Revolution, placing religion again as the main factor of unity and identity. However there is a basic dichotomy in the Shi`ite identity between loyalty to the whole international Muslim Umma and the specific Iranian-Muslim identity. The Shi`a triumph has placed the minority Sunni communities in a sensitive situation and they feel discriminated against, whilst non-Muslim groups are being forced back into the traditional millet and dhimmi status of tolerated and protected minorities subservient to the Muslim majority and excluded from all positions of power.

Underneath the unifying factors lie the regional forces for autonomy threatening the stability of the regime. There is a rising tide of national aspirations among the numerous ethnic groups that have rediscovered their particularistic identities. Kurds and Baluchs have been loudest in their demands for autonomy, but all other minorities also want a legal status for their language and culture.

The fast pace of change has caused problems of identity and authenticity for most Iranians. Whilst the elite and the intellectuals became secularized and Westernized, the majority of Iranians felt alienated and marginalized by the new forms. Westernization was lampooned as "gharbzadegi", Westoxication, a capitulation to a foreign culture which was blindly emulated.

There is a deep current of Iranian thought that has always seen Iran as the land of the good and the pure facing Satanic enemies across its borders. This was expressed in the dichotomy of Iran versus Turan and symbolized by the battle of light versus darkness. Iran, the Iranians, Farsi culture, are seen as the epitome of good and of civilization standing steadfastly against the barbarian powers of evil. This trend was well expressed by Ferdowsi in his "Shahnameh", the Iranian national epic. The outside enemy was alternatively the Greeks, the Romans, the Turks, the Mongols, the Western imperial states, especially Russia and Britain, and lately the USA and Israel. But the enemy is always out there, scheming against Iran.

 

 

 

IRANIAN CULTURAL TRAITS

 Bishop Dehqani-Tafti has described Iranians as a nation of poets and mystics. Sufism and its poetry certainly have had a great impact on the Iranian psyche.

Pride in their glorious past, a sense of Iranian uniqueness, latent chauvinism and xenophobia, are all part of the Iranian identity. There is justifiable pride in the various Iranian civilizations, the rich Iranian-Islamic culture, Farsi literature, and the remarkable aesthetic art and architecture that demonstrate the Persian love of symmetry, unity and orderliness.

The greatest art form is poetry, which in its classiscal form expresses the mysticism and wisdom of the Sufis, and in its modern variety functions as a medium of satire and political and social commentary. An appreciation for poetry is cultivated early in children who must memorize long passages from the classical poets.

The main principle of Iranian social life is ta`arof, good behaviour, the correct and polite way of expressing oneself. Ta`arof is a system of acknowledging one's place in the social order, a form of ritualized courtesy that includes stylized ceremonial, formality, compliments, flattery and gifts. The "proper" formulas of ta`arof protect the individual from assaults on his dignity and identity. Ta`arof demonstrates one's hospitality, generosity and modesty. In being well-mannered and refraining from causing trouble to others one wins self-respect and status. In ta`arof everyone knows his place and can play the role of superior to those below him while showing respect to those above. Westerners often interpret it as duplicity and hypocrisy, but for Iranians it is the framework of social interaction.

In Iran the extended family plays a key role in a person's identity and loyalty. The outside world is perceived as a place of peril, whilst the family provides a secure refuge. However there is a price to pay for this security: suspicion towards outsiders, mistrust of governments and state agencies and dissimulation of one's own views in public.

An element of stress results from the deep commitment to family honour and to the ideal of the patriarchal extended family as against the reality of conflict and competition within it. Denial of conflict and keeping up appearances in an effort to cover shame are a source of emotional pressure.

Repressed individualism and enforced conformity to the community cause resentment and a divided self. The clash of the old traditions with the alienating modern urbanized lifestyles imposes an acute psychological strain.

Close attention is given to respectable appearance and behaviour commensurate with one's social status and aimed at eliciting respect and approval. The fear of losing face is very marked. Admitting mistakes is difficult for individuals and authorities - scapegoats are preferred! Blaming foreigners is a trait that has often been exploited by the authorities.

Iranians seem to suffer from a deep sense of insecurity, symptomized by mistrust and suspicion of people and events. Life is uncertain, nothing good can last, one's sole obligations are to self and family. To survive and prosper you need a combination of luck, connections, sharp wits and few principles... Acquiring influence, social status and power through personal connections, patronage, flattery and gifts (bribes) leads to widespread corruption. Building a network of influential contacts is the key to success and survival.

Dealings with Iranians can be complex, as appearances are all important and nothing is taken at face value. All statements and motives are suspect, and there is an ongoing search for the real hidden motive.

Religion is still the main force for unity and social cohesion for most Iranians, the main refuge from the arbitrariness of life.

Whilst the Westernized elite under the Pahlavis adopted women's liberation and equality, the majority still see women as inferior to men and prefer strict segregation of the sexes. Women suffer from a strong sense of worthlessness, compounded by the burden of maintaining the family honour. The Islamic Revolution has strengthened these tendencies. Child rearing still depends heavily on negative reinforcement, shaming, and stimulating jealousy among siblings. Children are usually socialized to conformity and good behaviour whilst at the same time becoming skilled in dissimulation and scepticism towards outsiders.

The extensive kinship ties do help people adapt to urbanization and change and provide buffers against the vicissitudes of life as kinsmen remain the main source of support in times of difficulty.

Upward mobility in Iran also depends to some extent on speaking the Tehrani dialect of literary Farsi - all other forms are deemed provincial. This attitude discriminates against other regions, minorities, and the less educated. Literary Farsi is deemed the correct, proper, and sophisticated way of expression, giving the impression of a good education and high status.

 

 

CONSPIRACY THEORIES

 Whilst paranoid conspiracy theories are normal in most parts of the world, commentators agree that they are especially extreme in Iranian society, where all Iran's problems are attributed to the intrigues of foreign powers and secret societies. They appeal to Iranians because of frequent foreign interventions in Iran's internal affairs and the legacy of pre-Islamic and Shi`a dualistic worldviews of good and evil forces locked in cosmic conflict with Iran at the centre.

Iranian politics are seen as a puppet show directed by foreign powers controlling local politicians by invisible strings. Appearances must be ignored, it is the hidden links that are really important. The political discourse uses terms such as plots, spies, treason, imperialism, alien influences, secret designs, fifth column, behind the scenes, etc.

Of course there is a basis of truth in many of the accusations, but they are all taken to ridiculous extremes. It is true that the Great Powers have repeatedly intervened both overtly and covertly in Iran's affairs in the last few centuries, Britain, Russia and the USA being the main villains.

Most Iranians use these theories as a model of understanding Iran's history and politics. Whilst this eases anxieties, it certainly limits the ability to respond to challenges and engenders a sense of hopelesness in the face of uncontrolable external forces.

These theories focus on two themes: plots by Western colonial powers, and plots by Satanic powers against Iran.

Britain is seen as the worst offender amongst the powers, controling modern world history and stage-managing all events detrimental to Iran, using Russia and the USA as its stooges. The British are viewed as cold-blooded and cunning, whilst most Iranian politicians and ulama are seen as British agents. "All British people are spies" is a common perception. Following the British in anti-Iranian intrigues are the Russians and Americans. Since the Revolution the Americans have taken centre stage as the "Great Satan."

The other theme focuses on Satanic forces waging war on Iran since creation. These forces include freemasonry, Zionism and Bahaism who try to Hellenize Iran; Christianity in its Crusader mentality trying to subjugate and weaken Islam; and an International Jewish conspiracy.

Khomeini cleverly manipulated a mixture of chauvinism and xenophobia to rally the population against the Shah's regime and against foreign domination - it was a major unifying force among the disparate opposition groups that supported him. He saw colonial conspiracies everywhere, bent on destroying Islam and keeping Iran poor and dependent so as to exploit its resources. He attacked the religious minorities, particularly the Jews and the Bahais whom he accused of being imperialist spies distorting Islam and manipulating the media. The paranoid style of Iranian politics enabled both the Shah and Khomeini to manipulate the fears of the masses and eliminate political rivals.

Another point to remember is that the two world wars have destroyed the moral authority of the West, which is now not only feared but disliked. Few Westerners realize how little esteem their culture actually has today in the Middle East. There is a deep antipathy to its spirit, power, arrogance, immorality and insensitiveness. This deep bitterness is a dominating feature of society in Iran, where the West is seen as implacably opposed to Islam and determined to maintain its dominance in politics and economics.

 

 

 

 

THE INDIGENOUS ANCIENT CHRISTIAN CHURCHES - ASSYRIAN AND ARMENIAN.

 The Christian presence in Iran is indigenous and much older than Islam, consisting of the ancient Assyrian (Nestorian) and Armenian communities. Sadly it has dwindled to a very small minority of the population, and the majority Muslims see them as ethnically different and not really Iranian. The Christian presence in this century has dwindled mainly due to emigration to the West.

Under Islam, the status of the Christian minorities was regulated by the millet system, in which Christian communities were recognized as protected "People of the Book", who submit to Muslim rule, pay the special poll tax (jizya), and in return are guaranteed internal autonomy under their religious leadership. There were limitations on public manifestations of their religion, proselytism was forbidden, and there were demeaning aspect meant to emphasize the superiority of Islam and the humiliation of the dhimmis. Basically they were accepted as second-rate subjects, not fully Iranian as not belonging to the Muslim Umma, but useful to the ruling dynasties for certain specialized services.

In the colonial era Assyrians and Armenians were tempted to look for protection and support of their national aspirations to the Christian Western powers who manipulated them but could not deliver on their promises. The resulting Christian "assertiveness" fuelled Muslim aggression and is one cause of the terrible genocide inflicted on Armenians (and Assyrians) in the Ottoman Empire which spilled over into the Iranian northwest territories.

In modern times many Christians, as well as other minority members, were drawn to extreme leftist groups, especially to the communist Tudeh party, as it was the only Iranian political party that promised them complete acceptance and equality. Armenian and Assyrian peasants took an active role in the 1945 uprising against the central government. With the collapse of the Azerbaijani and Kurdish republics many Armenians emigrated to the Soviet Republic of Armenia, while many Assyrians emigrated to the USA.

In the Islamic Republic Christians form a separate electorate, not eligible to vote for Muslim representatives, but only for a few Christian representatives to the Majlis who take up seats reserved for minorities. Muslims do not vote for Christian representatives, nor can Christians run as representatives of the general public.

 

History

Ancient Christianity was divided into three major groups: The Syriac speaking churches centred on Antioch and Edessa, the Greek speaking churches with centred on Constantinople and Alexandria, and the Latin speaking churches centred on Rome. These three groups accepted each other in spite of differences until the splits which started in the 5th century.

The Syriac churches separated from the Greek and Latin ones in two stages: the Nestorians separated at the council of Ephesus 431 AD, and the non-Chalcedonians (including the Armenian Church) at the Council of Chalcedon 451 AD.

 

Nestorians (Assyrians)

After the conversion of Constantine, Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire, the great enemy of Iran, thus making Christians in Iran suspect of sympathies for the enemy. The great break with the Byzantine and Western Churches came at the Council of Ephesus in 431 AD when Nestorius, then patriarch of Constantinople, was condemned for rejecting the title "Mother Of God" (Theotokos) for the Virgin Mary, and for stressing the two separate natures of Christ.

These breaks although officially over the controversy about the definition of Christ's nature, had much to do with political intrigue and power struggles within the Byzantine Empire as well as nationalistic feelings of the non-Greek elements in the East. The breakaway churches were severely persecuted by the Byzantines and their state Greek Orthodox Church, strengthening the ethnic character of the other churches.

From the 5th century onwards the main centres of the Nestorian church shifted to the Persian Empire as the Byzantines closed its first centre at Edessa. Though periodically facing severe persecutions from the Sassanians, the Nestorians expanded vigorously eastward for 800 years. By the time of the Muslim conquest in 642 some 25% of the Iranian population where Christian. The Nestorian Church was recognised as one of the protected religious communities by the Muslim Caliphate, and many of its members attained high government positions as well as contributing to the new Islamic culture by passing on much of the Christian Hellenistic and Syriac legacy by translating Greek and Syriac texts into Arabic. They were great scholars and physicians. The Patriarch of the East had his seat at Ctesiphon, the Sassanian capital, and was later moved to Baghdad, the Abbasid capital in 775 AD.

The Nestorians were the greatest missionary church of all times. By the 8th century there were Nestorian churches in Arabia, the Malabar coast of India, across the steppes of Central Asia (where some Turkic tribes became Christian), and into China. They almost succeeded in converting the Mongol rulers to Christianity, but these eventually embraced Islam and the Nestorians had to bear the consequences of their frustrated hopes.

In the 14th century Timurlane completely destroyed the Nestorian church in the East and greatly diminished its numbers in Iran. A small remnant survived mainly in Eastern Anatolia and the Zagros mountains. Hakkari near Lake Van was their centre for centuries. They were again severely persecuted and massacred by the Turks and Kurds during WWI. Many of those who fled to Iraq seeking British protection were then massacred by the Iraqi army in 1933. Their numbers in Turkey, Iraq and Iran have continued to dwindle over this century as many emigrated to the West to escape the continual pressures of Muslim society.

Now greatly reduced, the Assyrians number some 2 million worldwide, most of them in the USA and other Western countries. In the Middle East Iraq has the largest number (400,000) whilst Iran has only some 70,000 left.

The Chaldeans are the Assyrians who accepted Roman Catholic supremacy as a Uniate Church, a process which started in 1551 and was finalised in 1830. They hoped for help from the Western Catholic states and the powerful Church of Rome. They kept their Syriac liturgy and many other traditions. Together with the Nestorians they are known as Assyrians - a term that has ethnic and national as well as religious connotations.

The Nestorian rite is the East Syrian Rite in the Syriac language which grew originally out of the Jerusalem-Antioch liturgy and is also used by the Chaldaean (Assyrian-Catholic) church and the St Thomas churches of India. It is sometimes accompanied by cymbals and triangles and is always chanted.

 

Armenians

The Armenians are a nation and members of an ancient church, the Armenian Apostolic Church, founded in the 3rd century, which joined the non-Chalcedonian monophysite group of churches after the council of Chalcedon. The Armenian church was the state church of independent Armenia as long as it lasted, and is still the national church of all Armenians in the world, although there are significant Catholic and Protestant segments today.

Armenians suffered much persecution by various Muslim states starting with the Seljuk conquest of the Armenian heartland with its capital Ani in 1071 and culminating in the massacres and genocide by Ottoman Turks and Kurds during WWI.

Armenia was a battlefield between the Ottomans and the Safavid Iranians for two centuries, many Armenians living under Iranian dominion until the final settlement finally gave Eastern Anatolia to the Ottomans in the 17th century, whilst Russia occupied Iran's Caucasian provinces where many Armenians lived in the 19th. Shah Abbas moved many Armenians from Eastern Anatolia to Isfahan in the 17th century. Other Armenians lived scattered throughout the Northwestern Iranian provinces. The Armenian community became the largest Christian community in Iran, concentrated in the large cities and active in trade, craftsmanship and the professions.

Armenians have a long and proud history and a rich culture. Whilst Armenian nationalism was strong in neighbouring countries, Iranian Armenians took a prominent part in the early Iranian nationalist movement at the turn of the century. During WWI however Armenians favoured Russia who was seen as their only protector against the Turkish genocide of Armenians. Iranian nationalists on the other hand favoured the Central Powers including Turkey. Reza Shah in the 1930s suppressed all manifestations of Armenian distinctiveness, closing their presses and schools.

With the Armenian homeland a communist Soviet Republic, communism gained many Armenian adherents in Iran and furthered the suspicions of both nationalists and Islamists. Armenians are involved in Armenian nationalist movements and their integration in an Iranian national identity is difficult.

 

 

Summary

Christians in Iran have remained faithful to their churches despite 1300 years of pressure under Muslim majority rule. This pressure has marked them with many characteristics of minority status which include isolationism, inward-looking, passivity and inner hostility towards the majority and cultural separatism.

Under the Islamic Republic all Christian churches face a threat to their communal existence, violence, and state control. The Churches are under siege as Islam revives its influence in the state and degrades Christians to second rate citizenship as "protected" but also despised and persecuted minorities.

Two trends must be recognized as affecting the Christians of Iran since the 19th century:

a. Migration from the rural ares to the main cities and especially Tehran, both to escape the local deterioration in Muslim-Christian relations and to improve their economic prospects.

b. Emigration to the West - a constant move which attains its peaks at times of internal trouble such as the Revolution of 1979.

Both trends mean that less and less Iranians actually have social contact with Christians in many parts of Iran today.

The fact must be faced that the traditional Christian presence in Iran seems to be doomed, including the newer evangelical version. 

 

HISTORY OF MISSIONS

 Protestant mission work started in Iran in the 18th century when Moravian missionaries visited Persia hoping to convert Zoroastrians. In 1821-39 Swiss missionaries from Basel were stationed in Susi, the best known being Reverend K.G. Pfander who wrote Mizan al-Haqq and other polemical essays used among Muslims.

The American Presbyterians and the British Anglicans have the longest history of involvement and the most extensive institutional presence in Iran.

As a result of a report on the Nestorians published by Dr Joseph Wolff, a converted Jew, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions initiated a work in Urmia in 1834/35. This was followed by stations in Tehran, Tabriz, Hamadan, Kermanshah, Rasht, Qazvin and Mashad aimed at Assyrians, Armenians, Jews and Muslims. The work was later taken over by the American Presbyterians.

In Southern Iran British missionaries started work in the early 19th century. In 1812 Henry Martyn, a chaplain of the East India Company, completed a Farsi translation of the New Testament for evangelism among Muslims. In 1838 William Glen, a Scottish missionary, finished a translation of the Old Testament. This translation was later combined with Martyn's New Testament translation to make a complete Bible for Farsi readers.

The Anglicans started work in Isfahan in 1875. A comity agreement divided Iran into a northern region where the Americans worked, and a southern region where the Anglicans operated. The Archbishop of Canterbury maintained a separate mission to the Assyrian Christians in Urmia from the 1880s. By 1912 there was an Anglican diocese in Iran with its own Bishop. In 1961 Hasan Dehqani Tafti was consecrated the first Persian Bishop of the Episcopal Church of Iran.

A supporting role was played by the Bible Society which in 1901 opened an office for distributing Bibles in Bushehr and later moved its headquarters to Tehran.

The Brethren Assemblies established a congregation in Iran. The Assemblies of God, relative newcomers in 1965, were quite successful in establishing some churches in Iran and are still the most active group.

Assyrian and Armenian Protestants resisted receiving converts from Islam into their congregations; as their services were conducted in Assyrian and Armenian, it would have been difficult for such converts who spoke Farsi or Turkish to participate.

From the beginning of missionary work the main avenues to winning converts were evangelism, medical services, and education. Evangelism involved distribution of Bibles, Scripture portions, and Christian literature; summer conferences, personal evangelism and revival meetings. Later radio broadcasts and correspondence courses were added.

Hospitals and clinics generated much goodwill and met real needs. Eventually the high cost of maintaining them and the development of government and private health facilities led to abandonment of medicine as an arm of mission work.

Modern education was first introduced by missionaries, initially for educating the children of the Assyrian and Armenian communities. Alborz College in Tehran founded by Presbyterians, and Stuart Memorial College in Isfahan founded by Anglicans were effective channels for influencing young Iranians.

WWI destroyed much of the work as northwestern Iran was devastated by Ottoman, Russian and British armies, resulting in starvation and disease and emigration. In the inter-war years the schools again educated many Christian children and children of the Muslim elites. The hard working missionaries impressed the Iranians and helped pave the way for the Pahlavi-Western alliance of the post-war period. On the other hand they helped train only the elite, Westernizing and alienating them from traditional Iran.

Christian education had a secular, scientific and national content that was approved of by the authorities as signifying progress. Muslim enrollment increased after 1932 and the mission schools trained hundreds of Iranians to become government and business leaders. They stressed dignity of work and service, democracy, equality of women, and love of country. Muhammad Rezah Shah in 1960 expressed his appreciation for the educational work of the missionaries.

With the growth of nationalism under Reza Shah all Western educational institutions were taken over by the government or were closed in 1940.

Other Christian activities, particularly those connected with relief and rehabilitation also enhanced the climate for evangelism.

In the second half of the 20th century a wide range of missionary organizations worked in Iran. They included the CMA (1935); World-Wide Evangelization Crusade (1963); Operation Mobilization (1964); the Armenian Missionary Association of America; the Baptist Bible Fellowship International (1966); Campus Crusade (1967); Christian Echoes National Ministry; Deutsche Orient Mission; Go-Ye Fellowship; the American Messianic Fellowship (1977). With the advent of the Islamic Republic the missionary societies withdrew their personnel from Iran.

Missionaries had much more success in converting Assyrians and Armenians than Muslims. The original purpose of the early mission in Urmia was to revive the Nestorian Church and make it the agent of evangelism among Muslims in Asia. The hope that Nestorians would carry on evangelical work was disappointed as initial support from the patriarch turned to opposition.

A group of Nestorian Evangelicals broke away from the church and formed the Evangelical Church in 1855. In 1862 Deacon Isaac, brother of the Patriarch, along with three bishops and a large number of priests and deacons joined the Evangelical community.

In 1870 the work was transferred to the Presbyterian Church and continued despite opposition by Nestorians and competition from Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox missionaries. On the eve of WWI the group numbered 2,000. During the war the Assyrian community suffered severely and most were scattered among the larger towns of northern Iran where Syriac-speaking Protestant churches were formed. In 1933-34 they joined with other communities of converts, including Armenians, Jews, Muslims and Zoroastrians, to form Kelisa-ye enjili-e Iran (Evangelical Church of Iran).

Protestant missionaries originally devoted little attention to the Armenian community. When conversion of Muslims grew too difficult the Armenian community became an object of evangelism. Despite strong opposition from the Armenian Apostolic hierarchy by the end of the 19th century there were six organized Armenian congregations. Since the Islamic Revolution many Armenians have joined Protestant churches.

The London Society for the Propagation of Christianity among the Jews started work in Iran in 1844. At about the same time Presbyterian missionaries started working among Jews in Hamadan, resulting in a small community of Jewish believers most of whom later moved to Tehran or emigrated to the West. The Jewish converts, though few in numbers, played an important part as leaders in both the Evangelical and the Episcopal churches.

In 1938 the Evangelical Church of Iran had 32 congregations and 2,560 members (Assyrians, Armenians, Jews, Muslims and Zoroastrians), whilst the Episcopal Church of Iran had 1,200 members, mostly Muslim converts with a few Jews and Armenians.

In 1950 the Evangelical Church in Tehran was the largest indigenous Protestant church in the Middle East, with 815 members, of whom 285 were Assyrians, 260 Assyrians, 160 Muslims, 100 Jews and 10 Zoroastrians.

By 1970 some 15,000 of the Christians in Iran were Protestant. The Episcopal Church of Iran had 7000 members, the Evangelical Church of Iran 3,000 (of whom 55% were Assyrian and 21% Armenian). The Assyrian and Armenian branches of the Assemblies of God included 2,200 members.

With the advent of the Islamic Republic the missionary societies withdrew their personnel from Persia.

 

 

 

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

REFERENCE

Encyclopedia Britannica

Encyclopedia Of Religion

Encyclopedia Iranica

Atlas Of The Islamic World

The Cambridge History Of Iran, Vol. 7, CH. 20: Religious Forces In Twentieth Century Iran, Cambridge, CUP 1991

Johnstone, P. Operation World, Carlisle: OM Publishing, 1993

 

 

BOOKS

Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 1982

Aroian & Mitchell, The Modern Middle East And North Africa, New York, Macmillan, 1984

Ayoob, M. The Two Faces Of Political Islam: Iran And Pakistan Compared, The Strategic And

Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra.

Ayubi, N. Political Islam, 1991

Beck, L. Nomad: A year In The Life Of A Qashqai Tribesman In Iran, 1991

Benad & Khalizad, The Government Of God - Iran's Islamic Republic, New York: Columbia

University Press, 1984

Bonnie & Keddie, eds. Modern Iran: The Dialectics Of Continuity And Change, Albany: SUNY,

1981

Cleveland, A History Of The Modern Middle East

Cottam, R.W. Nationalism In Iran, Pittsburgh: UPP, 1979

Eickelman, D.F. The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach, New Jersey: Prentice Hall,

1989

Ellis, The Vatican, Islam, And The Middle East, Syracuse,New York: SUP, 1987

Enayat, H. Modern Islamic Political Thought, Austin: University Of Texas Press, 1982

Esposito, J. ed., Voices Of Resurgent Islam. 1983

Falaturi, A. ed., Der Islamische Orient, Koln:Impressum, 1990

Farsoun & Mashayekh, eds. Iran: Political Culture In The Islamic Republic, London,

Routledge, 1992

Franz, E. Minderheiten In Iran: Dokumentation zur Ethnographie und Politik, Hamburg: German

Orient Institute, 1981

Frye, R.N. The Golden Age Of Persia

Gastril, R.D. ed., Freedom In The World, Freedom House, 1980, pp 127-156 "The Struggle For

Democracy In Iran".

Graham, R. Iran, The Illusion Of Power, London: Croom Helm, 1978

Gellner, E. Culture, Identity And Politics, 1987

Greussing, K. Religion Und Politik Im Iran, Frankfurt: Syndikat, 1981

Hefner, R.W. Conversion To Christianity, Berkley: UCP 1993

Hilf, R. ed., Weltmacht Islam, Munchen: BLPB 1988

Irfani, S. Revolutionary Islam In Iran, London, Zed Books, 1983

Keddie, N.R. ed., Religion And Politics In Iran: Shi`ism From Quietism To Revolution, New

Haven: Yale University Press, 1983

Keddie & Cole, eds., Shi`ism And Social Protest, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986

Keddie, N.R. Roots Of Revolution: An Interpretive History Of Modern Iran, New Haven: Yale

University Press, 1983

Keddie & Hooglund, eds., The Iranian Revolution And The Islamic Republic, Washington:

Middle East Institute, 1982

Kedourie, E. Politics In The Middle East

Khomeini, R. Islam And Revolution, tr. Algar, H. Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981

Lewis, B. The Shaping Of The Modern Middle East, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994

Livingstone, G. Planting Churches In Muslim Cities, Baker

Lyko, D. Grundung, Wachstum Und Leben Der Evangelischen Christlichen Kirchen In Iran,

Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1964

Milani, M. The Making Of Iran's Islamic Revolution, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988

Mottahedeh, R. The Mantle Of The Prophet 1985

Norton, A.R. ed., Civil Society In The Middle East, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995

Rahneema, A. Pioneers Of Islamic Revival, London, Zed Books, 1994

Rasooli & Allen, The Bitter And The Bold, Westchester IL: MD Publications, 1991

Rubin, B. Iran's Future: Crises, Contingencies, And Continuities, Washington: Foreign

Policy Institute, John Hopkins University, 1987

Sachedina, A.A. "Activist Shi`ism In Iran, Iraq, And Lebanon," in: Marty & Appleby, ads.,

Fundamentalisms Observed, Chicago: UCP, 1991

Schwartz, R.M. The Structure Of Christian Muslim Relations In Contemporary Iran, Halifax,

Nova Scotia, St Mary's University, 1985

Siddiqi, K. ed., The Islamic Revolution In Iran, London: Open Press, 1980

Tapper, R. Shahsevan Nomads Of Moghan

Tapper, R. Pasture And Politics

Tapper, R. Nomads And Nomadism

Tapper, R. ed., The Conflict of Tribe And State in Iran And Afghanistan, 1983

Tonkin, McDowell & Chapman, ed., History And Ethnicity, 1989

Vaziri, M. Iran As Imagined Nation, New York: Paragon House, 1993

Waterfield, R.E. Christianity In Persia, London: Allen & Unwin, 1973

Zubaida, S. Islam, The People And The State, 1993

 

 

ARTICLES

Ashraf, A. The Crisis Of National And Ethnic Identities In Contemporary Iran, Iranian

Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1,2, 1993

Dehqani-Tafti, H.B. Prospects For The Church In Iran, International Review Of Mission, Vol.

44, 1955

Tapper, R. "Holier Than Thou: Islam in Three Tribal Societies",

Zirinsky, M.P. A Panacea For The Ills Of The Country: American Presbyterian Education In

Inter-War Iran, Iranian Studies, Vol. 26, No.1-2, 1993