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Yet, ironically, as Plan Colombia gains adherents in the
United States and the European Union, Colombians seem increasingly fatigued
and skeptical about Pastrana's ability to bring about domestic peace.
LOS ANGELES TIMES
Sunday, 7 November 1999
Colombia's leader juggles duty to country and fighting drug war
By Sergio Munoz
HOUSTON -- A year ago, Colombia was deemed a pariah state by the
U.S. Congress. Today, it is the largest recipient of U.S. aid in the hemisphere
and the third-largest in the world, after Israel and Egypt. This tectonic
shift in policy is largely because of the June 1998 election of Andres
Pastrana as president.
With the support of both the White House and the GOP-controlled Congress,
U.S. assistance may increase even more because of a growing consensus that
Colombia's problems pose a threat to regional security.
Colombia has been at war with itself for generations. From 1948 through
the mid-'60s, as many as 200,000 Colombians died in the political instability
known as la violencia. During that time, two powerful Marxist guerrilla
groups emerged. Their war against the government in Bogota continues to
this day.
Revolutionary violence is not the only problem. Right-wing paramilitary
forces, created by landowners in the 1980s in response to the guerrillas,
are now an independent source of terror. Even more destabilizing are powerful
drug cartels that virtually run such Colombian cities as Medellin and Cali.
Until recently, the country's economy was relatively stable. Today,
it is mired in deep recession, with 20% unemployment and more than 1 million
people displaced.
To manage these problems, Colombians turned to Pastrana, the son of
late President Misael Pastrana Borrero. A former journalist, Andres Pastrana,
45, was himself a victim of the terror. In 1988, he was kidnapped and briefly
held by drug lords when they attempted to force then-president Virgilio
Barco Vargas to stop extraditing drug suspects to the United States.
To rescue his country from left-wing, right-wing and drug violence,
Pastrana has devised Plan Colombia, an ambitious and costly endeavor. But
his supporters are many, including officials in Washington. Pastrana and
the U.S. political establishment believe that peace can be achieved and
that Colombia an become a major regional power.
Last month, negotiations to end the 30-year conflict between the largest
guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and
the government began in earnest. Talks with the National Liberation Army
(ELN), the other guerrilla group, are underway in Cuba.
Yet, ironically, as Plan Colombia gains adherents in the United States
and the European Union, Colombians seem increasingly fatigued and skeptical
about Pastrana's ability to bring about domestic peace.
Pastrana is married and has two children. Educated in Colombia and the
United States, he can charm an audience in both English and Spanish. He
was in Houston last week to drum up foreign investment. By the time the
question-and-answer session ended, as many as 500 business people gave
him a standing ovation.
Question: Why should U.S. taxpayer money be spent in military and economic
assistance for Colombia?
Answer: First of all, I would not call it assistance. What we are doing
is fighting against the illicit trade of drugs, and that is something that
affects us all. Drug trafficking is the engine of all violence in Colombia;
most of the so-called self-defense groups, the guerrillas and even some
common criminals are financed by the drug cartels. We are asking many nations,
not only the U.S., to join in a partnership in which we all pitch in. Colombia
is putting forward $ 4 billion, but we need another $ 3.5 billion. This
as a joint venture to put an end to this tragedy called drug trafficking.
Q: How much of that $ 3.5 billion do you expect will come from the U.S.?
A: As much as possible, but it should be at least half of it. Colombia
spends 40% of its budget fighting the shipment of drugs into the United
States and Europe. This is money that we could spend building schools and
roads and bridges and dams in our country. We have to understand that this
plan is predicated on a partnership whose success depends on the resources
we have available.
Q: What should Washington expect in return for this money?
A: Our goal is to break the spine of the cartels, which finance most
of the violence in my country. I know that if we have enough resources
we could do more stings like Operation Millennium, which netted the arrest
of more than 30 drug lords. These men were responsible for shipping about
30 tons of drugs monthly to the U.S. And by catching them, we disrupted
the flow of at least half the cocaine sent to the U.S.--considering annual
consumption now is about 300 tons.
Q: Many Colombians say you embarked on this war against drugs under
pressure from the U.S. Is that true?
A: The main victims of the drug traffickers are the people of Colombia.
Some people mistakenly believe that drug trafficking has helped the country's
economy. Well, let me tell you, it has done nothing positive. The violence
associated with drugs has killed our best journalists, soldiers, policemen,
judges and politicians. Not only that, we are now beginning to feel the
effects of drug consumption in Colombia. Drug trafficking is the engine
of violence, which in the southern part of the country is fueled by the
left, and in the north is sponsored by the right.
Q: Are you saying leftist guerrillas in Colombia are drug traffickers?
A: The guerrillas have a political weight in Colombia, and we cannot
take that away from them. They make a lot of money from illicit drugs,
but they are not a cartel. They do not sell, commercialize or export drugs,
but they guard the land where coca grows and charge a tax for it, and this
brings in money to their coffers.
Q: Will this long war among Colombians ever end?
A: Yes, I believe we can end the conflict, but it will take time. Peace
cannot be achieved in 24 hours. I believe we Colombians want everything
done immediately. This attitude creates false expectations, and some may
believe that peace is around the corner. But that is not the case. We have
to build up peace, and that will take time.
Q: Some people in the U.S. are opposed to the idea of giving money to
the Colombian armed forces because they see them linked to the paramilitary
forces. Is this true?
A: If you look at the record of human-rights violations since I began
my term you'll see it's quite different from that in the immediate past.
I've been working hard to clean up the record of the armed forces, and
many generals who have been accused of human-rights violations are no longer
in the armed forces. The claims regarding abuses have been kept to a minimum.
But I agree we should remain vigilant. That is why we embarked on a
complete restructuring of the armed forces. We are so committed to a clean
slate that we have assigned $ 60 million to educate, promote and inculcate
respect for human rights within the armed forces.
Q: Some of your neighbors complain that the conflict in Colombia poses
a national security threat to them. Is that true?
A: Colombia does not present a continental threat. We have told the
neighboring countries that we must reinforce the mechanisms, contacts and
exchanges that may allow us to reactivate military cooperation in our borders.
Yet, smugglers move arms and chemical precursors and planes from one country
to the other, and that is why we should activate the security systems we
have in place. We have not had a single problem with Peru or Ecuador in
seven years. We have not had any problems with Venezuela in a year and
a half.
Q: The Venezuelans, however, have been blunt. President Hugo Chavez
has said he'll deal with the Colombian guerrillas because they are the
ones who hold power in Colombia. How do you respond to that?
A: The Colombian ministry of foreign affairs has informed the Venezuelan
authorities that Andres Pastrana governs in Colombia with the mandate of
the people. Furthermore, we have said we won't tolerate any interference
on the internal affairs of Colombia.
Q: Has Cuba's Fidel Castro played a role in helping you with the guerrillas?
A: We have said that anything that Cuba can do to help us achieve peace
we deem important. Cuba has played a very important role in the peace process,
helping us pull it along when it's been stuck. Castro has helped in a discreet
way, avoiding a protagonist role in this delicate and complicated negotiation.
His public statements have been direct and clear. For example, he said
that Colombia's problems cannot be solved by rising up in arms, they require
political negotiation.
Q: Let's go back to Operation Millennium. Are these drug lords extraditable
to the United States?
A: The U.S. has asked for the extradition of all 30, and as none of
them are charged with a crime in Colombia, the office of the attorney general
has petitioned the Supreme Court to extradite them. So we are waiting for
the decision.
Q: Every time drug lords fear being extradited, they retaliate with
terrorist acts, such as widespread bomb attacks. Are you afraid they'll
do this again?
A: No. If they explode one bomb, I'll extradite them immediately. The
law allows the president this prerogative when he declares there is a domestic
commotion affecting the country.
Q: Aerial spraying to eradicate drugs has been a failure on many fronts.
The people reject it, it creates ecological problems and the areas where
drugs are grown are cultivated every year. Why do you do it? Is it due
to U.S. pressure?
A: I am not sure I agree with that characterization, because we can
argue whether aerial spraying has been a failure. You have to consider
also what would have happened if we had not fumigated. The problem is that,
in the four years before my term, coca cultivation doubled and we have
yet to find out why it happened. Also, on this issue you have to differentiate
between the social problem created when drug traffickers hire poor peasants
to grow coca leaves in their small parcels and we fumigate that land. The
long-term solution, however, is to create alternative crops for these poor
peasants. Regarding coca cultivation in large holdings of land, fumigation
has proven a huge success.
Q: The U.S. Congress has warned you that the new U.S.-trained and financed
antinarcotics battalion should not engage in combat against the insurgents.
But given that many coca cultivation areas are under guerrilla control,
is it possible to avoid confrontation with the guerrillas?
A: This battalion was created as a rapid-deployment task force to attack
whomever is protecting the fields--whether they are self-defense groups
or guerrillas. In four years, we will have between 4,000 and 5,000 men
well trained for their task, with a clean slate in human rights and zero
corruption. The armed forces will concentrate on fighting the insurgents,
the police will fight the drug traffickers and this battalion will support
the police.
Q: Who are the biggest supporters of your plan in the United States?
A: We have the full support of the White House and bipartisan support
in Congress. Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and Speaker of the House
Dennis Hastert sent a letter to President Clinton urging him to support
Colombia. Fifteen days later, House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt did
exactly the same.
Q: Yet, there are some members of Congress who insist on narrowing the
assistance to combating drugs.
A: Yes, there are some differences of opinion. That is why we insist
that we have to look at the military and economic aspects of the problem.
We have a drug-traffic problem and a social problem; 55% of the money in
the Plan Colombia would be devoted to the modernization and reform of the
armed forces, and the other 45% would be used for social investment.
Q: You've been criticized for ceding a big chunk of land to the guerrillas.
Is that criticism fair?
A: No one has given up any territory. What we agreed to do is to create,
under the law, a demilitarized zone to hold negotiations, because the guerrillas
did not want to negotiate outside Colombia. Besides, most of the accounts
on the size of the area are grossly exaggerated. The area where the FARC
is amounts to one quarter of 1% of the national territory; in terms of
population, it comprises 90,000 people, not even one-quarter of 1% of the
40 million people in the country. We should clarify that once and for all.
Sergio Munoz is an editorial writer for The Times.
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