a. The two ejection seats were found adjacent to the wreckage site both clear of the burn area. The RSO seat was found 220 feet to the left of the pilot seat and 500 feet left of the cockpit area. The pilot's seat was 300 feet to the left of the cockpit body. There was no evidence of heat damage to either seat from the wreckage fire splash.

b. The two crew members landed in line with the prevailing winds and the general direction of flight of the aircraft. The pilot landed 3 miles from the wreck site and was dragged an additional .55 miles to a fence line. The RSO landed just short of 2 1/2 miles from the wreck, 3/4 miles to the left of the pilot and was dragged 700 feet into a fence line.

c. Analysis of the locations of the seats, canopies and crew members at ground contact indicate the following:

(1) The close proximity of the seats places them virtually in the same flight path on descent. The location of the aircraft canopies indicate very low forward velocity. This also indicates that possibly the difference in direction from the main crash site was caused by different vehicle attitude at time of ejection. The distances from the wreckage indicates that a very short time existed between the pilot and RSO ejections.

(2) Winds reported at the time of the accident were 45 knots, 310 degrees at 25,000 feet and 15 to 25 knots with gusts to 29 knots at 303 degrees on the ground. The difference in aneroid operations for man-seat separation between the pilot and RSO indicate the pilot having approximately one extra minute in the chute. This would easily account for the .69 miles which the pilot traveled relative to the RSO.

d. The best estimate for the altitude of ejection and sequence of events that can be deduced from available information is ejection at approximately 25,000 feet with the RSO first out and the pilot following within approximately 10 seconds.

3. Review of Egress Training and information available

a. A review of the flight handbook instructions does not reveal specific instructions for manual seat separation during and ejection. All mention is toward emergency ground egress. In addition ejection instructions are scattered throughout handbook in a confusing fashion and the crewmember could fail to locate information required for proper use of equipment.

b. Questioning of both crew members indicates that the manual seat separation area was either not covered in sufficient depth in egress training or not correct at all.

c. Further the fact that the seat could rotate up to 60 rpm on the end of the bridle lines to the swivel was not related to these crewmembers. This information was available locally from seat test reports.

d. Both crew members stated they had difficulty in differentiating the functions of this seat from the functions of the other systems they are exposed to in daily flight. Although PSD conducts continued visual and oral education directed to the specific system crewmembers are to fly for the day, in an emergency as in this one, the crewmember might encounter a delay in sorting out the proper procedures. On a low altitude ejection this could be fatal. Reversion to the older system could produce and action that would also be fatal.